

THE
QUARTERLY
CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.

VOLUME VIII.—NUMBER II.

JUNE, 1836.

ART. I.—BROUGHAM'S NATURAL THEOLOGY.

A Discourse of Natural Theology, showing the nature of the evidence and the advantage of the study. BY HENRY LORD BROUGHAM, F.R.S., and Member of the National Institute of France. Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & Blanchard. 1835.

NATURAL THEOLOGY is the basis on which the proof of revealed religion must rest. The bible declares the will of God more fully, and in many respects, more distinctly than his works; but the fact of the existence of one supreme benevolent Jehovah, must be learned from the volume of nature; and this fact must be admitted, before we can arrive at the conclusive evidence of the divine authority of revelation. It is not the peculiar glory of the bible, that it discloses the existence and perfections of God; "for the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." Its peculiar glory lies in the grand scheme of man's redemption, through the vicarious sufferings of the Lord Jesus Christ: "bringing life and immortality to light." Connected with this scheme, collaterally or consequentially, are the doctrines of the trinity, the special agency of the Holy Spirit, regeneration, and in short all those leading truths called the doctrines of grace. These are purely matters of revelation. The light of nature would never have disclosed them, and could therefore never have enforced the peculiar duties which spring from them. But it is from the facts which natural theology teaches, that we prove the divine origin and authority of the holy scriptures, which unfold these peculiar obligations.

To establish the authority of a revelation, it must be shown, that its author is one and supreme, and that he possesses infinite

natural and moral perfection. With the bible only as the source of evidence, though there might be an approach to probability, there could not be the complete proof, that these attributes belonged to the being who gave it. The whole system of its doctrines and declarations, is indeed consistent and harmonious with itself; not one principle can be found in conflict with another, and thus the stamp of unity of design is set upon every one of its pages. This shows, that if there was more than one author, there was at least concert of action; and might go far, perhaps, to prove, that it had its origin from one mind, and that mind intent upon one great object. But this would not prove, that there were not other minds equal or greater than itself, and consequently could not establish its own supremacy but by its declarations. It could not prove, that the author of the bible had a *right* to say: "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me." If, also, the harmony of the principles and duties of the bible, with the nature and the wants of man, together with all the kindness and sympathy which are conspicuous in its declarations, might seem to evince benevolence, and go far to prove for its author the exercise of good will towards our race, and thus furnish evidence which might strongly preponderate in favor of trusting it; yet could there not thus be found the conclusive proof, that it was an unshaken "rock of safety." If its author be not the supreme Lord of the universe, all these promises are delusive, and all this apparent kindness deceptive. They may be the offspring of malevolence, designed to end in disappointment; or, at most, kind expressions of regard, from one who has no power to put them in execution, and who cannot therefore be safely trusted?

Is it said, that the miracles and predictions with which this revelation is connected, prove its divine origin? In connection with the facts of natural theology, they do prove it beyond all question. But no reasoning from miracles or prophecy can be conclusive without presupposing the supremacy and benevolence of their author, the complete proof of which is to be found only in the facts of natural theology. Admit, that miracles were wrought, and predictions uttered, which have been fulfilled thousands of years after their enunciation, and what is the amount of proof that we can derive from such an admission? May not all this power and knowledge be possessed by one who is not himself supreme? Yet were he supreme, this power would not prove him benevolent. The argument from miracles and prophecy, is but of the same nature,—that a God of benevolence would not exert, nor permit any other being to exert, this power in such a manner as must deceive his creatures. But this argument presupposes both supremacy and benevolence, and the bare existence of the miracle does not conclusively prove either. There is astonishing power,

altogether beyond human comprehension, but it does not prove supreme power in the immediate agent, nor that it has been exerted for a benevolent purpose.

The internal evidences of revelation accord with, and corroborate the proof from natural theology, but taken alone they can rise no higher than strong probability. We need a broader field, a wider region of facts and evidence, than the simple book alone affords, to prove its binding authority over the conscience. But when we look abroad over the universe, and "from the things that are made" learn "the power and Godhead" of their author, and thus establish the supremacy and unity of the Deity,—his benevolence and omnipotence,—we have safe ground on which to rest unshaken the proof that the bible is his book, and that it is safe to trust it. If he gave it, he has power to sustain it and fulfil its promises. That he did give it, both his power and benevolence assure us; for they would forever prevent any other being from making our race the necessary victims of what were else so dreadful a delusion.

Natural theology, therefore, is not to be considered merely as the handmaid of revealed religion. It lays the only substantial foundation on which we can rest the proof of the divine authority of the bible, which is henceforth to be the only rule of faith and practice. Nor is this any disparagement of the bible. Its proof is as conclusive, and the elements which compose it lie open as fully to observation, and come as directly from God, as if they had been gathered from its own internal evidence. God has joined his works and his word together, and both illustrate and confirm each other. Every thing, therefore, which brings out the facts of the book of nature more distinctly, and applies them to the great objects about which natural theology is conversant, is of direct and important bearing upon all the religious hopes and interests of a lost world. Any attempt to divorce the works from the word of God, and through fear of disparaging, or under pretense of exalting divine revelation, to cut it off from all connection with natural theology, is doing thereby the greatest injury to the cause which it pretends to subserve. Says Mr. Locke: "He that takes away *reason* to make way for *revelation*, puts out the light of both, and does much about the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope."

With these views, we cheerfully record our grateful remembrance of many venerable names, whose labors have cultivated and enriched this field of inquiry. Ray, Derham, Bentley, Clarke, Paley, Dick, and others, have applied their vigorous minds to the subject of natural theology, with much benefit to the cause of divine truth, and lasting fame to themselves. "The Analogy of

Natural and Revealed Religion to the order of Nature," by bishop Butler, taking the ground, that the soundest reasoning for the truth of revelation, presupposes the facts of natural theology, is one of the most able and rigidly argumentative works in our language. We rejoice also to see this number increasing by the addition of recent names. The munificent bequest of the late earl of Bridgewater, has called out some of the highest talent of both England and Scotland on this subject. The assignment of different parts, covering a wide region of investigation, to different learned men, has produced many new and interesting facts, and applied them with great effect to the demonstrations of natural theology. As it regards unity of style and method, the great work considered as a whole, has been doubtless injured by this division; yet in relation to the multiplicity of facts, and thus to the number of separate independent arguments for the existence of one supreme, intelligent, first cause, the evil, probably, has been more than counterbalanced by the appropriation. It might seem, that little was left for subsequent investigation, in the direct line of gathering facts from the material world, which evince design, and thus afford the deduction of the existence of the great Designer. But an examination of the *basis* upon which the whole reasoning proceeds, and the entire superstructure of natural theology rests, is of great importance. The nature of the evidence, the foundation of the whole science, has been too much overlooked; while many minds of no ordinary discernment and influence, discard the whole subject, and pretend to feel no conviction from its labored demonstrations.

On this account we rejoiced to learn, that one who is in many respects among the most gifted minds of the age, had taken up this subject for examination and discussion in this precise point of view. No man has drawn upon himself the fixed gaze of the civilized world more universally, or more intently, than Lord Brougham. From the time when he stood before the British nation as the legal adviser and advocate of the late queen in her unhappy trial and onward, as member of Parliament, lord-high chancellor, and speaker of the house of lords, taking the highest seat in the kingdom to which a citizen can aspire, he has been connected with the most important events of his country's history, and filled a most prominent position in the view of the world. His political enemies of the titled aristocracy, and the writers of the London Quarterly, have affected to hold in contempt his talent and learning, and maintained, that with all his readiness, and activity, and success, there was in his mind nothing solid and of sterling value; that with all his quickness of perception, and dexterity in seizing upon every advantageous point, his mind was neither original, well-disciplined, nor self-

balanced. But we are far from setting so low an estimate upon his talents; nor do we see how it can reflect other than a very equivocal sort of credit upon those who thus depreciate his intellect, since by the force of it alone, he has taken his place over their heads. The whole history of Lord Brougham discloses a mind with distinct conception of its object, quick decision, rapid development of resources, and prompt execution; nor has any man of his generation kept the world in greater astonishment at the diversified application of genius and talent. While he held the great seal of England, and sustained all the cares incident to that office, and even when as leader in the cabinet, amid the dangers of reform and the side winds of aristocracy and radicalism, the helm of the nation was in his hand, he found leisure to give his attention to a variety of other pursuits and engagements. Contributions of political, literary, or scientific character, to the principal journals, were made from his pen; and in his connection with "the society for the diffusion of useful knowledge," his mind was a constant source of direct and varied instruction to all those who read its successive publications. No one has done more to bring the elements of useful knowledge within the reach of the laboring population of England, or contributed more effectually to the elevation of that lower strata of mind in European society, where it might feel the genial sun and dew of heaven, and be made to smile beneath the hand of moral and intellectual cultivation. We doubt not, that his mind is better adapted to the exercise of logical discussion and debate, and rapid despatch in the details of official business, than to patient, careful, philosophical investigation. Nor can it be denied, that amid such a diversity of application, many erroneous opinions, superficial views, and perhaps some gross misconceptions, and entire failures, may justly have been alledged against him. Some things in the work at the head of this article, give full opportunity for certain of these charges, notwithstanding its general force and clearness. Yet to say, that this is a proof that Lord Brougham is destitute of sound talent, and much science, is to fly in the face of a thousand opposing evidences. Would there were half the evidence for his evangelical piety, that there is for his talent; and that the serious and earnest spirit pervading "the Discourse," characterized the man as clearly as the learning which it discloses; we should then feel far better satisfied as to his title to the hope of the christian. What is to be the issue of his present reverse of royal, and, in some degree at least, of popular favor; what are his present plans, or hopes, or employments; or whether the half uttered whispers, questioning the sobriety of his habits, are well or ill founded, we have no certain means of information. We turn our attention from the man more particularly to the work itself, which is before us.

Its object is not so much to prove the existence of an intelligent first cause, from the many marks of design in the universe around us, as to show that the study which does this is properly "*an inductive science*."

'This discourse is not a treatise of natural theology ! It has not for its design an exposition of the doctrines whereof natural theology consists. But its object is, first, to explain the nature of the evidence upon which it rests,—to show that it is a science, the truths of which are discovered by induction, like the truths of natural and moral philosophy,—that it is a branch of science partaking of the nature of each of those great divisions of human knowledge, and not merely closely allied to them both. Secondly, the object of the discourse is to explain the advantages attending this study.' *Introd.* p. 10.

The reasons for undertaking this work, are thus stated, in the dedication to John Charles, Earl Spencer :

'The composition of this discourse was undertaken in consequence of an observation which I had often made, that scientific men were apt to regard the study of natural religion as little connected with philosophical pursuits. Many of the persons to whom I allude, were men of religious habits of thinking ; others were free from any disposition towards scepticism, rather because they had not so much discussed the subject, than because they had formed fixed opinions upon it after inquiry. But the bulk of them relied little upon natural theology, which they seemed to regard as a speculation built rather on fancy than on argument : or, at any rate, as a kind of knowledge quite different from either physical or moral science. It therefore appeared to me desirable to define more precisely, than had yet been done, the place and the claims of natural theology among the various branches of human knowledge.' pp. v. vi.

With this object,—“to show that natural theology is a science, the truths of which are discovered by induction, like the truths of natural and moral philosophy,”—and these motives to undertake it, Lord Brougham proceeds to adduce a variety of examples designed as proofs of his position.

1. Our *first* object will be, to state the nature of the argument from design ; and thus correct an error into which his lordship has fallen, as it regards what is meant by *inductive science*. Throughout the “Discourse,” he has applied the term “*induction*” to cases to which in strict accuracy it is inapplicable. He makes the name cover *all cases*, where individual facts are adduced, and inferences are derived from them. But it has reference only to a peculiar manner, and a distinct object in the use of particular facts. Induction brings together facts of the *same class*, noting their agreement, and rejecting all, however similar in appearance, that are not in fact alike, and from the union of the

whole, deduces some *general principle* or *rule* respecting the nature, properties or relations of the things thus included. Its object is to advance from *particulars* to *generals*, and from *less* to *more general*; and thus, by careful steps, arrive at the *most general* notions, which Lord Bacon calls "*forms*," or "*formal causes*." For this purpose, those particulars only in which there is an agreement can be brought together. We include under one general term, all fowls which have *webbed feet*, and put them within the order of *ANSERES*. We have a more general name for all that have *wings* and *feathers*, and call the whole class *BIRDS*. We can become still more general, and include all creatures which have life and voluntary motion, under the comprehensive name of *ANIMAL*. But in each case, we must bring only those individuals that are *alike* under these classifications. The general name would be wrongly applied to any that disagreed in the distinctive marks of the class in which they were to be included. So we apply heat to water, and find it enlarges its bulk. We go on with the *same* thing, and apply it to all liquids,—to all metals,—to all substances; and we find the same results in all, and thus make the general deduction: "Heat expands all bodies." By an indefinite number of the *same* facts, we have gained a *general rule*. In proportion to the number of particulars embraced in the induction, is the probable correctness of the rule; but if any subsequent examination finds one fact in direct opposition, the rule is effectually subverted. Hasty conclusions have thus often been formed, which further examination proved unwarranted. For a long time after the investigations of geologists had discovered numerous organic remains in the different strata of rock formations, no relics of human skeletons had been found except amid the sand and gravel of post-diluvial origin. In their haste to sustain a theory, they jumped to the conclusion, that there were no stratified fossil human bones; and from this made the further deduction, that the race of man could not have been contemporary with these formations, and the living existence of the organic remains entombed within them. Later examination, it would seem, has proved the falsehood of this general conclusion.* Here was inductive

* "Donati found human bones in the breccias of the Dalmatian mountains, which has since been confirmed by the repeated examination of Germar. Canobio found them in a calcareous tufa near Genoa. Bulletin Univers. 1826. p. 22. Boue saw them in the year 1823, behind the lake of Baden; and Count Razoumowski, in Lower Austria, mixed with quadrupeds partly *extinct*. Count Breuner found them near Krems, in Lower Austria. M. Sterberg met with them at Kostritz, in Saxony; others have been seen among the Karaibs and the inhabitants of Chili. Bull. Univ. 1830. pp. 296, 162. In France, human bones were found a short time since in two caverns, in the departments of Gard at Poudre, and of Jouvignarque, mixed with mamalia ones; others were found at Bize, in a black mud, mixed with those of *lost* animals. Bull. Univ. 1829. p. 237. M.

reasoning,—the bringing together of many facts of the same kind, —but because the examination had been too partial, the general deduction was overthrown by later observation; if the facts mentioned are so.

Induction, therefore, is the bringing together of many particulars of the *same class*, and from them deducing a *general law*. But that is not inductive reasoning which adduces *different* things for the same *particular* purpose; as when a variety of *different* things are brought together, to prove the *particular* facts of what a person did, or where he was, at a given time. Lord Brougham has used the term, as if it were inclusive of *all* cases, where facts are collected and deductions made from them. To call natural theology, therefore, “an inductive science,” is not strictly correct. If it be admitted, that the order and harmony which allows so many things to be classed under a general rule, is evidence of design, and may therefore be used as such in the proofs of God's existence; yet it is but a poor compliment to natural theology, to labor the point, that it has a right to these comparatively limited and far-fetched traces of design, when the whole universe of adaptation and contrivance is before it. Still less to its credit is this claim, when we consider, that if it be placed upon the ground of inductive reasoning, it can never challenge for itself any thing higher than strong probability; for no finite induction of agreeing particulars can make it certain, that the very next fact examined shall not overthrow the whole former process.

Natural theology has a much broader and surer basis than any induction of particulars can give. The universe is before it, and wherever in heaven above or in the earth beneath the traces of design, and adaptation of means to an end, are found, there are the legitimate elements of its demonstrations. This, it is evident from all his examples, is the broad ground on which Lord Brougham meant to place the subject. His error lies in mistaking the legitimate province of inductive reasoning. He begins by laying down the proposition, that natural theology is strictly an inductive science; but when he comes to the proof, he takes his examples from that which has no connection with inductive reasoning, and thus, by an inconsistency very fortunate for his subject, he proves its right to a much higher and stronger position than the language of his thesis had led him to demand.

While the whole universe of adaptation and design is thus

Renaux saw human bones, in 1820, in a grotto of Jura limestone, at Dufort. *Ib.* 1830. p. 30. M. Bernardi found them with the bones of the hippopotami, in a grotto at Mount Giffon, near Palermo. *Gior. Offic. de Palermo.* Apr. 1830. A human skeleton was found in travestin, in Auvergne; and a fossil human head in the travestins of St. Alise at Cleremont, by Le Coq. [TRAVESTIN, I take to be a kind of white spongy stone.] More facts of the like nature may be seen in *Bull. Univ.* 1830. p. 346.” *Bib. Repos.* No. XXI. p. 97.

shown to be the rightful domain of this science, it is important to look at the nature of the argument on which its conclusions rest. We remark, then, that its whole strength lies in the conscious separate agency of our own minds. It is founded entirely on the recognition, that there is something within us, independent of matter, and conscious of its own existence, which we call *mind*; and thus comparing the marks of design which we see around us with our own mental exercises. The feeling is irresistible,—‘If I had such a design in view, I should use some such means.’ In other words, the application, so nicely, of such means to such purposes, forces the conviction, that somewhere there exists an independent, intelligent MIND, the *same in kind* as that of which we are in conscious possession; though as much superior to ours, as his designs are the more vast and complicated. The first point, therefore, is, the admission of the separate existence and conscious agency of our own minds; for it is only from this, we can infer the separate existence of other minds. This fundamental principle in the argument from design, has been too much overlooked by the great mass of writers on the subject of natural theology. They not only have taken almost all their examples of design from the material world; but neglected the question of the mind’s separate existence and agency, though this must lie at the basis of all their reasoning. The sceptic, against whom their arguments are directed, is the last to admit,—probably strenuous in denying,—the separate existence and immateriality of his own soul. He does not deny the *fact* of apparent order, fitness, and adaptation to an end, in the parts of the universe with which he is acquainted; he simply denies, that these facts prove any thing in relation to the existence of an independent intelligence. While he assumes this, the exhibition to him of ten thousand proofs of adaptation and design, has no tendency to produce conviction. The first point to be gained, is the recognition of his own mind as a distinct and separate agent; and then, from the nature of its agency in adapting means to ends, we can press home the argument of the existence of other minds from the same marks of design. Without this, the whole array of argument from all the traces of design in the universe, will make no impression upon the false refuges in which the atheist or the sceptic have intrenched themselves.

Nor is the proof of this at all difficult. It is the shortest, and therefore the clearest, process of deduction which reason can make. There is no other fact to which we can come from so sure a starting point, or by so short a step. Our senses may deceive us. In some respects they do deceive us, until one sense is corrected by another, or by experience. Thus in respect to distance, motion, solidity, absolute contact, etc., it is matter of demonstration, that the first impressions of our senses are delusive. But the process

which proves the separate existence of mind, admits of no deception. It is a subject of consciousness, about which it is not possible to conceive of deception, that we *think, desire, or reason*; and while we are conscious of these exercises, a deduction of but a single step brings us to the inevitable conclusion of an individual existence, to which they belong. Indeed to say, that that which thinks, feels, and reasons, and which is the only conscious subject of the identity of these acts, does not itself exist, is a contradiction in terms. The absurdity at once puts the man who pretends to maintain it, out of the pale of all rational argumentation. But when the fact of its own existence and separate agency is admitted, the argument from design is as forcible and conclusive as any other deduction which the mind can make. It is irresistible. We may talk of chance,—the fortuitous concurrence of atoms,—the formative or recuperative powers of nature,—and blind ourselves by words that mean nothing, or, if any thing, the very meaning in dispute; but when the real point is seen, the mind is not and cannot be satisfied. It is conscious both of the reality and the manner of its agency, in all its works of design, and from the law of its own action, it cannot rest satisfied in any trace of design which it meets, without referring it to a separate and intelligent author. This is the very constitution of our nature. It is an ultimate fact, and can be included in none more general, that from our own intelligent agency in all our acts of design, we are irresistibly obliged to refer all undisputed marks of design to some intelligent author. And when in any such case that author is found, the mind is satisfied. It rests as completely secure of the truth of its deduction, as in the most rigid demonstration of mathematical science. All this applies not only to the fact of the *existence* of the designer, but as clearly and in the same way, to his *attributes* and *character*. His power and wisdom are seen in proportion to the extent and perfection of the adaptation; and his benevolence from the happiness,—the good,—it is his manifest design to produce by such adaptation. In each case we reason irresistibly from the conscious laws of our own agency. The mind is as satisfied in the deduction of attributes and moral character from the *nature* of the design, as it is of the existence of the author from the *fact* of design.

It is also important to remark, that each separate fact of design, is itself a distinct source of complete demonstration. An inspection of one moving steam-engine, proves an intelligent author as conclusively before as after we have watched the operation of a thousand. The number of instances which bespeak design, are useful, not so much to prove the existence, as to show in the diversified manner of operation, the attributes and relations of the author. Equally obvious is it, that if any particular fact be wrongly se-

lected, and the supposed traces of design be afterwards found to exist only in appearance, and not in fact ; it can but destroy the argument from that particular example alone, without weakening or at all interfering with other cases that stand independent of it.

With this understanding of the nature of the argument from design, we shall make it our object, in the *second* place, to show *the conclusiveness of its application*. For the purpose of a more distinct impression, we will compare it with the deductions of natural and mental philosophy, in those particulars where there is an agreement ; and thus lay down the proposition which we think Lord Brougham should have expressed,—that the deductions of natural theology are as sound and conclusive as those in any of the philosophical sciences, natural, mental, or moral.

A very great proportion of philosophical science is occupied in observing the relations, tendencies, and adaptation of things, and from these deducing conclusions, in relation to effects, ends to be attained, or things to be done,—*the final causes* of the facts which are to be considered ; and in all these particulars, they are analogous to the course pursued by natural theology. These elements of philosophical science, involve the recognition of the separate existence and agency of our own mind, as much as those of natural theology. The ideas which we attach to the terms cause, tendency, fitness, adaptation, etc. are derived only from the conscious action of our minds. The mere *sequence* of events, though perpetual, would never account for these ideas. Because night follows day, we do not therefore feel that one has a tendency or is adapted to produce the other ; nor because one hour in the day invariably follows another, do we from this derive any idea of such a relation between them. Nor were there nothing but the fact, that vision *followed* the admission of light to the eye, should we ever form the idea that light was adapted to the purpose of vision. The possession of a quality is always supposed in one which constitutes its power over the other. We feel that it is something inherent in light, and not the mere sequence of vision to its admission,—something in it, which is not in heat, or air, or any thing else in nature, that gives it its adaptation to the ends of vision. But this idea of inherent adaptation, is derived from the conscious operation of our own minds alone. Our will modifies our train of thought, and controls our outward actions. We are conscious of this inherent power. We learn from its agency its adaptation to its end. Here is the origin of all ideas of tendency and adaptation. It springs from the recognition of the conscious agency of our own minds. The sceptic who will deny the deductions of natural theology, because they presuppose the separate actions of our own minds, must also discard the whole round of natural science, and blot out all ideas of relation, ten-

dency, and adaptation ; for they inevitably involve the same fact. Philosophical science, therefore, inasmuch as it is conversant with these qualities, stands upon the same ground with natural theology.

But there is another mistake which has operated as a reason why, as Lord Brougham has said, " many scientific men regard natural theology as a speculation, built rather upon fancy than argument ; or at any rate, as a kind of knowledge quite different from either physical or moral science." It arises from the fact of not discerning, that they are the same, so far as tendency, adaptation and design are concerned, except simply the difference of a shorter or longer process. A very common mistake exists on another subject quite analogous to this, and which may serve as an illustration. It is the general practice to divide the method of acquiring knowledge into two kinds, and call one " the knowledge of sensation," the other " knowledge of reflection." We thus separate that method of acquiring knowledge, which is through the medium of the external senses, from that which is gained by the mind's own internal operations. But in reality, there is no ground for this distinction. The process in both has been the same, except that one has been longer than the other. For example, take the common element of water : it is palpable and yielding to the pressure ; and we call it a fluid, the knowledge of whose existence, it is supposed, has been acquired from the immediate consciousness of our senses. But when we have taken into view the different gases which enter into its composition, and their combinations in a certain proportion, and have thus gained a knowledge of the component elements of water, this is said to be the result of experiment and reason. In fact, however, the knowledge both of its existence and its component elements, has been the result of a mental operation. Let the sense of touch be perfect, and perform its function completely, but cut off from the process all the deductions of the mind, and what knowledge could there be ? The nerves have borne to the sensorium the mere fact of a specific affection or impression, and thus furnish materials for a mental operation ; but independent of the deductions of the mind, there is nothing which can properly be called knowledge. The sensation from the touch, was connected with the consciousness of the mind's own existence, and gave rise to the inference, that something else, external and independent to itself, also existed ; and thus, by a process of abstraction and comparison, and a distinct deduction, the knowledge of the existence of water was derived. But a few more links added to the same chain, brings the mind also to a knowledge of its constituent elements. The process is the same, except as to the difference in length. So of colors. Objects are differently illuminated, and thus modify the impression upon the organs of vision. Hence we say, that color

is a quality, the knowledge of which is derived from sensation. Yet it is necessary here, as in the former case, that the mind should recognize its own existence, the existence independently of itself, of an external quality, and discriminate between the diversity of colors, or there could have been no knowledge of the given color. Here is a mental operation as really as when all the seven primary colors have been separated, and their qualities separately apprehended, and the laws of reflection understood; and thus a philosophical knowledge of the law of colors and their combination, in the composition of light, has been gained. One is longer than the other, but this affords no good reason for supposing them different in kind.

It is thus in those particulars in which philosophical science and natural theology harmonize. In all that relates to tendency, adaptation, or cause and effect, they proceed in their deductions upon the same principle. They are the same in *kind*, the only difference is that of *length*. Natural theology goes over precisely the same ground, and with the same measured and cautious footstep as philosophy; but when philosophy has reached the goal of its inquiries, and stops short in the course, theology advances farther on, and arrives at a far more sublime and commanding position. It adds some more links to the chain, because its point of demonstration is farther removed; but they are as rigidly consecutive, and as firmly bound together, as any part of the whole series. Natural philosophy goes abroad over the works of nature, gathering facts, observing their peculiarities and correspondencies, and tracing out each, through their various adaptations, to the *uses* and *ends* to which they are subservient. It is perpetually conversant with tendency, harmony of proportion, order, design, and nice and minute adaptation; indeed it rests upon the admission of these facts. But its whole object is completed in simply deducing from these laboriously gathered elements, the *uses* they subserve, and the ultimate *ends* in which they terminate. Natural theology, on the other hand, goes over this same broad field of wonders, takes up the same facts, arranges them in the same order, and follows them out through all their tendencies and adaptations, and sees as plainly their final causes; but neither wearied in the pursuit nor deluded with the splendor of its discoveries, it leaves philosophy here to muse in solitude, and fixing its eye distinctly upon the clear traces of *intelligent design* and *wise contrivance*, which these nice adaptations disclose, follows upward with cautious but firm footstep to the distinct perception of the great intelligent Designer; learns his attributes, and reads in deep-drawn characters, the obligations and responsibilities which rest upon all the ranks of his moral subjects. Though it has gone on immeasurably beyond the resting-place of philosophy, every step has been taken in the same way, and been

made on as firm ground, as when they trod their common road together. No matter how extended the series may be, if each link is a direct deduction from the preceding, the first will be no more sound and irrefragable in its demonstration than the hundredth or the thousandth. It is true, that because of human infirmity, the longer process will be more liable to human mistake and error. But this only proves the necessity of great circumspection and care in the investigation; not at all that when it is rightly made, the last step is not as safe and sure as the first. If the whole chain is correctly put together, it will hold fast to any demonstration, however remote from the beginning. The short deduction "*Cogito, ergo sum*," is no more certain than the most remote human duty, deduced from the existence and attributes of God and his relation to his creatures. While natural theology does carry its deductions farther out than natural philosophy, it is not therefore the less certain of their correctness. The *end* is inferred no more surely from the *adaptation*, than the *design* compels the deduction of the existence of the GREAT DESIGNER.

With these remarks in view, we shall adduce a number of examples common both to philosophical science and natural theology, for the purpose of showing how completely both are identified in all which renders their deductions sound and conclusive. In doing this, we shall follow somewhat in the order of Lord Brougham, but without confining ourselves either to his facts or illustrations. We shall avoid also, as we have hitherto done, the technical terms "*psychological*," "*ontology*," "*deontology*," etc., as more appropriate to a strictly scientific treatise, and endeavor to give the ideas for which they stand in the ordinary language of common life.

An examination of the structure of the eye, in all the complicated parts of its formation, leads directly to the knowledge of the fact, that it is in perfect adaptation to the properties of light. This fact was obvious before many of the properties now known to belong to light had been discovered. A plain man now, as in any former age, without any philosophical understanding of the subject, has sufficient knowledge of the fact, to admit that the eye and the light are fitted to each other. But when Newton discovered the fact of the different degrees of refrangibility in light, and thus a new and interesting property of it had come to the knowledge of the world, it was also at once seen, that the eye, by its combined lenses of different material, was fitted to this newly discovered property; and in full accordance therewith, was made to throw the image distinctly upon the retina, and thus secure clearness of vision. Mr. Dolland, the celebrated optical-instrument maker in London, subsequently found, that different substances possessed the quality of scattering the rays of light in different degrees. By compounding these different substances in a certain proportion,

object-glasses of far greater perfection than had before been used, were constructed. But it was also manifest, upon the first observation, that the eye had this improvement in a far more perfect manner, than all the compounds of human skill could effect. Thus the general fact, of the mutual adaptations of the eye and light, always admitted, is traced out in its more minute particulars, as science discovers more of their respective properties. Natural philosophy gathers up these facts, finding new properties, tracing analogies and adaptations, following them out to their final causes, and looks down upon the work delighted; wondering at the beauty of the organ,—the perfect mutual relations, and the complete attainment of the end,—the mysterious power of vision. No one questions the reality of its facts, or the soundness of its deductions.

But while philosophy is thus absorbed in the admiration of its own discoveries, natural theology has gone over the same ground, gathered up the same facts, and traced the same nice adaptations, and then drawn the incontrovertible deduction, that all this must have been well known to the Maker of the eye, before it had been discovered by the investigations of human science; that such marks of skilful design evidently bespeak the existence of a supreme, intelligent, first cause; and thus having found him, stands before the throne of the great Eternal, humble and adoring. We might enlarge, and show the adaptations of the eye in its different modifications, to every varied condition in which its use is required. The mole that burrows in the earth, the fish inhabiting the denser element of water, and the eagle soaring into the heavens, with a sight so piercing, that he can discern his prey on the surface of the distant globe beneath him, all have peculiarities of structure and furniture in the eye, which fits it for its destined place of operation. Thus, while natural philosophy gathers its facts and deduces the *ends* to which they are subservient, natural theology, from the same materials, and by the same process carried out, discovers also the existence and attributes of their great Author.

A quill from the wing of a fowl, when minutely examined, is an interesting instance of nice adaptation to the end for which it is to be used. The barrel, or stem, is of a peculiar, firm texture, that it may possess sufficient strength to sustain the weight of the body and force of the stroke in flying, and yet hollow and light that it may not itself be a burden. The continuance of the stalk, as it runs off into a more porous and homogeneous substance, preserves the same adaptation, and yet is fitted to give place and nourishment to the filaments which arise in continuation on each side of it. These filaments are arranged in separate lamina, the broadest surfaces of which lie upon each other, so that the force which acts upon them in flying comes upon their edges, and thus meeting them in the direction of their plane, receives the resist-

ance of their whole substance. These filaments, it is obvious, must, in some measure, be bound together, or they would be as insufficient for the purposes of flying, as the scattered threads of down upon the feathers of the ostrich. Any glutinous substance, would be subject to injury from the constant exposure to weather, or soiled and loaded from the dust and particles of matter with which it would come in contact. To accomplish this purpose therefore, in the most perfect manner, from the edges of the various filaments, as examined through a microscope, are seen little sets of fibrils or teeth thrown off upon one side, which are fitted by opposite clasps to shut into, or overlock those that are thrown off by the next on its adjoining side, and thus hold themselves firmly together. Each quill in the wing is then so placed, that the filaments of its broadest side lie over those on the narrowest side of its fellow next in succession, the greater strength of the one thus supporting the weaker side of the other; while that in turn is the more expanded to oppose the greater surface to the air, upon which it is to act in sustaining the body upon its bosom. If to all this we add the exact points in which the wings are attached to the body, to sustain it in equilibrium, the formation of the joints for the peculiarity of its rotary motion in flying, and the position and action of the muscles, in exact conformity with the principle of antagonist forces, in which it is to strike the resisting medium of the atmosphere, we find as true a system of the nicest adaptations, to a particular and important purpose, as can well be conceived.

The circulation of the blood in the animal system, the discovery of which has immortalized the name of Harvey, though too complicated to admit here of a full description, may nevertheless bear a general reference. The heart, which is the great laboring engine in performing the work, is a hollow and muscular organ of a conical shape, divided into four compartments, the two larger termed *ventricles*, and the two smaller *auricles*. The former send forth the blood into the arteries, the latter receive it from the veins. In the arteries are numerous valves, which all close *toward* the heart; the veins also have numerous valves which all close the other way, *against* the passage from the heart. A contraction of the heart, sends the blood from the *right ventricle*, through the pulmonary arteries, into the lungs. There, by a most wonderful adaptation of structure, the blood receives its vital properties from the air which has been inhaled, and gives off its noxious qualities, which are exhaled at the next respiration. From the lungs it returns by the pulmonary veins again to the heart, and enters the *left auricle*. It then begins its more general circulation. The *left ventricle* sends the blood into a large artery, called *the aorta*, branches of which go upwards to the head and arms, and other branches along the inside of the

spine to the lower extremities. The minute extremities of the arteries, by a change in the direction of their valves, become veins through which the blood returns toward the heart, and all uniting in one main trunk, called the *vena cava*, the blood is again poured into the heart at the *right auricle*, and thus completes the circulation through the whole system. The heart contracts about 4000 times an hour, sending off about one ounce of blood at each stroke, or about 250 pounds in an hour. If the blood in the human body be estimated at twenty-five pounds, the whole, at the above ratio, would pass through the general circulation once in six minutes, or ten times an hour. Nothing can exceed the wondrous adaptation here displayed to keep the vital stream in constant motion. It was the observation of this adaptation, which led to the discovery of the fact. When Mr. Boyle inquired of Harvey, "What induced him to think of the circulation of the blood?" he answered: "that when he took notice that the valves in the veins were so placed that they gave free passage to the blood toward the heart, but opposed the passage of the veinal blood the contrary way, he was incited to imagine, that so provident a cause as nature had not so placed so many valves without design, and no design seemed more probable, than that since the blood could not well, because of the interposing valves, be sent by the veins to the limbs, it should be sent through the arteries and return through the veins whose valves did not oppose its course that way." On the principle, that "nature" was "a provident cause," and did not act without "design," Harvey inferred, from facts which he saw, the circulation of the blood. Certainly it is no less philosophical with natural theology, to infer, from the circulation of the blood and the minute contrivances to effect it, the existence of this "provident cause."

The following is another example, in the words of Lord Brougham :

'When a bird's egg is examined, it is found to consist of three parts ; the chick, the yelk in which the chick is placed, and the white in which the yelk swims. The yelk is lighter than the white, and it is attached to it at two points, joined by a line or rather plane *below* the center of gravity of the yelk. From this arrangement it must follow, that the chick is always uppermost, roll the egg how you will ; consequently the chick is always kept nearest to the breast or belly of the mother, while she is sitting. Suppose then that any one acquainted with the laws of motion, had to contrive things so as to secure this position for the little speck or sac in question, in order to its receiving the necessary heat from the hen,—could he proceed otherwise than by placing it in the lighter liquid, and suspending that liquid in the heavier, so that its center of gravity should be above the line or plane of suspension ? Assuredly not ; for in no other way could this purpose be

accomplished. This position is attained by a strict induction;* it is supported by the same kind of evidence on which all physical truths rest. But it leads by a single step to another truth in natural theology, that the egg must have been formed by some hand skillful in mechanism, and acting under the knowledge of dynamics.' pp. 25, 26.

The human hand is another striking instance of the complicated adaptation of means to an end, but which we have not space to describe. We refer to the learned work in the *Bridgewater Treatises*, on this subject, by Sir Chas. Bell, and also to a notice of this work on our pages. *Ch. Spec. for March, 1834. Art. III.*

In the solar system, we see the planets revolving in orbits which are not complete circles, but more or less flattened into ellipses. While the primaries are rolling onward, in several instances they are also carrying along their secondaries by a double motion,—around their primaries, and with them around their great center the sun,—and in all there is still another motion in their individual rotation upon their axis. These complicated but regular movements, prove intelligence and wisdom as the source of their harmony. But there is another peculiarity observed in their movements, that deserves special attention. There is a constant and uniform alteration of their orbits in one way up to a given point, which then becomes an inverse alteration down to a given point, and never passing beyond the goal on either side. Philosophy inferred, that this was necessary to the counteraction of disturbing influences from unequal attractions, and thus to the permanency of the system. This inference of philosophy became demonstration by the integral calculus. But surely the deduction of philosophy in this case ought not to be considered as more sound and legitimate than that of natural theology, which, taking all these facts in their harmony, infers directly from this universe of sublimities the existence of its almighty Architect.

We adduce only one more example from the material world. Philosophy sometimes seizes upon the mere fragment of some former entire existence, and through the line of known relations and dependencies, by a series of deductions, comes out at last to the complete knowledge of that entire existence, of which at first it had only some of its scattered relics as the data. Geology and especially comparative anatomy, as followed out by Baron Cuvier, Prof. Buckland, and others, throws many such a startling fact before its disciples. In a cave, or in a ruptured strata, or perhaps amid the debris of some wild region, a decayed and partial fragment of the skeleton of an unknown animal is discovered; perhaps but two or three broken bones are gathered up from

* The same erroneous application of the phrase as that before mentioned.

the place in which they have rested for unknown ages. Natural philosophy takes them in hand, and from the known order and analogy in all the animate creation,* goes onward step by step in its deductions, till it has fitted these fragments of bone to their fellows, reproduced the entire skeleton, and clothed it anew with flesh and skin, and set it before us in its original shape and size,—its habits and localities,—its very self in all except its life and motion.† The megalonyx, iguanodon, and all the monsters of the Saurian race, are thus the wonderful new creations of natural science. Surprising as these discoveries are, and incontrovertible as is the process by which their former condition is developed, it is but deducing conclusions founded on adaptations from given premises, that we thus come to the knowledge of what has now no existence among the moving tribes of animated nature. And these same facts exhibit such clear marks of design and skill, that the deduction from them, of a wise presiding Deity, is at least as sound and philosophical. If now it ennobled the philosopher, above the peasant who dug up these fragments of another world, to be able to trace the series of deductions to their curious and splendid results; is it not still more exalting to that mind, which stops not at the bare existence, but follows up the same path till it finds the hand that made and fed them? Such, however is the

* Baron Cuvier, in his examination of fossil bones, has the following declaration: "Every organized being forms a whole and entire system, of which all the parts mutually correspond and co-operate to produce the same definite action by a reciprocal reaction; none of these parts can change without a change of the others also. Thus, if the intestines of an animal are organized in a manner only to digest fresh flesh, it is necessary that his jaws should be constructed to devour the prey, his claws to seize and tear it, his teeth to divide the flesh, and the whole system of his organs of motion to follow and overtake it, and of his organs of sense to perceive it at a distance. It is necessary also, that he should have seated in his brain the instinct to hide himself and spread snares for his victim; such are the general conditions of a carnivorous regimen; every carnivorous animal must infallibly unite them; without them the species could not subsist. But under these general conditions, there are particular ones with respect to the size of the species, and the abode of the prey, for which each animal is disposed."

† The following description of the feelings of Baron Cuvier, by himself, when he first arranged the bones of unknown animals, found in the gypsum quarries of Paris, is most interesting. "I was in the situation of a man who had given to him *pele-mele* the mutilated and incomplete fragments of a hundred skeletons, belonging to twenty sorts of animals, and it was required that each bone should be joined to that which it belonged to. It was a resurrection in miniature; but the immutable laws prescribed to living beings were my directors. At the voice of comparative anatomy, each bone, each fragment regained its place. I have no expressions to describe the pleasure experienced, in perceiving that as I discovered one character, all the consequences, more or less foreseen of this character, were fully developed. The feet were conformable to what the teeth had announced, and the teeth to the feet; the bones of the legs and thighs, and every thing that ought to reunite these two extreme parts were conformable to each other. In one word, each of the species sprung up from one of its own elements." Bakewell's *Introd. to Geol.* pp. 235, 236.

relation which natural philosophy sustains to natural theology. Both make their deductions on the same principles; the only difference is, that the latter lengthens out the process.

The *intellectual world* also presents many conspicuous examples of wise adaptation and design, affording an opportunity for testing the soundness of the deductions of natural theology, compared with those of mental philosophy. Why the study of mind, for this purpose, has been so almost entirely neglected, may be difficult to determine. That it has, is a plain matter of fact. Very few examples of design, have been selected for the use of natural theology, beyond the limits of the material universe. The whole intellectual world is nearly a *terra incognita* to this science. This is not more a matter of wonder than of regret. Allow it is true, that the study of the human mind is less general and its facts less clear to the apprehension of common people, and that its traces of design, and proofs of God's presence are, on these accounts, less distinct and impressive to a majority of mankind; yet there are not a few minds who would feel the argument more forcibly, and be more delighted with the process, when taken from facts in the intellectual, than in the material system.*

While much that relates to mind is still mysterious and inscrutable, yet the careful study of mental philosophy has taught many things plainly. We now know something of the faculties of mind, its method of operation, and the laws by which it is governed. Both the intellectual and moral faculties have been closely examined, their mutual influences and tendencies compared, the bias which surrounding circumstances may give them, and the proper method of cultivating and strengthening them. Under given cir-

* The ancient philosophers seem in some instances to have applied the proofs of the existence of the Deity from the nature of mind, in a powerful and happy manner. This shows, that for some reason or other, they had been led to give this part of the subject more attention than the moderns. We quote from the translation of Lord Brougham. The discussion as recorded in Xenophon, between Socrates and Aristodemus, after alluding to the adaptations of the bodily conformation, has this striking passage: "Nor has the Deity been satisfied with taking care of the body alone; he has implanted in man what is a far greater work to have made,—a most excellent soul. For what other animal possesses a mind that can perceive the existence of the gods, by whom all these vast and fair works have been formed? What other creature than man worships these gods? What other intelligence is superior to man's, in providing against hunger, and thirst, and cold, and heat? or in curing diseases, or in exercising strength, or in cultivating learning, or in storing up the recollection of things heard, and seen, and learned?" Xen. Memor. I. iv. 13. Again in the discussion with Euthydemus,—“They,” that is the gods, “have implanted reason in our nature, whereby we inquire touching external things. And acquiring and remembering we learn the uses of each, and hit upon many contrivances for attaining good and avoiding evil. Have they not also given us the gift of speech, by which we can communicate mutually, all we have learned, and thus instruct each other, and make laws, and regulate civil polity?” Xen. Memor. IV. iii. 11. Many other similar examples occur in Plato, and especially Cicero.

cumstances, it may almost as surely be foretold how mind will act, as mechanical forces.

By the power of *abstraction*, we can separate one idea from all others, and make it an object of distinct and individual consideration. By the same process we can single out another individual idea, and bring the two together, and then calling up another faculty of the mind, we can *compare* the two distinct ideas thus brought together, and observe their relations and connections, their agreement or disagreement in certain particulars; and by still another mental exercise we can deduce a definite *conclusion* or *result* in respect to them. To this result we can bring another similarly found, and compare these results as we had before compared the simple ideas, and thus arrive at a more *general conclusion*. This process may be pursued to any extent, and is what we call *reasoning*. The mind has the power, within given limits, of fixing its *attention* upon the process, and thus calling up every appropriate faculty precisely at the right point, and securing the correctness of the operation. Without this power the process could not be correctly pursued, or the connection of each link in the series apprehended. The perfection of reason, therefore, must very much depend upon the power of *fixed attention*. And as this is so essential, many things conspire to assist it. *Curiosity*, the love of *novelty*, the *desire of knowledge*, the *pleasure* of the demonstration, all concur, not only to fix the attention, but to make it a source of delight and happiness. The *repetition* of the process also increases the power of attention, and *habit* in this, as in other things, comes in to confirm it. The *law of association*, or *simple suggestion*, also contributes its aid. This is but giving a name to the fact, that one idea introduces another, *associated* in some way with it, and therefore *suggesting* it to the mind. It not only furnishes materials, or direct illustrations for the process itself, but it also imparts a pleasure from the revival of former ideas, which had once been familiar, though then viewed in a somewhat different connection. Here are facts in mental philosophy, which, as every attentive mind must see, are wonderfully adapted to secure a certain end, and without which this end could not be attained. All these faculties not only act in harmony with each other, but they are also adapted to the very elements of thought which compose the process of reasoning, and thus all conspire to the great result,—the discovery of truth, and the enlargement of human knowledge. These are the deductions which philosophy makes without hesitation, but how plain is it, that all this field is completely open to natural theology. What sublime marks of design are here! How legibly the impress of supreme intelligence in all these adaptations and subserviencies! Had not such complicated and yet harmonious mental powers

their origin in some supreme intellect? "He that planted the ear shall not he hear? He that formed the eye shall not he see? *He that teacheth man knowledge shall not he know?*"

The faculty of *memory* has its adaptations and uses, which might be drawn out in the same striking manner. The power of fixing the attention upon that which is to be retained, and thus giving it a deeper impression upon the mind, is a well known expedient for strengthening the memory. So too is the power of association, by connecting the idea to be remembered with some other; thus not only calling up past transactions and events with their attending circumstances, but past reflections and trains of thought which were the offspring of our own minds. This power, in connection with other faculties of the mind, and the harmony of its operations with them, is strikingly conspicuous in many of the employments of life, and especially in many of the occupations and details of professional business.

But in no place, perhaps, is this more conspicuous than in extemporaneous speaking. Many of the mental faculties, in connection with the memory, are then called into exercise, with a rapidity and harmony of action truly wonderful. The following language from Lord Brougham, on this point, must be a striking history of the operations of his own mind:

'A practiced orator will declaim in measured and various periods,—will weave his discourse into one texture,—form parenthesis within parenthesis,—excite the passions or move to laughter,—take a turn in his discourse from an accidental interruption, making it the topic of his rhetoric for five minutes to come, and pursuing in like manner the new illustrations to which it gives rise,—mold his diction with a view to gain or shun an epigrammatic point, or alliteration, or a discord; and all this with so much assured reliance on his own powers, and with such perfect ease to himself, that he shall even plan the next sentence while he is pronouncing off-hand the one he is engaged with, adapting each to the other, and shall look forward to the topic which is to follow, and fit in the close of the one he is handling to be its introducer; nor shall any auditor be able to discover the least difference between all this and the portion of his speech which he has got by heart, or tell the transition from the one to the other.' pp. 43, 44.

Not only might we thus adduce every separate *intellectual faculty* as a complete adaptation to its manifest object; but every *native susceptibility of the human heart*,—the affections and sympathies,—the passions and emotions,—might one by one be thus spread out as the separate manifestations of a subserviency to important ends, from the harmony of their mutual action, and their nice adaptation both to human wants and human circumstances. To these might be added, all that belongs to the *moral structure* of the human mind; its sense of obligation and responsibility, its

feelings of regret, repentance, or remorse, and all the moral feelings of approbation, or disapprobation, which arise from a view of his own, or others' conduct and character. All are evidently nicely adapted to his condition as a social being, acting amid his companions, not only for his own welfare, but where it is necessary that the welfare of others also should be consulted. Who can fail to see, in all this orderly arrangement of the noble faculties of mind, and the shining elements of a moral nature, the glowing marks of design which bespeak an almighty, wise, and benevolent moral Governor? Who does not see, that natural theology can here make her deductions, and arrive at her conclusions, with a process as clear, as logical, and as irrefragable, as the metaphysical or moral philosopher?

The *animal instincts* present examples more appropriately classed with mental operations, and which have not been so almost wholly overlooked, as those which spring directly from intelligence. They afford such striking exhibitions of the adaptation of means to ends, as could not easily be disregarded. Whether as acting in man, or in greater perfection, as they are found in some animals, they present a most interesting field of investigation. Those of the *dog* through all its varieties,—of birds in the formation of their notes,—the ant also in many of its interesting peculiarities, all exhibit a wise and benevolent design in their respective endowments. The bee presents many points of animal instinct truly wonderful. Through all the regulations of its numerous community, instinct seems to take the place and perform the part of political skill and wisdom. What commonwealth, under the most enlightened and virtuous legislation, is more orderly, industrious, or prosperous? The form of its cells, fashioned by a skill and workmanship which are inimitable, is every where the same; the size and proportions precisely alike in every country and clime. And what is still more remarkable, this form is the very one which mathematical precision determines to be the most economical in space, strength, labor and materials. But while this exact angle of 120° is always chosen, a still more surprising fact was discovered by that celebrated mathematician, Colin Maclaurin, and published in the *Philosophical Transactions*, in an essay, "On the basis of the cells wherein the bees deposit their honey;" to wit., that the angles always chosen for the parallelograms of the roof, are 110° and 70° . The "*fluxional calculus*," by Newton, and its application to "that most curious problem of *maxima* and *minima*," by Maclaurin, thus enabled science, with much study and labor, "in these ends of the earth," to find out those proportions which the bee had been unerringly using for near 6000 years, as perfect in its first as in its last generation. What striking marks of adaptation and de-

sign are here! How clear the deduction that there is a Deity, "wise in counsel and wonderful in working!"

Thus, matter and mind both disclose their innumerable examples of refined and complicated adaptation; and while philosophical science is collecting, arranging, and comparing these facts, and drawing conclusions which command the assent of all mankind; natural theology, with as firm a step, and as conclusive deductions, carries forward the work to a point incomparably more important and sublime,—the existence of the **ALMIGHTY MAKER** and **GOVERNOR** of all.

3. There is a *third* object of attention, to wit, *the ultimate design of God in regard to man*, as inferred from what we know of both. We have, however, but little space to devote to this most interesting portion of natural theology. The conclusions are not so distinct and clear in this as in the former particulars to which our attention has been turned. They are, however, as strictly logical. They fail in point of clearness, only because the facts from which they are deduced are more difficult of comprehension. God, and the soul of man, are more concealed and hidden in their nature, than the plain marks of design in the universe around us. But so far as any distinct conceptions of their natures or attributes can be possessed by the human mind, they furnish data for as perfect demonstrations. The sublimity, and in some respects mystery, which invest this subject, doubtless require that it be approached with much solemnity and humility. Says Lord Brougham, in relation to investigations of this nature:

'The argument requires to be handled in a humble and submissive spirit; but if so undertaken, there is nothing in it which can be charged with presumption, or deemed inconsistent with perfect though rational devotion. In truth all the investigations of natural theology are equally liable to such a charge; for to trace the evidence of design in the works of nature, and inquire how far benevolence presides over their formation and maintenance,—in other words, to deduce from what we see of the existence of the Deity, and speculate upon his wisdom and goodness in the creation and government of the universe,—is just as daring a thing, and exactly of the same kind of audacity, as to speculate upon his probable intentions with respect to the future destiny of man.' p. 81.

As before remarked, the traces of design in the universe around us, no more surely proclaim God's existence, than the nature and end of those designs disclose his attributes. It is impossible to trace these works of design through their tendencies to the results at which they aim, without feeling, that the mind which devised them is both supremely wise and good. Not one can be found, which does not evince a direct contrivance for a good end, as fully

as it discloses wisdom in its adaptation to gain that end. No member or organ of the body can be found, whose manifest original design is to inflict pain and secure misery. No law of the universe applied to any of its materials, is directly fitted to secure destruction. Even the claws of the lion, and the fang of the viper, are minutely contrived for the defense and preservation of their species. Evils, both natural and moral, are in the world; but their existence, wide as they prevail, can be accounted for with no impeachment of the divine benevolence. Man is a free agent, and responsible for his own acts; and no one can show that he could always be kept in holiness without an interference on the part of his Maker, which would be a violation of every principle of benevolence. But when moral evil *has* entered, which is the work of the creature and not the creator, its tendency is to misery and ruin; and it is right and good, for it is the property of its own nature, that it should possess this tendency. All the natural evil which follows is either disciplinary and corrective, and thus the result of pure benevolence; or punitive and judicial, which equally indicates a determination intent on the general good. Both from the original tendency of all the works of design in nature, which are manifestly to a good end, and from the seeming exceptions to this in the actual existence of much moral and natural evil in the system, when carefully examined, we feel persuaded, that the mind will be obliged to infer the *wisdom* and *benevolence* of its Author and Governor. We have time here but to glance at this evidence which we are sure a further examination will only serve to strengthen.

With this view of the *character of God*, we turn to a short consideration of the *nature of the soul of man*. As above, we can but just hint at the sources of proof in relation to the soul. That it is *immaterial*, may be argued from a variety of considerations. Suffice it to say, that as we can form no distinct conception of such a fact, so neither does any analogy from nature permit the assumption, that the soul is the result of a peculiar conformation of matter, or a specific modification or combination of its elements. We have the nicely chiseled forms of an Apollo and a Venus, but it is the same cold marble still. There is another *shape*, but not a *new existence*. We can combine an *acid* and an *alkali* and form a *neutral salt*, unlike to either ingredient. But there is nothing here analogous to the existence of a body, vivified by what has neither form, weight, nor color. Nothing in the universe of matter has any thing analogous to thought, volition, or emotion. The very nature of the soul is one and simple. In every act of consciousness, it separates itself from all that is material, and can have no knowledge of matter but by the deduction which it makes, that there is something external and independent of its own

existence. Indeed it may safely be said, that the distinction between matter and mind, is an *ultimate fact*, arising irresistibly from the very law of our nature. Such is the nature of our minds, that we cannot rest satisfied in any other opinion, and here the mind does rest secure, as on an immovable foundation. That the soul of man is *immaterial*, is therefore a probable ground for the conclusion, that it is *immortal*. So far as we know, it has no constituent parts, like the body, capable of division or dissolution. Nor is it exposed to annihilation, but by the act of its Maker; which is, to say the least, improbable.

The mind's independence of the body, is another fact from which the same deduction of its immortality would follow. The phenomena of *dreams*, however metaphysically explained, prove, that the mind is not dependent for its action, upon the state of the animal functions. The unequal development of the powers of body and mind also, and their unequal decay, go to the same fact. Although it may be supposed, that as a great general fact, body and mind mature and decay together, yet a moment's attention will show a difference so great as to prove the one independent of the other. It is certain that the body and all its functions arrive at maturity at twenty-five or thirty years of age, and that from thence it begins gradually to decline in agility, suppleness of muscle, and ability to endure fatigue; and that from sixty to seventy this decline of the bodily powers is most rapid and melancholy. The faculties of the mind however, as evidently enlarge in vigor, compass, clearness and energy, from thirty onward to fifty years of age; and can scarcely be said to have undergone much decay till sixty-five or seventy years. For at least thirty years the body has been going one way, and the mind another; nor are there wanting many instances where the body can hardly be said to live, in which the mind shines out like some brilliant sun set beneath the storm. But the clearest argument for the soul's independence of the body, is found in the physical fact, that it does survive its repeated dissolutions. The body is in constant change, which though gradual, is none the less real. Probably as often as once in ten years, man puts off one mortal covering and assumes another. What was once bone, muscle and sinew, has gone off into other combinations, and other elements have come in and taken their places. But through all this ceaseless change, and repeated entire transformation, the soul has held on to its identity, "the same yesterday, to-day"—and thus giving the opportunity to add the deduction—"and forever." As really as when the dust of the body has mouldered in the sepulcher, and mingled with the elements of its shroud and its coffin, so surely has it repeatedly before our eyes been resolved into other combinations, while the soul has held the even tenor of her way onward to the shores of immortality.

When to all this, we bring the desires and hopes of the soul, and learn its quenchless longings after immortality, and view these as the endowments of a God of benevolence, we cannot reconcile it with the harmony of his other works, or the goodness of his character, to suppose that they were given to end only in inevitable disappointment. Place before the soul a combination of all that can delight, and give it ages heaped on ages for enjoyment, but fix at last its limit, and you have infused the wormwood which embitters all the joy. The desires of the soul overleap all bounds, and roll along a vast eternity. What is not immortal cannot fill it. Did infinite benevolence awaken these desires only to quench them in endless night, after its dream of "three score years and ten?"—Add the noble qualities of the soul, its mental and its moral furniture, its tender affections, its high aspirings, its glowing imagination, its powers of intellect, and more than all, its moral sense, its capacity to know and love, and serve, and enjoy forever its Maker,—and if from any facts adapted to an end, and showing the traces of an intelligent design, we can infer what that design and end shall be; will there not from these data be at least an equally cogent deduction for man's immortality? What effect his sin may produce upon him, in the course of righteous retribution, is another question; what his Maker designed him for, is to be read in the original elements of his nature; and in characters deep and large, they hold up before the soul of man its IMMORTALITY.

One or two remarks will close this article. 1. *Natural Theology deals only with undoubted facts.*

Wherever real facts disclose design, there are legitimate materials for natural theology. But beyond this, nothing is safe. Ingenious speculations, and beautiful hypotheses may attract attention and excite admiration and delight, but until they have been proved, and thus become facts, natural theology has nothing to do with them. Whether electricity has *two fluids*, or different bodies are merely *positively* or *negatively* charged with one,—whether the phenomena of light be explained upon the hypothesis of *emission*, or the *vibrations of an elastic ether*,—whether Geology shall maintain the agency of *Neptune*, or *Pluto*, or of *both*,—and which of the many different hypotheses of *combustion* shall be adopted,—all these and many others of a similar nature, are questions about which this science has no concern. If either hypothesis seem to present the traces of design, yet it is no proper element in natural theology. The hypotheses itself, however specious, may fail, and with it goes its marks of design, and the argument built upon them. Though for a while these deductions might stand amid the solid columns of the temple, apparently as fair and strong as they, yet sooner or later they must fall. Another age will detect the fallacy, and scepticism enter at the very

door which had been designed to exclude it. Facts are all its materials. God's works, are the proof of God's existence. As science enlarges the boundaries of human knowledge, and makes us acquainted with more facts which evince design, natural theology may "lengthen her cords and strengthen her stakes," but the path must only be pursued where "the clear light shineth." Nor is there any need of these philosophical speculations. The humble peasant, who goes out to his daily labor, as the rising sun dispels the darkness, and spreads the landscape with life and beauty; or returns to his cottage as the shades of evening gather, and sees the rising moon, or shining stars as they show themselves in the soft blue sky, feels as firm a conviction of the existence, power, wisdom, and goodness of the Maker of them all, as that philosopher who can explain their laws and count their numbers. One may see more and nicer marks of adaptation than the other, and trace the process of his own mental operations the more minutely; but the very nature of the peasant's mind obliges him to conclude from what *he* can see, 'that so much power bespeaks a being who is powerful, so much wisdom a being who is wise, so much goodness a being who is good.' One knows *more* facts than the other, but the multiplication of facts only varies, without rendering any more complete the demonstration. One may even perplex, and confound, and delude his mind by empty speculations, and his boasted philosophy serve no other purpose but to mislead and destroy, while the other soars to heights which philosophy never trod, and worships "within the veil," where philosophy never entered. On every hand are the traces and voices of the Deity, and like the ancient Roman, he is "never so little solitary as when alone." While other studies may awaken curiosity, and lead the mind onward a few steps in the field of truth, they soon bring it to the limits of all science, and leave it at the confines of an unknown and trackless void; but this, from simple facts and sound deductions, conducts at once to a sure and safe resting-place,—the existence of a wise, powerful, and benevolent Jehovah.

2. *The true position of Natural Theology.*

It is the substantial basis on which is laid the proof of divine revelation. By it we learn the fact of God's existence, unity, supremacy, and benevolence. We bring these facts and apply them to the holy scriptures, and prove conclusively, that God gave them,—"that holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." And with this service performed, its chief work is accomplished. True, it unfolds many duties and responsibilities, and thus leaves man "without excuse," where there is no revelation. But like the law, it is as "a school-master to bring us to Christ," which is its chief design; and then leave us at *his* feet to hear *his*

words. It tells man, that he is a sinner, but leaves him without help, with "no eye to pity and no arm to save," yet lends its power to confirm the divine authority of the gospel, and sends the sinner there to learn, believe, obey, and be saved. Never is it to be raised above revelation, to become a substitute for it, or deemed sufficient without it; but on the other hand, never is it to be deemed superfluous, or contradictory and uncongenial in spirit, or a profane blending of human and divine science,—an unhallowed mingling of philosophy with religion. Never is the attempt to be made, with sacrilegious hand, to divorce the one from the other. God's works and word harmonize, and he meant that they both should subserve the ends of his moral government. "From the things that are made, are clearly seen his eternal power and Godhead." And when he commissioned prophets and apostles, and Christ himself came in human flesh to reveal the will of God more perfectly, he clothed the revelation with such exhibitions of miraculous power, and filled it with such manifestations of its foreknowledge, that from what we knew of God by his works, we could not doubt, that this message was from *him*, and that it was in love and kindness to our race. Here is the true position for natural theology. Here God designed it to stand and subserve his glory. It confirms beyond dispute, the record of his Son, "bringing life and immortality clearly to light." We read and examine that record,—compare it with the works of God, and see the impress of the same hand,—we trust its promises, commit our souls to its grace, and die triumphant, for "we are Christ's, and Christ is God's."

ART II.—SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE HON. STEPHEN MIX MITCHELL, LL. D.

IN the autumn of the year 1835, the last member except one,* as is supposed, of the congress of the United States, previous to the adoption of the constitution, departed this life at Wethersfield, Connecticut. This was the Honorable Stephen Mix Mitchell, late chief justice of this State, and long known as a distinguished and useful citizen. His life was extended far beyond the usual period assigned to man, having been but little short of ninety-two years. In the last triennial catalogue of Yale College, published in the summer of 1835, it appears, that he was then the living sen-

*Among the associates of Judge Mitchell in that body, were John Hancock, William S. Johnson, Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King, Theodore Sedgwick, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, John Treadwell, and several other eminent civilians, who have all, it is believed, been called from time, with the single exception of Mr. Madison.

ior alumnus of that institution. He was not, however, more venerable for years, than for his patriotic services, and moral worth; and much as he was honored with public testimonials of regard, he was still more endeared to a large circle of friends and acquaintances in private life.

Judge Mitchell belonged to that generation of men, who commenced, sustained, and perfected, the independence of their country, who molded its civil and religious institutions, and to whom the nation, on these accounts, is under the deepest obligations of gratitude. Very few of them remain to receive the homage of their countrymen, or to enjoy the reward of their arduous services in the cause of freedom and humanity. The rapid diminution of their number, would naturally, we should suppose, if not from a principle of curiosity, yet from a sense of propriety and justice, call forth the increasing attention of their juniors towards them. The relics of so noble a race, deserve our consideration for many reasons. As benefactors of mankind, and especially of their country, as patriots, and in many instances, as models of civic virtues and christian excellence, they deserve the lasting respect, as well as careful imitation of their successors and descendants. Their principles of conduct, as developed in civil life, and in an attention to the duties of piety, are worthy indeed of our most diligent study. Too much importance cannot be attached to their political and religious doctrines, constituting as these do, the basis of their character: and doubtless the best manner of learning them is from the living voice and example. We have still an opportunity from such a source, of acquiring information of more value to our country, than the experience of all the states of antiquity can supply. A few years, at most, will bear beyond our personal inspection or intercourse, all those, who, either in a civil or military capacity, acted a part in the interesting scenes of our revolutionary struggle. The generation is in embryo who will know these worthies, only in the story of their achievements. We can lose no time, then, in cherishing with a lively regard, those specimens of a class of our fellow-citizens to whom we are so much indebted; and as the chief among them from time to time disappear from the list of the living, we should feel it a privilege to record, in a passing tribute at least, our sense of their merits and services. It is with these views, that we propose to occupy a few pages of this work in giving a sketch of the life and character of the eminent citizen already named.

Stephen Mix Mitchell, was born at Wethersfield, in the county of Hartford, Connecticut, Dec., 20th, 1743. He was a son of James Mitchell, who emigrated in early life, from Paisley in Scotland, and settled in the town above named.* His mother was a

* James Mitchell first came to Boston, but not being pleased with the country,

daughter of the Rev. Stephen Mix, of Wethersfield. She was grand-daughter to the Rev. Solomon Stoddard, of Northampton, and of course, cousin to the first president Edwards. She was a second wife to James Mitchell, and died, leaving her son Stephen Mix, the subject of the present sketch, about four years old, her only child. The father of Stephen, died the first year of the revolutionary war, charging his son on his death bed, never to desert the cause of their adopted country. He had lived to see the latter settled in the world, and happily entered on his professional career.

At a suitable age, young Stephen commenced his studies preparatory to admission into college. His principal teacher who was a Scotch gentleman, by the name of Beveredge, and who had been sent for to this country for professional purposes of this kind, perfectly understood his business. He was not only a man of learning, but a disciplinarian of no ordinary character. His young charge in the present instance, soon ascertained, that mistakes in the recitation of his lessons, would be atoned for only by a severe corporeal infliction. The fear of such a consequence, for the most part, overcame the carelessness or indolence of youth. Lessons were well learned, and long remembered, or if blunders at any time were made, these were remembered still longer. To so strict and severe a discipline, however, Mr. Mitchell afterwards felt not a little indebted. He entered college in 1759, and graduated in 1763, when he was nearly twenty years of age. He distinguished himself by his talents and proficiency while in college; and though his course there was not without danger for a time, the influence exerted over him by a class-mate of excellent character, afterwards the Rev. Ebenezer Baldwin, was of a most salutary kind. In 1766 Mr. Mitchell was chosen a tutor in that institution, in which office he continued three years.

It was while he was in this situation, that he repaid to a pupil obligations which he owed to a class-mate. It was a case in which he manifested that benevolent interest, which he took in the welfare of others, and which marked his whole subsequent course in life. It deserves a particular notice from the importance of the result. Timothy Dwight, afterwards president of Yale College, was his pupil as well as kinsman. The loose opinions and corrupt practices which then extensively prevailed in the country, had, to some extent, affected that institution. This state of things

and receiving an invitation to go by water to Connecticut, he soon left the place to seek a new home. Passing up Connecticut river, it is said he saw nothing that reminded him of the beauty of his native Clyde, until he arrived at Middletown. Encouraged by the prospect, he continued his sail until he reached the rich and beautiful lands which constituted the towns of Wethersfield and Hartford. He stopped at the latter place, but after having lived there for a time, he removed to Wethersfield, where he spent the remainder of his days.

operated unfavorably on the noble and ingenuous mind of young Dwight. He had not directly fallen into vice, but the fascinating amusement of gambling, though he never staked money in play, had begun to occupy his attention, to the exclusion of his studies. Mr. Mitchell perceived his danger and desired to rescue him from so hurtful a course. Accordingly he administered a rebuke to his pupil, as he happened to meet the latter without the walls of college. Young Dwight was only irritated by what was said, and so far indulged resentment, as to withhold from Mr. Mitchell, the customary marks of respect due from students to an officer of the institution. Mr. Mitchell, however, could not suffer the affair to pass off in this manner. He sent for young Dwight to his room, and there by appealing to various motives calculated to operate on a susceptible and conscientious mind, (for the feelings inspired by a religious education were still strong,) he effected the change which he wished to see in his pupil. This was a memorable era in the life of Timothy Dwight, who ever afterwards felt and acknowledged his obligations to his tutor. It was a source of the purest satisfaction to Mr. Mitchell, that he had been instrumental in rescuing so fine a mind, from an illusion which had begun to pervert it, and in saving, in all probability, to the church and to the world, a youth who afterwards proved to be one of the greatest and most useful men in modern times. Vast as is the good which has proceeded already from this one act of faithfulness to the subject of it himself, and through him to hundreds whom he trained to virtue, it is probable, that as yet we see and know but a small part of its expanding amount. Let those who have the care of bright and ingenuous youth, be encouraged to the faithful performance of their duty, as soon as the latter are observed to deviate from the paths of rectitude, since they may add not one gem merely to the Redeemer's crown, but a great multitude, which, through a successive instrumentality, shall be fixed and sparkle there.

It was during the period of Mr. Mitchell's tutorship, as far as can now be ascertained, that his mind became more especially interested in the subject of personal religion, and that he began to lead the life of a believer in Jesus Christ. He professed religion soon afterwards, in Newtown, Conn., whither he went to reside upon leaving New-Haven.

His professional studies had been pursued during his tutorship, and afterwards under the direction of Jared Ingersoll, Esq. He was admitted to the bar in Fairfield county in 1770. In August of the preceding year, he became connected in marriage with Miss Hannah Grant, daughter of Mr. Donald Grant of Newtown, who had emigrated to this country some years before from Inverness in Scotland. Their union was of sixty years continuance. Mrs. M. having been called out of life on the 11th of Feb., 1830, at the

age of eighty. The firmness of her character and her christian temper, fitted her for the station which she occupied as a wife and the mother of a numerous offspring, and as called to dispense the hospitalities of the family to its frequent guests, and to manage its concerns during the repeated calls of her husband from home.

In 1772, Mr. Mitchell removed from Newtown to Wethersfield, his native place, and there established himself in the practice of the law. He continued in practice about seven years, having a large and increasing business. In this capacity, his diligence and integrity, won the confidence of the profession, and the community. As, however, he was in easy circumstances, from the property which came into his possession, both by inheritance and by marriage, and as his talents as well as inclination, pointed to the walks of public life, he relinquished the practice of the law to those who stood in greater need of its perquisites. In May 1779, he accepted the office of an associate judge of the Hartford county court. He held this office until May 1790, when he was placed at the head of that court. He continued in the latter situation until Oct. 1795, when he was appointed judge of the superior court, and in May 1807, chief justice of that court, which office he held until May 1814, when he became legally disqualified by age. His services in these stations were highly acceptable to the community, and he retired from the bench, carrying with him the sincere esteem and affection of all who were acquainted with his unaffected kindness of demeanor, purity of motive, and solid attainments.

In the earlier part of the period just spoken of, and indeed before he relinquished the practice of law, he represented his native town in the general assembly of Connecticut. He was first chosen representative in 1778 and from that time through five years in succession, he attended the semi-annual sessions of the State legislature. In one of those sessions, Oct. 1782, he was chosen clerk of the house of representatives. The year following, 1784, he was chosen assistant, or member of the upper house, and annually thereafter for nine successive years; and was in that capacity a member of the supreme court of errors. His services in these stations, were duly appreciated by the citizens of his native town and State.

But the exigencies of the country at large, and the demand for its best talents, and highest integrity, immediately subsequent to the great Revolutionary struggle, a period eminently of danger and weakness, called him repeatedly into a wider field of action. His exertions were wanted in the councils of the nation, as well as in the narrower sphere of State legislation. In 1783, he was a delegate from Connecticut, in the congress of the United States. To this station, he was again appointed in 1785, and thence suc-

cessively to 1788, including the last named year. In Oct. 1793, he was appointed a senator from the State, in the congress of the United States, for the unexpired part of the term made vacant by the death of the Hon. Roger Sherman. In this situation, he continued until he became judge of the superior court of Connecticut, in Oct. 1795. The station which he occupied as member of congress, both of the house and senate, called into exercise the utmost reach of his capacity, wisdom, and patriotism, in conjunction with those of the distinguished men, with whom he was associated. The perils of the country were great, and could be met only by unusual firmness and caution, on the part of the government. He contributed his share to the production of that order of things which eventually took place, and which was signalized by unusual national prosperity. He took his equal station with the master spirits of the times, and though it is not known, that he was a frequent or eminent debater, yet he was much consulted in regard to projects and measures, and his opinions had great weight. It was perhaps, as some one has remarked, "characteristic of those days, that talents were displayed more by the wisdom of measures,—in their result,—than by the display of logical debate. There was an intuition in the men of those times, which led them directly to a just conclusion. Nor was the talent in general for argument then, by any means equal to that of the present times. It is certainly, however, due to the character of the age that is past, to say, that wisdom and foresight were its prominent traits, by whatever process it was that the actors arrived at the results." We may add, that there were several individuals who distinguished themselves in debate; and this was more especially the case during the latter portion of the period above referred to. It was when Mr. Mitchell held a place in the United States' senate, that is, from 1793 to 1795, that the most exciting questions arising out of the relations sustained by this country to Great Britain and France, involving natural rights, and the proper measures to be pursued in such a crisis, were discussed; and which elicited the highest debating talent of the national legislature. In general, however, it was much less an era of speech-making than it is at present, and happily the effect was much more salutary to the country. The caution of those days in regard also to a superabundance of legislation, may perhaps be recommended to our modern legislatures, for their advantage. We may form an idea of it, from a familiar reply made by Mr. Mitchell, to a question as familiarly put to him by one of his neighbors, upon his return home from a very protracted session of congress. "What Mr. M. have you found to do, for so long a time at congress." "Why, sir, we have had as much as we could do *to keep from doing.*"

The part which Mr. Mitchell took, in one or two instances, in

public measures, while a member of the national legislature, will show the character of his services, and the obligations which his countrymen, especially the citizens of his native State, owe him for his exertions. It is not perhaps extensively known, that to Mr. Mitchell's efficiency while a member of the U. S. senate in 1786, the State of Connecticut is chiefly indebted, for the establishment of her title to the Western Reserve. He labored in connexion with Dr. Johnson, his colleague, and nothing was wanting on their part, to secure an object of so much importance to the State. As they expressed themselves in a joint letter to Gov. Huntington,* after success had crowned their efforts, "all the honest arts of political finesse, and every exertion of industry," of which they were capable, were exhausted on that occasion. It is proper, however, to state, that before the negotiation was brought to an issue, Dr. Johnson had returned to Connecticut in despair of accomplishing any thing. The laboring oar was of course left in the hands of Mr. Mitchell. Not long after, a favorable moment in the negotiation arrived, and Mr. M. lost no time in conferring by letter with Dr. Johnson on the subject. The doctor in reply, encouraged his

*We have in our hands a copy of a letter written during this period, the contents of which may gratify our readers.

NEW-YORK, May 20, 1786.

SIR,—After congratulating your Excellency on your advancement to the chief seat in government, we would inform [you,] that the business of our cession of western territory, is not yet finished; no vote has yet been had in congress upon it, although it has been three days at different periods under consideration and debate. Pennsylvania has thrown many obstacles in the way of acceptance, and we are not without our fears they will prevail so far as to prevent our wishes; we have urged for a decision with all our might, and we hope the ensuing week to bring the matter to a conclusion one way or the other; never did we undertake any thing in the political world so difficult, and which cost us so many pains and vexations. Our particular shares, of the land, if obtained, will be dearly bought.

Congress has received intelligence from Mr. Adams, by which we learn the answer of the British Court relative to delivering up the western Posts. Lord Caermarthen has delivered an answer to a demand of Mr. Adam's, in which he allows the detention of the Posts to be contrary to the stipulations in the treaty, but offers in justification thereof, the following reasons—That the laws of America in many instances, prohibit the recovery of debts due British subjects. He begins with Boston, and declares she has forbid the courts rendering judgment for interest which arose during the continuance of the war; he then mentions the New-York trespass law, prohibiting any military order being received, as evidence to excuse persons committing trespass, and also her laws relative to debts. He goes through the continent, and enumerates the laws in every State which are supposed by him an infraction of the treaty, and makes the Southern States much worse than the Northern, and concludes by saying, when America fulfils on her part, Great Britian will endeavor to do the same. We are happy to find Connecticut is not among the number of those States who are accused of breach of treaty.

New York has in some manner, granted the impost, as your Excellency will see by the inclosed copy of her law relative thereto.

Your's,

WM. SAMUEL JOHNSON,
STEPHEN M. MITCHELL.

colleague in view of such a state of things, to proceed in the application of his *Caledonian skill* in relation to the object. From the issue, it would seem, that it was very effectually applied. The negotiation, if rightly recollected, was principally carried on with Judge Wilson and Gen. St. Clair; who, without losing sight of the interests of their constituents, were personally friendly on the score of national affinity. The happy and successful senators, in the letter above spoken of, congratulate, as they well might, in view of the important acquisition, his Excellency and their fellow citizens on the joyful event. And certainly Connecticut, in the proud eminence of having the largest school fund in the world, has reason to remember with gratitude the exertions which secured to her such a treasure.

We briefly advert to another instance in which, it is believed, the subject of this sketch exerted a propitious influence on the condition of his country. From the more secret history of the times, it is probable, although it is not known with certainty, that the suggestions of Mr. M., made in friendship to a leading member of congress, were remotely the means of saving the nation from a collision with Great Britain. We refer to the period of the British encroachments on the commerce of the United States, in 1793, and to the consequent famous commercial resolutions of Mr. Madison in congress, in the early part of 1794. Mr. Mitchell, whose sagacity penetrated very much into the springs of action, became persuaded, that the effect of those resolutions, if adopted, must eventually involve this country in a war with Great Britain. Impressed with this feeling, he laid open his views on the subject to Mr. Madison, when he had an opportunity in private, urging on his notice the probable fatal consequences of such a plan of legislation. What effect was produced on Mr. Madison's mind, is not known. The person who expressed his opinions to the mover of the resolutions, never was assured, nor could he assert, that they produced any effect. It is however known, that those resolutions were never called up by Mr. Madison for a final determination, and we can only infer the probability, that his own reflections on the measures proposed, were improved or remodelled by the representations of Mr. Mitchell.

To the list already given of the instances in which the public consideration was bestowed upon Judge M., it may be added, that in Sept., 1807, he received from the Corporation of Yale College, the honorary degree of LL. D., and that he was a member of the convention that formed the Constitution of Connecticut in 1818. At the latter period he was in the 76th year of his age, and unimpaired in his intellectual powers.

Few men, it would seem from what has already been said, have been entrusted with more of the business of the public, or with

more kinds, than the subject of this sketch,—occupying as he did the seat of justice in its various gradations,—holding a place in the legislative hall of his native State, successively in each branch for many years,—and appearing repeatedly on the floor of congress, at first in the house of representatives, and afterwards in the Senate. Indeed he had an uninterrupted succession of public business of an important character, from 1778 to 1814, embracing a period of thirty-six years.

These facts show the degree of confidence which his fellow citizens reposed in him, and the conviction which was generally entertained, of his abilities and worth. That confidence was richly deserved, if it can be deserved by a long life spent in public services, with a spirit of disinterested patriotism, and a governing regard to the good of the community. The conviction so generally entertained of his capacity for public business, and his integrity in executing it, was well founded; for he seems never to have disappointed the expectations of his fellow-citizens. They were fully satisfied with the manner in which he fulfilled the trusts committed to him,—with his efforts for the public weal. The purity of his love of country, as was the case generally with the great men in connection with whom he acted, will never be questioned. It was the loveliest model of patriotism in any age or nation. It deserves to be held up for the admiration and imitation of all future time. It has been remarked by one who well knew the subject of this sketch, that in all the changes of politics, the exasperations of party, and the collision of sectional feeling, he seemed to seek only the public good.

The true interests of his country, so far as he comprehended them, he was unwaveringly bent upon promoting. He kept this object steadily and intensely in view, in all his public life. Even in the shades of retirement, and long after he had ceased to bear an active part in public business, he anxiously watched the progress of events, and felt a deep interest in the measures of the government. In the reign of party spirit, as it appeared in its earlier forms, we have heard his regrets in view of its prevalence, and he expressed the opinion, that neither in the name of the two political parties, nor in their objects, could there be a reasonable cause for the suspicions and malignant feelings that were engendered, and that no such difference existed as was designated, for instance, by whig and tory, in British politics. *There* he allowed there might be a real and radical difference of principle. This view of our party politics may well commend itself to the patriots and christians of the present time,—to the candid and judicious of all persuasions. This unhallowed political rancor should cease. For, however necessary or desirable it may be in a government like ours, freely to canvass its measures and strictly to watch its

agents, it is certain that our political wranglings as now carried on, promise any thing rather than benefit to the nation. The temper of this everlasting warfare is wrong. Its effects are most pernicious. It pollutes, corrupts, destroys whatever it fastens upon. The malaria does not more certainly cut down the Tuscan peasant in his summer labors on the Maremma, than our violent partisanship will eventually wither the root of national prosperity. It sacrifices to its fierceness and phrensy, to its cruelty and vindictiveness, private friendships, family concord, brotherly affection, patriotic devotion. It sets at nought all considerations of justice and right; scorns whatever is valuable in knowledge, venerable in virtue, or lovely in polished life. In short, the apprehension may be justly entertained, that through its influence in these times, we are losing sight of the public good, and jeopardizing all that we hold dear as a people. In this view, it is refreshing to call to mind the noble instances of patriotism which a former age produced.

If we may inquire into the reasons of a confidence, so frequently and long reposed in the person whose life we are narrating, it is obvious to remark, that we shall find one of those reasons in *his wide and liberal views* of subjects on which he was called to act. This was a common characteristic of the leading men of those times. They were accustomed to take an extended survey of the great questions of national policy, which were presented to their consideration. They had a large forecast, and examined profoundly the bearings and relations of measures. The narrow schemes of private interest were discarded, and in general, they rose even above sectional prejudices. They acted not for themselves and the present times, but for posterity and future ages. In these comprehensive and catholic views, Mr. M. participated, as well from the native structure of his mind, as from the force of circumstances. Enlightened and sagacious in no ordinary degree, as a statesman, he discerned, and as a patriot, he pursued the true interests of the commonwealth. This broad and far-reaching sight secures the only true and desirable popularity. The statesmen of our times should be instructed by the examples of the purest age of our republic. Let them take liberal and large surveys of questions of national interest, and it would certainly, in many instances, improve their patriotism, as it would speak much in favor of their intellectual strength and training. They might not be the great men of a mob, or favorites of political partisans, but they would carry with them the respect of the judicious portion of the community, and be cheered with the prospect of being remembered with gratitude by posterity. There would not be such free attempts, as we fear are now made,—

‘To sound
Or taint integrity.’

Strength of intellectual character, and largeness of views, would repel the audacious interference, and sadly balk the hopes of an aspiring demagogue.

With the above, in the case of Mr. M. was connected a *quick discernment of character, and an accurate knowledge of the human heart*. Men and manners he studied with much interest and success. He noticed, not without profit, the various forms in which human nature presents itself to persons who mingle much with the world, as was the fact in regard to himself. It was delightful to him to mark the operations of the intellect and heart, and his opportunities for this purpose exceeded those of most men. From the large number of his public connections and his acquaintances in private life, he was brought continually into contact with his fellow men, and that in very diversified circumstances. His field of observation was indeed large. These circumstances, connected with his professional habits, aided the natural sagacity and aptness of his mind, in tracing the lineaments of character. He consequently judged with accuracy, and successfully scanned the motives of men. He knew how to approach them, with a view to subserve the important purposes which he sought. Hence the allusion which was made by Dr. Johnson as above mentioned, to his Caledonian skill. A knowledge of human nature and human life, was of high importance to one in the stations which he occupied. It directed him to right judgments, and contributed to his success in life. It gained the confidence of the community, and laid a sure basis for an extended and lasting popularity. A knowledge of the springs of action, gives a man in any situation, a great control over others, not only by the direct exercise of that knowledge, but even at length by the conviction that he possesses it. But especially is this the case in official life. A successful, skilful public agent, is at least in orderly times, a man of the people.

A cause of public confidence may be found also in the *union of moderation and firmness*, by which Judge Mitchell was characterized in public life. He took a dispassionate view of things, and pursued a course of moderation, even in times of great excitement. He was not a man to commit the interests of his country or constituents, in the prosecution of wild and impracticable schemes. He loved order, propriety, and right; he aimed at the golden mean so generally praised, but so frequently lost sight of, both in public and private life. Violent and intemperate measures seldom do good; and the spirit which dictates them is harassing to the community. But moderation does not imply weakness, pusillanimity, or indecision. It may consist with firmness. It may be tenacious of truth and justice. It was so in the subject of our sketch. He was not easily deterred from pursuing the course which his judgment deemed to be correct. In his public

life, it is believed he ever evinced a commendable firmness and decision. Whoever has read the history of those times, especially the private letters which passed between the distinguished actors, must have a most thorough conviction, that the destinies of this country depended on the firm and dispassionate spirit which prevailed in our public councils. They had a noble object to gain, and yet the means of obtaining it were few and precarious. What contingencies existed in regard to the issue of measures? What interfering claims among the different States, to harmonize and settle? An extract from a letter which we have in our possession, from Charles Thompson to Mr. Mitchell, dated June 26th, 1787, will show, in a single instance, what qualities were required in the critical period of forming the national government.

* * * * * "I am glad to hear the delegates from your State will come on as soon as their attendance is found necessary. There are now five States attending, and I have written to Philadelphia, to the delegates of two States, who assured me they would attend as soon as there was a prospect of making a Congress. I expect them here to-morrow or next day, and am not without hopes of their bringing with them a third State, if so, your State will make nine, which will be competent to the great business of the Union. I therefore earnestly wish you to come on immediately. In my opinion, the honor and safety of the confederacy, greatly depends on the meeting and continuance of congress in session. * * * * * Whatever expectations politicians may indulge from the wisdom and magnanimity of the convention, I think they will be mistaken in their hopes of finding all our difficulties at once removed. I entertain as high an opinion as any one can or ought to entertain of the wisdom and rectitude of that assembly; but considering the temper of the times, and the present situation of affairs at home and abroad, I cannot help thinking that the happy issue of their deliberations, and the peace and safety of the confederacy, greatly depends on the meeting of congress and their continuance in session, and keeping up the form of government until the new plan which may be devised, shall have been adopted." The calm and decided measures of the wise and prudent only, could conduct the confederacy to a happy issue.

The *sterling integrity* of Judge Mitchell's character, should also, and in an especial manner, be brought into account here. It elicited, as it also justified, the confidence which was reposed in him by the public. It was christian integrity,—conscientiousness based on a regard for God and his word, and this dictated no other than a patriotic and disinterested course of public life. Neither interest, passion, nor a love of popularity, seems ever to have influenced the purposes or the decisions of his mind, in his official

career. If ever a man was free from the common charges of corruption in political life, he was so. His honest and honorable aims ; his purity and consistency could not be doubted. They were depicted in his very countenance, and breathed in the intonations of his voice. His uprightness and generosity ; his solicitude to serve the interests of the public, were too sincere to permit him to stoop to the common and base arts of political chicanery. He had no feuds to foster, no enmities to indulge, no rivals to put down. His only rivals were the magnanimous men, who strove together to confer blessings on their country. Guided and controlled by a pure principle,—by a single and simple purpose to do what was right, both in the legislative and judicial functions which he exercised, we readily see, how, in connection with the other characteristics of his public life, he secured the confidence and approbation of the better portion of the community.

But we love to contemplate a public man in the privacy of retirement ; mingling with his family and neighbors in unrestrained intercourse. Is he beloved here ? Is his kindly influence felt in the domestic circle, and in the vicinity of his home ? Is the approved or venerated incumbent of office consistent and exemplary in this condition ? Is he pure and amiable, cheerful and affectionate, decided and condescending in the intimacies of private life ; in communion with those who see him every day ? We are happy to be able to state, that Judge Mitchell was a bright example of the domestic and social virtues.

In the phraseology of the world, he was a fortunate man. With the exception of providential bereavements in his family, which however were many in the latter portion of his life, he was permitted to attain most of those objects which mankind value. His success in life exceeded that of most men. In worldly comforts, in social connections, and in political advancement, he must have realized whatever a wise man can consistently desire. He met with many favoring events, and was thrown into circumstances where his talents were called for, and where he had the privilege of exerting a beneficial influence on large numbers of his fellow-citizens. Now *we* do not attribute his worldly prosperity, or any portion of it, to chance or destiny ; for we believe in no such divinity. It was owing to a propitious providence,* connected with

* How much of this prosperity and the divine favor, was owing instrumentally to the agency of an eminently godly mother, on her dying bed, we leave for the consideration of those who believe in the efficacy of prayer, and of a consecration of children to God. As the incident was accidentally omitted in the proper place, we would mention here, that the mother of Mr. M., when near her end, was asked if she did not wish to see her little son, then living at a short distance from home, and give him her parting blessing. To this she replied in the negative, assigning as the reason, that the sight of him would only recal the

his own exertions, his seizure of the critical and promising turns of life; events that occur perhaps to most men, oftener than they are improved. If we may judge from his private correspondence, he was greatly a matter-of-fact-man. He was guided by settled, practical principles; weighed carefully the tendency of measures; and applied his various experience in life to its various exigencies. Proceeding on such a plan, he naturally met with success in the improvement of providential openings. This course he seems to have urged on his children, recommending it in connection with prayer to God, and dependence on his all-sufficiency. These he felt to be necessary for them in the great duties and emergencies of life.

In the more intimate and endearing relations which he sustained, he was all in affection and kindness, that could be desired. The calls of public business separated him often from the scene of his most valued enjoyments,—the spot which of all others he loved the best,—home and the family circle. Yet he cheerfully obeyed the summons of duty abroad, and through a protracted period, was necessarily employed in other than domestic cares. At the era in which he was in active life, it was not a time to indulge in soft delights and gentle cares at home, when every thing was at stake in the forming crisis of a nation's existence. Strong as he felt the social tie to be, he could forego its endearments, when the common good demanded the sacrifice. Yet he always returned to the beloved circle, with a renovated interest in its scenes, duties, and enjoyments. Judge Mitchell relinquished the career which, as a legislator, he had so long pursued, with heart-felt satisfaction; remarking in a letter to his wife, just before leaving Philadelphia, that 'he felt once more at his liberty, and that the public call had no more a command in it for him.'

The cordiality and the warmth of his feelings and attachments, were also an obvious trait of his character in private life. They were indicated by his manner in conversation, and in the general style of his intercourse with his friends. His familiar acquaintance had every reason to be satisfied with a friendship towards them, and a disposition to serve them, as sincere and pure as were ever felt. In his presence, modest merit was never abashed, but was awakened into confidence in itself, by his effectual and honest approbation. He did not more readily see, than heartily encourage,

desire of continued life. She could commend him to God, without seeing his face again in this world. This she accordingly did, in a fervent and importunate prayer, invoking the divine prosperity and blessing on her little one, soon to be left motherless. Mr. M. ever believed, that his success in life was connected with this act of solemn dedication to God, on the part of a dying mother. This persuasion, in every case, of a particular providence, was remarkably strong.

the indications of talent and moral excellence in others, especially in the young.

In his affable and condescending manners, and the lively interest which he took in the company that visited him, and in subjects of conversation, were presented a specimen of the gentleman and the host of the earlier and perhaps better times. His highly sociable qualities rendered him agreeable to all classes. Dignity was united with courtesy; good breeding with perfect plainness. Every thing about him was unadorned, unassuming.

"In himself was all his state." Elevated in station, he seemed never to be conscious of it. With his neighbors, he mingled in most familiar intercourse, and appeared on equal terms with the most humble individuals that approached him. He was so far from hauteur, or the affectation of consequence, that it was perhaps, impossible for one to be farther from it. None seemed to feel any other restraint before him, than that which a spontaneous veneration of his character dictated. He entered cordially into the situation of others, and in the tone and spirit of his conversation, made one feel, that his own mind was much enlisted in their behalf. We have admired at times, to see the freshness and buoyancy of his spirit in extreme old age,—how quickly upon occasions, his sympathies and his sensibilities broke forth,—how the associations of other days, the love of knowledge, the kindlings of patriotic enthusiasm, have seemed to revive, or retain in his mind a portion of their wonted power.

Benevolence adorned, as it constituted, an ingredient in the character of judge Mitchell. As expressed in cheerful services rendered for the benefit of others, it was an habitual exercise. The spirit of disinterestedness, was wrought into his very moral texture. Acts of kindness, were put forth whenever opportunities were presented. He particularly delighted in witnessing the elevation of others, and in forwarding whenever he could, the rise in station and character, of families and individuals. Instances might be related, if it were proper in this place, where his agency was employed in effecting objects so grateful to his generous feelings. Afflicted in the deaths of the larger part of his family, principally in middle life, and thus deprived of the gratification which he might otherwise have expected from them, he felt not the less interested in the welfare of other families. The depressing effect of bereavements, on no occasions, manifested itself in selfish complaints, or in a morbid indifference to the joys or the griefs of his fellow creatures. He knew better the secret of inward enjoyment, and the duty which he owed to God and man. He knew

"that good the more
Communicated, more abundant grows."

His disposition, and the present reward which he felt in his bosom, prompted him to this course of action.

His acquaintance with human nature, and the world, which has already been adverted to, as being so serviceable in performing the business of the public, was equally valuable in the more retired walks of life. With his other excellent qualities, it gave him a desirable influence over men in more circumscribed spheres,—in the particular church to which he belonged,—in his neighborhood, and in his family. The counsels of his wisdom and experience, fell not unheeded upon those who were thus in his immediate vicinity. His power of control and management in these humbler, though scarcely less important, departments of human agency, was not less real, than it was felicitous. Few societies, it is believed, were more quiet, regular and harmonious in former times, of general political agitation, than that in which judge Mitchell resided; a state of things which was owing essentially to his instrumentality, in connection with a few excellent influential townsmen of his. The people were convinced, that he understood the course proper to be pursued in regard to their local interests, and that he had the honesty to pursue it, and accordingly yielded to him their confidence. He was indeed an excellent adviser, and in individual cases, many felt the salutary effect of his suggestions. In occasional letters to his children, we have noticed the course which he gave them in regard to their studies, conduct and principles, with much admiration of its seriousness and wisdom. He comprehended at once the character of the human heart in youth, as well as in adult years, and sought to avert evil, before it became firmly fixed in its favorite resorts.

This nature, sagacity, and ability to penetrate the springs of action, combined with his catholic feelings and companionable turn, made him an admirable reprover of faults which he saw in others. Nor would reproof as coming from him, seem to excite resentment, however much it was felt. Instances are known, in which certainly, it was very happily performed. We venture to mention one or two cases, that we recollect to have heard. The former would tell well even in temperance times. Some one, we believe, who came to do a day's work for him, solicited a glass of bitters before breakfasting. Mr. Mitchell requested him to wait until he had answered some household calls, and then he would attend to his request. The poor man's trial of patience was somewhat severe, but he waited in hope that "the good creature," would be forth coming in due time. After a season of expectation sufficiently long to sharpen the appetite, Mr. Mitchell entered the room with an empty tumbler, and gave it to the disappointed man, remarking to him, that "this was the best bitter in the morning." Another case was the reproof of a townsman, who was known to

have acquired property by occasional gambling. Seeing Mr. — who lived at some distance from the centre of the village, he accosted him in his usual friendly manner, at the same time observing to him that he “seemed to prosper greatly, that his buildings, fences, and fields were in excellent order, and that every thing about his premises wore a neat appearance.” “But,” said he farthermore, in an emphatic tone, “These things M—— wont last. You can’t flourish always; for they tell me you play the devil up-street.” How much are such men, bold and faithful in reproof, wanted

“to annoy
The atheist-crew”—

those

“That live an atheist life,”

themselves impregnable on the ground of moral conduct!

The intellectual habits and character of judge Mitchell, deserve a more distinct notice, than we have bestowed upon them. His native powers of mind, were of a high order, and moreover disciplined by a good substantial education. The taste and polish, connected with the literary training of our times, were, in the early period of his life, unknown, or at least but little attended to, in this country. The general style of writing which prevailed among our literary men, was far from being correct or elegant. There were, however, many sound and ripe scholars, bearing probably a fair proportion to the number at present, of this description. In the branches which were studied, there was, in many cases, a most commendable proficiency. Indeed, there were instances of solid acquisitions, which have not often been rivaled since: while at the same time, it may be safely said, that the variety and extent of literary and scientific attainments, were not generally so great as characterize the present period of our intellectual history. It is not known, that judge Mitchell ever wrote much for the press—probably he did not. The character of his intellect was rather exhibited in conversation, and in the wisdom of his decisions and deeds, than in elaborate composition. The active scenes in which he mingled, were less favorable to regularity and closeness of study, than the condition in which many others are placed: and he has been known to regret, that he did not pursue a more thorough course of study, subsequently to his initiatory acquisitions. He could not, however, have been very seriously remiss in improving his intellectual powers, at any time. His range of information was extensive. He particularly excelled in the knowledge of past events, and in traditionary lore. The incidents and events connected with the history of this country, gathered, whether from reading, oral, rehearsal, or observation, were more familiarly known to him, than

to most of our educated men. His memory was so retentive, that nothing which he ever read or heard was forgotten; every important transaction in which he was engaged in his long and busy public life, could be recalled, in most of its particulars. He was minutely conversant with the scenes, the speeches, the deliberations, the opinions, and the projects connected with our congressional legislation, and we cannot but regret, that some pen had not recorded them as they fell from his lips in the free conversations of the fireside. Not a little knowledge of the past, of the traditionary kind, and pertaining to the more hidden and private transactions connected with our national history, we fear has perished with him. So lately as the publication of the *Life of John Jay*, when judge Mitchell we believe was about ninety years of age, and when the memory of the very few who live to such an age, fails entirely, while the work was read to him by a daughter, he inquired in several instances, whether certain transactions which he particularly designated, were not related in the book, as they were at length found to be, in the course of the reading. He retained his relish for intellectual pleasures, in a remarkable degree, and continued to the last in the cultivation of his mind, and in inquiries after knowledge. His intellect at ninety had not perceptibly abated its power.

Judge Mitchell was not undistinguished by his colloquial powers, and ready flow of wit. Repartee was natural to him, but it was not of an offensive kind. He had a quick command of his accumulated stores of information, and in intellectual converse with his friends, he was alike instructive and entertaining. We have seldom been acquainted with the individual to whom it was more interesting to listen in familiar conversation. His manner on such occasions was collected, but at the same time indicated much cordiality and warmth of feeling.

We have already referred incidentally to his moral and religious character. He was in principle and practice we are persuaded, as well as by profession, a disciple of the Son of God. His honesty of belief, and integrity of heart, will not be questioned among those by whom he was intimately known. There was a time in the early part of his life, as we have been informed, in which he entertained doubts in regard to the truth of christianity. But these were soon dispelled, upon serious inquiry upon the subject, and he became firmly settled in evangelical belief. In a letter to a son, in which he gives the latter religious advice, particularly urging him to make application to God for wisdom and direction, and pointing out the way in which the application should be made, as also assuring him of success, should his advice be followed, we find in a single remark, his own firm convictions on the subject. "I believe this," he says, "as much as I believe my own existence, and have by experience great reason to believe it."

His place in the church and in the house of God, was regularly filled, till extreme age and its infirmities, denied him the precious privilege. A stranger to the gospel, must surely have been favorably impressed with its power over the human mind, in witnessing one so venerable for years and wisdom, and whose hoary head was encircled with many an honor, sitting at the feet of Jesus, and listening with the docility of a child, to the words of grace.

His professional engagements and necessary devotion to civil and secular affairs, occupied time which, in some instances, might have been profitably consecrated to the direct duties of religion. The influence of the world he lamented; the incumbrances of public business he felt to be a serious obstacle to the spirituality of mind and the religious enjoyment which he desired. Doubtless too, he felt the necessity of habitually guarding against so insuaring an evil. As he approached towards the close of his days, it was evident to those who witnessed his social devotions, that they became more and more spiritual and heavenly in their character. This was, no doubt, an indication of his increasing meetness for the worship of a purer world.

His firm support of the institutions of the gospel, and his esteem of the christian ministry; his attachment to evangelical order and love of peace in the professing body of Christ, were well known traits in his character. He felt it to be a happiness as well as duty, to aid the cause of religion, both in his private and official station.

In his religious reading, he was fond of the substantial and rich authors of a former age. Baxter's *Saint's Rest*, in particular, was a favorite and often perused work. It occurs to our recollection, that in speaking of Edward's history of redemption, he passed an encomium upon it, which, as it was most deserved, also indicated the religious views and feelings of his own mind, to wit, that "it was to him the most interesting history which he ever read." He noticed and remarked upon the sentiments and style of sermons which he heard, with much discrimination. In our hearing, he once observed, in the way of recommending to ministers to write their discourses, that he never knew but one preacher who could express and deliver his thoughts extemporaneously as well as he could in writing. That individual was Dr. Bellamy, of Bethlem. His encouragement of ministers of the gospel, particularly such as were young, endeared him much to those who were the objects of his kind attentions. From such a circumstance, it is doubtless to be inferred, that he felt the importance attached to the ministerial office, and relished highly the truth communicated by its instrumentality. Indeed he was known to have the deepest convictions of the necessity and usefulness of faithful ministers of religion.

Judge Mitchell died as he lived, with a mind self-possessed,

clear, studious of the divine approbation, and realizing the solemnity of the change which he was about to undergo. He had often felt the fear of death, and sometimes expressed doubts respecting his preparation to meet it. But its actual approach was unaccompanied by any such weakness of nature, or failure of faith. Indeed, he had once before had the trial of threatening sickness in regard to the strength of his religious hope. Fears and doubts diminished, in the near prospect of death, in that instance, and composure and confidence succeeded in their place. The last conflict was short. Extreme age, attended at the time with a degree of morbid action of the system, had exhausted the powers of nature, and he fell easily into the arms of death. After he considered himself, and was considered by others in dying circumstances, he was able to communicate in a degree with his friends, and he left this emphatic testimony to the reality of divine grace,—that grace which he had received, as he distinctly and feelingly announced it; “I place my reliance entirely on my Savior.” It was on the 30th day of September, 1835, that he was called from this sublunary state.

So lived and died this venerable man and eminent civilian. It is refreshing to his friends, as it is a precious instance of the truth of the gospel, that God raised him up to act his part in a critical period of his country and its institutions; and that he acted it so well. Who does not see in such an example of moral worth, and in the lofty hopes inspired by true religion, the superiority of christian principles and gospel times, to other systems and other ages. All that the wise and tender-hearted Plutarch, for instance, could say to the mother of his young daughter, upon the decease of the latter, by way of consolation, or of inducing acquiescence in the distressing event, was, that death had deprived their child only of “small enjoyments. The things she knew were of little consequence, and she could be delighted only with trifles.” Alas! he could not point the mother to those higher joys, (for he knew not that topic of support in bereavement,) which are found when such as pertain to this life are lost,—joys which are reserved in heaven for all the people of God, when they are called from time. The christian survivor of good men,—of men who have lived to answer valuable moral purposes,—has no need to recur to so melancholy a thought, as the smallness of enjoyments, that have been lost on the part of the deceased, as a reason for acquiescence in a trying dispensation of providence. He can recur to the greatness of the felicity which has been gained.

In view of the present example, we intended to set forth what we conceived to be the importance of piety in civilians; in the influence of their piety on our country, its national councils, administration of justice, and other precious interests; and the im-

portance of piety in that class of men, especially at the present time, when our institutions, civil and religious, are jeopardized by political rancor, and the flagitiousness of many who sustain the more responsible offices of civil life. But we have only time to say, that the honored and honorable life of the subject of this memoir, his peaceful death, the sanctification of his intellectual powers; all that in him which combined the dignity of the christian, the purity of the patriot, the faithful public servant, the amiable citizen and neighbor, the exemplary head of a family, the venerated husband, father, and friend, may well be held up as a light to those who are now on the stage, and to coming generations in our land.

His virtues and services have been appropriately consecrated in the following lines, by Mrs. Sigourney :

‘ High requiem for the hoary head
With years and honors crowned,—
High requiem for the sainted dead
Within yon hallowed ground.

A patriarch of the ancient time,
A statesman free from stain,
A christian, strong in faith sublime,
Doth join the voiceless train.

Life to its latest remnant worn,
In wisdom and in love;
And all times burdens nobly borne,
He sought the rest above.

But ‘mid the throng of sacred dead,
From earthly passions free,
Why muse we on a mortal’s fame,
Though dear that fame may be !

High praise to him who gave the power,
Here in this vale of strife,
To foil temptation’s darkest hour,
And choose eternal life.’

ART. III.—HOPKINS' PRIMITIVE CHURCH.

The Primitive Church compared with the Protestant Episcopal Church of the present day: being an examination of the ordinary objections against the church, in doctrine, worship, and government, designed for popular use; with a dissertation on sundry points of theology and practice, connected with the subject of episcopacy. BY JOHN HENRY HOPKINS, D. D., Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal church in the diocese of Vermont. “ Thus saith the Lord, stand ye in the ways, and see, and ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein.” Jer. vi. 16. Burlington: Smith & Harrington: 1835. pp. 380.

ALTHOUGH this book reminds us of arch-bishop Laud, we have certainly no intention to make an unjust comparison between the author and that eminent martyr, as he is styled by high-churchmen. But so far as setting up a claim for the “ unquestionably divine institution of episcopacy,” in all the minutiae of its forms, is

concerned, the bishop of the diocese of Vermont evidently has some affinity of views with that misguided prelate. He has attempted nothing less than to deduce a scriptural warrant for the sum total of Episcopacy, as held by the church which he represents, in doctrine, worship, and government, not excepting the "ministerial garments." Whether such demands upon our credulity result from election to a diocese which may require the assumption of so high ground, or whether these are the bishop's former views, now for the first time distinctly expressed, we presume not to judge. But had there been less boasting,—a more evident concern for the *power*, and less regard for the *form* of godliness,—and had the strictures on revivals, and the temperance reformation been omitted, the claim to apostolical descent would, in our judgment, have been better supported. We shall test the validity of this claim in the proper place; but may observe here in passing, that the first reformers in the church of England, abandoned as untenable the high ground assumed by our author. We know also, that no small portion of the Episcopal church at the present day will dissent from his exclusive views. Attached as they are to their form of worship, they are evangelical in doctrine and practice, and pretend to no scripture warrant for any precise external form of the church, or *jure divino* mode of its government. It is due to truth and candor to say, that we have no controversy with such brethren. They will accord with us in the opinion of Baxter, that "the faith and holiness of the apostles, is the only title to descent worth contending for." We misjudge if there are not many in the new diocese of Vermont, who will recollect a different kind of teaching from that set forth in "the primitive church." From the Vermont Episcopal Register, edited as we are informed, by bishop Smith of Kentucky, we select the following appropriate extract.

'By some, a degree of importance is attached to the externals of christianity not much less fatal to genuine spiritual piety, than the systematized formalism of the Romish church. The effects of baptism are so magnified, the value of confirmation so extolled, and the efficacy of the Lord's supper so exaggerated, that some parents seem to imagine that the graces of christianity can as easily be put on their children at suitable ages, as the fashion of their clothes can be changed; and the deluded children perhaps at length imagine, that by these steps in religion they are as effectually prepared to come out christians in due time, as to appear accomplished and acknowledged ladies or gentlemen. Periodical solemn acts of religion can easily be magnified into the whole of it. And do not they who exalt the importance of these acts, at the same time they say little of deep, experimental, personal piety, contribute most fatally to the substitution of forms for real godliness?'

For some years past the Episcopal controversy has turned chiefly upon the three fold order of the ministry,—the exclusive valid-

ity of the sacraments as administered by this order,—and the importance of seeking salvation by a visible union with the apostolical church. In the volume before us, in addition, we are summoned to examine the traditionary and scriptural authority for god-fathers, liturgies, responses, vestments, and high titles. We see no end to this matter. The whole ground of controversy, from the reformation downward, has been gone over thousands of times, and yet the patience and talents expended have conducted us no nearer to a final issue. We are heartily tired of the same thread-bare citations from the fathers, who, through corruption and the mist of time, furnish to both parties in the case, nearly the same amount of testimony. We are no less tired of appeals to the scriptures for the decision of a subject which originated years after the sacred volume was closed, and of which it knows no more than it does of the origin of distilled spirits. The self-same arguments have been unblushingly reiterated, and as often confuted to little purpose. For ourselves, we would never meddle again with this interminable controversy, were it not for the direct bearing it is made to assume upon the vital interests of christianity.

"The primitive church," contains ten lectures, devoted (one on the temperance society excepted,) to the doctrine, worship, and government of THE CHURCH; and a dissertation on sundry points of theology and practice, connected with the subject of Episcopacy.

The author's views of *doctrine* we hesitate not to pronounce anti-apostolical and unscriptural. His introductory lecture from 1 Thess. v. 21, "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good," treats of the following topics: "The command to come to Christ—obedience rendered to it by uniting with his apostles—the church established by them still exists—and the necessity for uniting with it is still the same—how is this to be done in our day, when the church is so much divided—all sects cannot be equally near the apostolic system—christians are bound to examine and select that church which is the most scriptural and primitive, etc."

In this discourse, the bishop assumes what he is so confident of proving, to wit: that "our own branch of the universal church is the nearest to the apostolic pattern; and although "we may not condemn our christian brethren, since God is the judge," yet, "it is nevertheless absurd to say that error is equally safe with truth." This last self-evident position he illustrates by reference to "the society of Friends, the Swedenborgians, the Roman Catholics," and by inference to the whole body of dissenters, who may not be regarded as equally safe with the members of his own communion. "Since God is the judge," we are not greatly disturbed by this classification of ourselves with such errorists, which is more broad-

ly hinted at in other parts of the volume ; but let us look at the exposition of the command to come to Christ.

'Come unto me all ye that are weary and [labor and are] heavy laden, and I will give you rest, is the gracious command and sure promise of the Redeemer. And the mode in which we are to obey the command so as to obtain the fulfilment of the promise, was set forth by the apostle Peter, on the day of pentecost, when he said to the conscience-stricken multitude, "repent and be baptized every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the Holy Ghost." Of those who heard this exhortation, three thousand converts yielded their hearts to Christ Jesus without delay, acknowledging him as the Lord of life and glory. They were baptized forthwith, and taken into communion with the apostles ; and thus was formed the church of God under the gospel dispensation, to which we are told, 'the Lord added daily such as should be saved.'

The church, my brethren, still exists, to attest the truth and power of its divine Master. Compared, in the beginning, to a grain of mustard seed, it has become a great tree with many branches. And still, those who would be saved, must be added unto it, must profess the same repentance and faith, and receive the same ordinances, and hold communion with its ministry, for there is no other mode revealed whereby we may enter the kingdom of heaven.' p. 1.

We admit *spiritual* union with the church of Christ to be essential to salvation ; but we dare not affirm as much of a *visible* union. This would give to ordinances, an importance unauthorized either by the letter or spirit of the gospel, and consign over to perdition many of the pious, who from conscientious scruples delay the profession of their faith, and in the mean time are prevented by sudden death. Every sinner who cordially submits to Christ, finds immediately the promised rest, that is, pardon and acceptance ; and moreover, so far from duty is it, to seek this rest by uniting with the church, that a gracious state is a necessary pre-requisite to visible union with any branch of Christ's kingdom. The command of the Saviour therefore, (Matt. 11. 28.) is manifestly and grossly perverted, by adding, as essential to obedience to it, the necessity of church-union. It will appear from other extracts, that we do not misunderstand the author's exposition. He does make "entering the communion of the saints" essential to salvation.

'If we had lived during the ministry of the Savior upon earth, and desired to come unto him that we might have life, it is plain that we should have approached him in person, and have left all, that we might follow him, as did his other disciples. Before he ascended into heaven, he constituted the apostles his representatives, saying expressly, 'Behold I give unto you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted to them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained.' 'As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you.' 'Who so receiveth you, receiveth me,' etc. Of course,

had we lived in the days of the apostles, our only mode of coming to Christ would have been to come to them, his appointed representatives, professing our penitence and faith, receiving baptism, and uniting ourselves to their visible communion or fellowship.' p. 4.

'But is it not worthy of serious consideration, whether the promising men salvation *without the church*, has not the strongest tendency to persuade the world that the privileges of this ark of God are of no importance? Is it not wiser, to extend the definition of the church universal to the utmost limits, than to indulge men with the expectation, that out of its sacred enclosure, they may be saved?" Dissertation p. 349.

'While therefore, I should maintain that the substance of the sacraments may be had without a regular ministry, and that under precisely similar circumstances, the case of the Corinthians might be a very proper model, yet I cannot but believe, that a wanton or a needless departure from the apostolic order of sacramental ministration involves a sin of the nature of sacrilege, of which no conscientious and enlightened mind would ever risk the commission.' Diss. p. 346.

This might suffice, but to "make assurance doubly sure," we turn to "The Primitive Creed, examined and explained," a work of the same author.

'In vain then, to the sinner, is the belief in God, the belief in Christ, or even the belief in the Holy Spirit, without the adoption into the church, the entering the communion of the saints, and in this appointed, visible, and necessary channel, the obtaining forgiveness of sins. We speak not here of those who are cast in the wilderness, or amongst the heathen, and who CANNOT come in the appointed way. The Lord asks not for impossibilities. But we speak of those and to those who are in a land of christian light and knowledge; we speak to some among yourselves, my brethren,—to you who, if the forgiveness of your sins be worth your seeking, have no excuse for neglecting to seek it in the only regular and sure channel, by uniting yourselves in heart and in an open profession to the visible body of believers. Seek then, the blessings of salvation, the grace of forgiveness, the pardon of your sins from the atoning sacrifice of Christ, in the communion of the saints, in the holy Catholic or universal church, and through the Holy Spirit who presides in the assemblies of his people.' p. 196.

We are amazed at the promulgation, by "a master in Israel," of such a doctrine as is disclosed in these extracts. How far is it from the popish tenet: *extra ecclesiam Romanam salus non potest!* Associated as it is with frequent allusions to the "admirable liturgy," the "venerable apostolical church," and the importance attached to forms of worship, it cannot fail to have a pernicious tendency. It must depreciate the value of that "godly sincerity," that holiness of heart and life which constitute the sum and substance of "pure religion and undefiled," as inculcated in the scriptures. Paul says to Timothy, (i. 1, 4.) "Neither give heed to

fables, and endless genealogies, which minister questions rather than godly edifying which is in faith. Now the *end* of the *commandment* is *charity out of a pure heart, and a good conscience, and faith unfeigned*: from which some having swerved, have turned aside unto vain jangling." There cannot be too broad a distinction between the *form* and the *power* of godliness. The one is comparatively of little value; the other is absolutely essential to salvation.

We cannot leave a topic, so intimately connected with the vital interests of christianity, without just adverting to a quotation from scripture, in the first of the above extracts, and the exposition of a passage in the "primitive creed examined." The bishop says, that Christ, before his ascent, "constituted the apostles his representatives, *saying expressly*, 'behold I give unto you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted to them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained.'" We have here the whole of John xx. 23, appended to a small and incorrectly cited part of Matt. xvi. 18, 19. What Christ is quoted, as "*saying expressly*," we have no recollection of his saying at all. These are his words: "And I say also unto *thee*, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto *thee* the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever *thou* shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven." We have a right to complain of such mangled citations from the scriptures, by a protestant bishop; and the pope of Rome, we think, will object to this wresting of a passage which constitutes the only prop of his pontificate. But we have stronger objections to the exposition of a passage in the "creed examined." The bishop says:

'It by no means follows from this, however, [salvation by grace through faith, the gift of God,] that the Holy Spirit operates upon the mind and heart, according to an arbitrary system of election, by which some are saved and others lost, merely through the choice of the Deity. So far from it, that 'grace,' to use the emphatic words of the same apostle, 'grace is given to EVERY MAN, to profit withal, and Jesus Christ willeth ALL MEN to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.' The Holy Ghost confers on all who hear the gospel, a measure of his blessed influence, sufficient to enable them to believe and obey; and if this measure of grace be used aright, more is given, and the supply is continued and increased, so as finally to bring into the highest exercise, every power and faculty of the awakened soul.' p. 140.

This brief notice of the doctrine of election, of which we find nothing more in the work, taken in connection with what follows,

savors strongly of Arminianism, and it will require much ingenuity to make it harmonize with the *seventeenth* of the *thirty-nine* articles. But passing this, the words of Paul are misquoted, misinterpreted, and misapplied. He says, not grace, but "the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man, (that is, christian,) to profit withal." (1 Cor. xii. 7.) "Now concerning spiritual gifts, *brethren*, I would not have you ignorant. There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal." The apostle adds, "to one is given by the Spirit, the word of wisdom; to another faith; to another the working of miracles, etc." By the same Spirit, miraculous gifts, tongues, prophecies, are imparted, but the manifestation of the Spirit, in the diversity of its operations, is given to every christian for the common benefit (*πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον*) of the household of faith.* We have long been astonished, that on this and one or two more perverted texts, should have been reared the fabric of Arminianism: the removal of original sin by the death of Christ; the giving of grace to all men, bringing them into a "salvable" or half-converted state, and gradual regeneration, by the improvement of this inherent grace. These doctrines are repugnant to scripture and to facts in religious experience. Could it avail any thing, we would enter our solemn protest against such random quotations from the inspired word; such perversions of its meaning; and we might add, the employment of passages enforcing the practical duties of religion, to hang tradition, speculation, and the forms of religion upon. What, for instance, has the necessity of a new birth (John iii. 5.) to do with "The Protestant Episcopal church, misunderstood and therefore misrepresented,—infant baptism,—explanation of the sponsor's duty,—sentiments of the primitive fathers, etc." Yet such topics, utterly foreign to his text, constitute the burden of the bishop's two succeeding lectures. We shall limit our attention, however, in this part of the work, to the more important doctrine of *regeneration*.

The author complains that the church is misunderstood, and wrongfully accused in regard to many points of faith and practice; but especially concerning the doctrine of *regeneration*.

We are aware, that Episcopalians of a certain class, are charged with error in regard to the fundamental doctrine of the new birth. We confess too, that we ourselves are of the number of those who fear, that there is too much ground for such an allega-

* Vid. Schleusner, and Rosenmueller.

tion. From an examination of the subject of baptism, as set forth in the book of common prayer, and observing the application of this rite in numerous cases, we are not satisfied, that correct views are entertained of this ordinance. The "mystical washing away of sin" by sanctified water, we must regard as a *canonical error*, however it may plead the sanction of antiquity. We see no evidence that either a child, or adult is, in the sacrament of baptism, born again, "regenerated, and grafted into the body of Christ's church,"—"received into Christ's holy church, and made a living member of the same." Nor are we convinced by the author's explanations, that his views of this all-important subject accord, to use his own favorite phrase, with "scriptural and apostolic doctrine." He might have spared half his laborious citations from the primitive fathers, and the great lights of the English reformation, and yet substantiated the fact, that their views of baptismal regeneration, correspond with his own; but the testimony of primitive fathers has not the authority of scripture, at least not with us; nor is it certain, that in this matter they have correctly expounded the word of God. But we will give the reader the bishop's own exposition of the doctrine of regeneration.

'First, What is regeneration, or the new birth. Secondly, What is a change of heart. And, Thirdly, What place do we assign to this change of heart, in relation to baptism.'

'Regeneration, as presented to us in scripture, signifies that act of divine grace, through Jesus Christ, in which we are received as the sons of God by adoption. By our first generation we are born the children of wrath, in consequence of our corrupt and sinful nature; and we must be born again in order to become the children of God. This second generation is our regeneration. The great authority on this question is our Lord's assurance to Nicodemus. "Verily, verily I say unto thee, except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Now we have here the express declaration of Christ himself, that in the new birth, or the regeneration of the sinner, he is born of water and of the Spirit; in which it is remarkable that the water is placed first, as if to prove incontestibly that the spiritual adoption *follows* the application of the water, instead of preceding it.' p. 18.

A *change of heart*, we are informed, is synonymous with repentance and faith; and "modern theologians have confounded regeneration with this change."

'When we speak of a change of heart, in a religious sense, we mean much the same as the apostle more correctly describes under the terms, 'repentance towards God, and faith in [towards] our Lord Jesus Christ.' Indeed, repentance, in the original Greek, signifies a change of mind; and in its full application to the sinner, it would import all that the modern and somewhat unscriptural phrase, change of heart, is

supposed to mean. And here is the origin of the whole difficulty in the doctrine of regeneration, that modern writers have thought fit to call repentance by this name, because they conceived that as repentance was the first introduction of spiritual life into the soul, therefore every true penitent was born of God,—born of the Spirit, and consequently regenerate. But a very little reflection on the figurative language employed by our Lord, might have led to a different conclusion. For he refers Nicodemus to the analogy of the natural birth; and we all know, that in the case of the natural man, it is one thing to have life, and another thing to be born. Nay, we know that in the order of nature, the infant must have life many months before its birth into our world. How simple then, is it to understand that the soul of the sinner must have spiritual life before it can be born into the spiritual world. How plain does it seem that repentance towards God, and faith in [towards] our Lord Jesus Christ, or what is popularly called the change of heart, **IS NOT** the new birth, nor regeneration; but in all who are old enough to be the subjects of this change, 'must, according to the order of grace, GO BEFORE IT.' pp. 19, 20.

We add one passage more. 'The case is supposed "of one who has never been baptized, and who is living careless, prayerless, and profane, without hope and without God in the world." This man becomes truly penitent, and "feels within, and shows outwardly, that a mighty change is passed upon him."

'What should we say of such an one? That he is regenerate? No. That he is born of God? No. But that he is penitent, contrite, converted, and changed by the power of divine grace, in order that he **MAY BECOME REGENERATE**, in order that he may be born again in the way appointed by Christ; of water and of the Spirit. The spiritual life is indeed begun, the motions of that life are manifest, but the hour of birth is not yet come. In due time however, this penitent and converted man presents himself to the minister of God, as a candidate for baptism. He is examined in the principles of the christian faith, and found to be prepared. And then, in the presence of the Most High, and before the assembled congregation of the Lord's people, he solemnly renounces Satan, the vain pomp and glory of the world and the sinful desires of the flesh, professes his faith according to the apostolic creed, pledges himself to the performance of the will of God, and after the full surrender of himself, body and soul, to the Redeemer, the minister of Christ, by the authority of his divine Master, pours upon his head the water of baptism. His name is forthwith registered in the book of life; the grace of adoption descends upon him, and he is received into the family of the heavenly King, the child of God, born of water and the Spirit,—regenerate,—forgiven,—washed,—sanctified,—the heir of glory.' p. 22.

We shall make a few comments on the doctrine of these passages, after we see its application to the case of infants. "The change of heart should precede baptism," in the case of adults,

but "in the case of infants, this change must follow" baptismal regeneration. It is obvious, that repentance and faith must follow infant baptism, because at the time of their dedication, they are incapable of repenting and believing. But in what sense are they regenerated? He says:

'They [the sponsors] make the solemn renunciation and profession of faith, which in due time devolves upon the infants, and thus they are adopted by Christ, and registered as his own; their sinful nature is pardoned, a spiritual blessing descends, as a germ of life into their souls; they are born of water and of the Spirit,—regenerated and made heirs of the heavenly kingdom.

To my mind, therefore, there is no truth more clear, and being myself a parent, there is none more precious, than the doctrine, that the Spirit of God, in receiving the infant consecrated to Christ by baptism, not only adopts him as an heir of immortality, not only grants him the remission of sins, not only registers his name in the book of life, but also gives him a *spiritual blessing*, which blessing I am willing to understand as the first pulse of spiritual life in his soul,—the earnest, if I may so express myself, of all the future influence of divine grace,—the dawning ray of that heavenly light which is in due time to arise upon his heart as the sun of righteousness,—the germ of sanctification.' pp. 23, 28.

The bishop admits, that this "first pulse of spiritual life" in the infant soul will cease, without diligent cultivation; but he has no doubt, that if the sponsors are faithful, it will in due time result in christian character. We must be permitted to doubt, and even to reject this doctrine of infant regeneration. The scriptures are silent on the subject, and the long array of testimony from the early fathers, is by no means satisfactory. The weight of their authority rests on the nearness of time to the apostles, and the conjecture, that they must have received such a doctrine from these inspired men. It has no other ground than this for its support. From the character of the apostles, the spirit of the gospel, and the testimony of facts, we *guess* that the doctrine is false.* This "germ of life," and "germ of sanctification," we regard as the germ of error, and of much mischief. Followed out in its tendency, it would lead a man into the church, in the mere possession of an outward moral character, and correct religious sentiments. Take this view of the new birth, in connection with the

* Some of the old divines degraded the natural character of man below the consequences of the fall. Arminius, but much more his successors, admitting the antinomian error to have been true before Christ came, sought a remedy in the fiction, that the atonement removed original sin, gave grace to every man, and brought him into "a salvable," or half converted state. Neither doctrine has any basis but man's device. So extremes of error meet.

doctrine, that "the communion of the saints" is necessary to salvation, and the importance attached to ordinances; and have we not just ground of apprehension, that the true doctrine of regeneration is misunderstood, and may be overlooked in a christian profession? We admit, that repentance and faith, in the scriptural meaning of these terms, imply a change of heart, or what we should call, a new spiritual birth; but such views of ordinances as we have noticed, must also tend to produce erroneous views of all the great doctrines of the gospel.

But let us see how, in the case of *adults*, baptismal regeneration is proved from the scriptures. The passages relied on, are Acts ii. 38; xxii. 16; 1 Pet. iii. 20, 21; John iii. 5; Tit. iii. 5; and Acts x. 47. All the testimony that can be derived from these passages, in favor of the doctrine in question, is the simple fact, that remission of sins and regeneration, are mentioned in connection with baptism. But will they bear the construction put upon them? Peter says to his convicted hearers, on the day of Pentecost, "Repent and be baptised every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." Bishop Hopkins, gives us the following comment on these words. "Here we see that baptism is introductory to the remission of sins, and of course to the privilege of adoption; for we can hardly conceive of God adopting any as his children, whose sins were not forgiven." But the same apostle says, (Acts iii. 19.) "Repent ye therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out." The scriptures promise salvation on the exercise of faith, as in the case of the jailor; and we have decisive testimony, as well as the assurance of scripture, that sins are forgiven immediately on the exercise of repentance. The reference to Peter, comparing the preservation of Noah in the ark to salvation by baptism, does not prove, that the outward rite is essential to salvation; for Peter tells us explicitly, that he means purity of heart, of which water is a symbol. As to the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, (Tit. iii. 5.) we ask if the same apostle who said, "Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel," could mean any thing more than the new creation of the Spirit, signified by baptismal water? Could he understand the direction of Annanias, "Arise and be baptized, and wash away thy sins," in any other sense? Dr. Scott, in his commentary, says, that this washing "was an outward sign of the washing away of his sins, and the seal to him and to all true believers, of that blessing and of the righteousness of faith, as circumcision had been to Abraham." He says of the passage in Titus, "by the washing of regeneration, that new birth of the Spirit, of which 'the laver' of baptism was the sacramental sign, but nothing more." The case of devout Cornelius, and his pious

company, is unfortunate for the purpose for which it is introduced ; notwithstanding we are told, that "perhaps there is nothing more decisive on the subject of the necessity and privileges of baptism." For although the centurion and his company were godly men, and the Holy Ghost in his miraculous power had fallen on them, "yet the apostle does not think all this sufficient for his admission into the kingdom of heaven, but proceeds to have him baptized for the remission of sins, that he might be born of water and of the Spirit, and adopted as the child of God in the solemn sacrament of regeneration." p. 49. We beg leave to ask how it is known, that Peter had all these reasons for administering baptism in this instance, since he says not a word about the new birth and the remission of sins. The remaining passage (John iii. 5.) on which so much stress is laid, we conclude, can mean nothing more than a renovation of the heart by the Spirit ; signified, sealed, and professed by the institution of baptism. Dr. Scott says, "If however, baptism and 'being born again,' be terms of the same meaning, or if the one invariably accompanies the other, so that all who are rightly baptized, are regenerate, and none else ; then all who die unbaptized, even infants, as well as others all over the earth, and in every age of the world, without exception, are shut out of heaven ! A proposition far more dreadful than any held by the most unfeeling and supralapsarian Calvinists."

We had marked for comment, the singular idea of "spiritual life before spiritual birth," derived from "the analogy of the natural birth ;" but we have dwelt so long on the vital doctrine of regeneration, that we have not room to pursue it. We will only ask the reader to examine the following passages, where the word is used, denoting what the scriptures term, *being born of God*, and he will find satisfactory proof, that the importance attached to baptism, and the views of regeneration in the "primitive church," are unscriptural, and of dangerous tendency. (John i. 13 ; 1 Pet. i. 23 ; Philemon x. 1 ; Gen. ii. 29 ; iii. 9 ; iv. 7 ; v. 1, 4, 18.) These are nearly all the passages, that speak of regeneration in the new testament ; and neither baptism, nor the necessity of it in order to the remission of sins, is mentioned in a solitary instance.

We have a word to say on the office of *sponsors*, and shall then examine the doctrine of *confirmation*. Bishop Hopkins uses the following language :

'As the infants mentioned in the gospel according to St. Luke, were brought to the Savior that he might touch them, and as he graciously took them into his arms and blessed them, even so the church dedicates her children to the Lord ; the minister receives them at the hands of such as are themselves in membership with the Redeemer, they make the solemn renunciation and profession of faith, which in due time devolves upon the infants, etc.—Our rule requires that three persons, if

they can be found, should present each child ; two men and one woman, if the child be a male ; but two women and one man, if the child be a female. These persons are called god-fathers and god-mothers, because they do the part of a father and mother before God, in dedicating the infant to his service.' pp. 23, 36.

This office of sponsorship, to sustain which, even the Catholics consider *two* persons sufficient, is not attempted to be justified from scripture, for the best possible reason, necessity ; but is made to rest wholly on "a universal principle of law." Not even the primitive fathers are adduced to relieve the difficulty. Nothing like it occurs in the history of circumcision. Who, for instance, stood god-father to Abraham's household ? He was commanded to dedicate his own children on his own faith ; and this command applies in the case of infant baptism. The sponsor's office is purely of human device, and interferes with the parent's duty ; as for the sponsors in general being "in membership with the Redeemer," it is incorrect, unless mere infant baptism gives them membership. We know, that many a god-father and god-mother makes no pretensions either to faith or piety, and has little or nothing to do with the child,—often absolutely nothing,—in its education. To say, therefore, of such an office, that it is useless, is to speak less than the truth.

We proceed to the doctrine of *confirmation*. The text on which is rested this "apostolic ordinance," is Heb. vi. 2. But in the context Paul says, "Therefore, leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ, let us go on unto perfection ; not laying again the foundation of repentance from dead works, and of faith towards God, of the doctrine of baptism and of laying on of hands," etc. Truly we have had enough of first principles and outward forms, and it must be high time to go on to perfection,—the practical duties of religion. If, however, *ecclesiastical confirmation* is an important "apostolical ordinance," we will not undervalue it. But we have no evidence of this,—none at all. The laying on of hands, in blessing children, healing the sick, ordaining ministers, conferring the miraculous powers of the Holy Ghost, and some other instances, are frequently mentioned in the scriptures ; but there is nothing like the distinct and separate rite of confirmation. In the ancient church, the imposition of hands was immediately after baptism, if the bishop was present ; and throughout the East it still accompanies baptism : but the Romanists make it a distinct, independent sacrament.* The Catholics who admitted the baptism of heretics, repeated the rite, or as it was afterwards styled,

* Clarke's Essay on Confirmation. Wood on ditto. Howe's Episcopacy, pp. 167, 174. Mosheim, vol. i. p. 210, Lond. 1790.

the sacrament of confirmation, to which they ascribed many mystic and marvelous prerogatives, both visible and invisible.*

The English non-conformists, styled in derision Puritans,† by high-churchmen, with other substantial reasons for separating from the hierarchy, "disapproved the custom of *confirming children*, as soon as they could repeat the Lord's prayer and their catechism, by which they had a right to come to the sacrament, without any other qualification; this might be done by children of five or six years old. They were also dissatisfied with that part of the office where the bishop, laying his hand upon the children, prays that God would *by this sign* certify them of his favor and goodness; which seems to impute a sacramental efficacy to the imposition of his hands."‡ We are aware, that the ground of objection to this ordinance, since the days of the non-conformists, is in part removed. But we still fear, that between baptism and confirmation, candidates for the "holy communion" may overlook the essential requisites in a christian profession. Much is said by bishop Hopkins of preparatory instruction, and the means of strictly examining the "qualifications of every candidate." We are asked, "What can open a wider field for instruction and examination, as to the knowledge, the sincerity, and even—if the minister, from peculiar circumstances, should think it necessary—the *experience* of those whom he recommends as fit for confirmation?" The word *experience* here, set in italics by the author, in connection with "*peculiar circumstances*," seems to insinuate, and we regret to say it, that in general, *experience* is unnecessary; and they who require it are over-much precise. We have a right then, to express our fears, that in regard to preparation for the ordinance of confirmation, the parents may devolve their duty on the sponsors; while the sponsors in many instances, as is well known, have little sense of the obligation they assume, for they make no pretensions to piety; and indeed many of them seldom see the children, whose religious education is committed to their trust. We ask for information, how far the objection urged by protestant non-conformists (Neal, vol. i. p. 259.) remains yet in force. "When the education of children is by the laws of God and nature intrusted to parents, who are

* Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, London ed. in one vol. p. 616. Chardon *Hist. des Sacréments*, tom. i. pp. 405, 552.

† It may be well, for those who still vindicate the principles of the Puritans, to repeat the testimony of Hume. (*Hist. Eng.* vol. v. pp. 183, 469.) "So absolute indeed was the authority of the crown, that the precious spark of liberty had been kindled and was preserved by the Puritans; and it was to this sect whose principles appear so frivolous, and habits so ridiculous, that the English owe the whole freedom of their constitution. It was only during the next generation, that the noble principles of liberty took root, and spreading themselves under the shelter of puritanical absurdities, became fashionable among the people."

‡ Neal's *Hist. of the Puritans*, vol. i. p. 260, Portsmouth ed. 1816.

bound to form them to virtue and piety, they apprehended it very unjustifiable to release them totally from that promise, and deliver up the child to a stranger; as was then the constant practice, and is since enjoined by the twenty-ninth canon, which says, "*No parent shall be urged to be present, nor be admitted to answer as god-father to his own child.*"

To sustain his position, that "Confirmation was instituted by the apostles as a standing ordinance in the church of Christ," bishop Hopkins refers to Acts viii. 15, and Acts xix. 5, 6, in connection with Mark xvi. 17, and 1 Cor. xii. But what do these passages amount to? The apostles conferred the miraculous powers of the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands; but they did not in this way confer that measure of divine influence which then was, is now, and ever will be necessary to the production and increase of personal holiness. The subsequent "apostolical ordinance," therefore, so called, falls to the ground, and it is in vain to bring forward in its support, "Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, Urban, bishop of Rome, the council of Arles, A. D. 314," and in the fore-front, Calvin and Luther. The gift of miracles, by the laying on of hands, has ceased, and what more do we want of the *sign* when the *thing signified* has vanished away? Confirmation, as it now exists, was totally unknown to the apostles, and the laying on of hands to bestow the gift of the Holy Ghost, as Calvin says, should have ceased with them. Our author by no means refutes the argument, by objecting, that as miraculous powers followed preaching and praying, these too, on the same ground, should have ceased. He is sufficiently answered by replying, that what was peculiar and necessary to the church in its infancy has terminated, and what was needed to the end of the world is perpetuated, divested of accompaniments no longer necessary.

We have a word to say on the use which is made of the apostle Paul in relation to the present subject. We apprehend, anachronism aside, that it will be extremely difficult to make him a true churchman, either in the article of baptism, or confirmation. Beside the well known fact, that he attached comparatively little importance to the externals of religion, (Acts xvi. 3; Rom. xiv. 7; 1 Cor. ix. 19, 21; Gal. v. 6.) his testimony in the present case is perverted. He was sent, not to baptize, but to preach the gospel; and consequently certain commentators have furnished him with the usual attendance of "some of the inferior orders of the ministry," to do the work of baptism, and therefore, he baptized "probably only when he was alone." And so it is readily assumed, that he did not baptize the disciples of John at Ephesus. (Acts xix. 5, 6.) But whoever reads that chapter without a theory to support, will conclude that Paul came alone to Ephesus, and performed the baptism himself, and at the time, or immediately after the baptism

laid his hands on them. Apollos was at Corinth, and no mention is made of any companion in the journey. But to say that "some other minister" generally accompanied him, and baptized "on the direction of Paul," contradicts his own testimony. If we may for once, resort to "the analogy of human law," and of divine law also, Paul did what his agent did at his direction. *Qui facit per alium facit per se.* It is said, that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John, (though Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples.) John iv. 1, 2. Would a man of Paul's sense and character have thanked God, that he had baptized so few, if his traveling servants administered the ordinance for him at his command? What is the difference whether the master did it, or the servant, as directed by his master? We hesitate not to say, that there is no scriptural authority for confirmation. We do not object to its continuance, as a venerable usage, if its importance is not exaggerated; but we must be allowed to ask, how an ordinance of human device came to be exalted in value above the only two sacraments which Christ instituted. The inferior order of the ministry may officiate in baptism and the Lord's supper, but the highest order, namely, bishops only may confirm!

The three following lectures treat of the "charges brought against the church on the score of missions—the bible society—prayer meetings—revivals—dangers of the modern revival system—the temperance society—the use of ministerial garments—forms of worship—the Lord's prayer—forms of prayer—liturgies—music of the church, etc. The texts, which seem to have little affinity with this group of topics, are 1 Cor. xi. 16; Acts xxiv. 25; 1 Cor. xiv. 15. Our limits compel us to take only a brief view of these various subjects, especially as the form of church government remains to be examined. Bishop Hopkins says:

'Among the specific accusations sometimes heard against the ministry of the church, as a body, it has been said, that we are indifferent to missionary efforts and to the bible society, and opposed to prayer meetings and revivals of religion. I shall touch briefly on the first three of these charges, designing to devote this lecture chiefly to the last, as being most in need of discussion.' p. 104.

With regard to the first of these allegations, says our author, "I must utterly deny that it has any just foundation. The church is not indifferent to missionary efforts." The proof adduced to refute this accusation is, "to say nothing of those noble undertakings in which our mother church of England has been so deeply engaged," the fact that "there has, for many years, been a missionary society among ourselves, formed by the whole American church in General Convention, and designed expressly to embrace the entire field of foreign as well as of domestic missions." The

bishop, while he affirms, that "indefatigable zeal" has been exhibited in promoting the objects of this society, admits, that "the priority of our domestic claims, and the want of clergymen calculated for the foreign field, have prevented as yet, the actual success of any distant effort, except the important and highly valued mission to Greece." But it is added, that "the purpose to establish a large circle of foreign operations, has long since been publicly announced by the executive committee of that society." We have given the reader the whole argument in favor of the Episcopal church "on the score of missions." We think it would be well to inquire into the reason why there is a "want of clergymen calculated for the foreign field;" and we add our conviction, that while a certain portion of the Episcopal church is active in the cause of missions, a certain other portion needs more of the apostolic spirit in this matter. The text on which this lecture is founded,—"If any man seem to be contentious, we have no such custom, neither the churches of God,"—is not well chosen; for the whole church was at first a missionary society. In general, the best method of refuting calumny, is not a denial in *words*, but in *deeds*; holiness of life, and zeal in extending the kingdom of Christ.

We pass to the next topic. "Equally unfounded is the second of these charges; that the church as a body, is indifferent to the distribution of the bible." This charge is refuted by reference to the fact, that "the first bible society on earth sprung up in the bosom of the church of England; and the first instance in which that example was imitated on this side of the Atlantic, was in the bible society of Philadelphia, formed under the auspices of our venerable bishop White." The author admits, that many of the clergy prefer to conduct "this branch of modern christian effort, as a distinct class, instead of uniting with other denominations in a general association." He also admits, that others "choose to combine the book of common prayer with the distribution of the bible;" and that "perhaps there may be a few who doubt the expediency and the authority of any *separate* prosecution of the different parts of the gospel system, believing that the truth of Christ can be most successfully diffused by keeping all the members of the divine plan together in their own sacred connection." The amount of the whole argument is, that the charge brought against the Episcopal church for want of interest in the bible society is unfounded. But says bishop Hopkins:

'For myself however, I acknowledge that I turn with much greater confidence to another view of our reverence for the bible, which to my mind is far more conclusive and satisfactory. It is the fact, that ours is almost the only church now existing, which preserves faithfully, the primitive rule of incorporating *all* her public worship with the *stated reading of the book of God in the common language of the people*,

according to a fixed and positive calendar, from which our ministry *are not at liberty to deviate*. The Greek church reads portions of the scripture in the ancient Greek, which is only intelligible to their scholars: the Roman church reads portions in Latin, which the people do not understand. Our Protestant brethren of the various denominations *may* read a chapter in the bible before their sermons, and they may, if they think proper, *let it alone*.' p. 106.

We remark on the above, that it is with us almost a universal practice to read a portion of scripture every sabbath; and this with bible classes and expositions, we think without boasting, which is contrary to our views of religion, gives our denomination about as much and as thorough knowledge of the scriptures, as they would be likely to obtain from "the positive calendar" of the Episcopal church. We are willing at least to abide by the comparison. But we think such reverence for the word of God is no valid reason for neglecting to send it to the destitute, nor is it entitled to "much greater confidence" than the reverence manifested in the combined effort to send the word to all people. The plain truth is, that there is some just ground of complaint against those Episcopalians who stand aloof from the "general association" for the distribution of the scriptures. The bible is the common book of Protestants; and we see no reason why they may not unite to send it forth without note, comment, homily, or prayer book.

Next in order, is the subject of "prayer meetings:—"

'That we are opposed to prayer meetings is a total misapprehension. We maintain that all our public worship is a prayer meeting; that is, a meeting for the purpose of uniting in social prayer. * * * * But I willingly allow, that we do not approve the *mode* in which prayer meetings, *technically* so called, are conducted; where those who consider themselves ordained to minister in sacred things, invite the laity in their own presence, to perform their ministerial office without any ordination at all.' p. 107.

We were not aware that *ordination* is necessary to qualify the christian to offer prayer and a word of exhortation in the social circle, even though a minister should be present. Nor can we "believe that the minister has *no right* to devolve these duties upon the laity, so long as he is able in person to discharge them." We do not infer quite so much from the new testament; and we think the position is not maintained by "the principle of official consistency," illustrated by reference to the duties of judge and jury, physician and patient, lawyer and client, military captain and private soldier. But admitting, that the private christian has no right to officiate in "prayer meetings *technically* so called," that is, in the presence of a minister; does bishop Hopkins allow of social prayer meetings without the presence of a minister? He holds, that

"every christian man is so far priest in his own house and in his own family," that it is his duty to offer prayer and praise for himself and household, and "for any friends who may form a part of the company." But further than this he saith not; and the fair inference is, that he does not approve of christians meeting by themselves for social worship. In this he differs from many of his brethren, and discourages that exercise of prayer and praise which the apostles required as the general duty and privilege of christians. (Acts ii. 42-47; Heb. iii. 13; 1 Cor. xiv. 3-9; 1 Thess. v. 11.)

We pass now to the important subject of *revivals*.

'Among the new modes of speech, which, with many pious and good men, have attained the rank of watch-words in the camp of Israel for a few years past, one of the most common is the favorite phrase, 'revival of religion.' And as it is a very frequent topic of accusation against the Protestant Episcopal church, that her clergy are opposed to revivals, it is incumbent on me to discuss this charge, so as to consider the substantial merits of the allegation.' p. 109.

The reader will perceive by a reference to the volume, that bishop Hopkins considers nothing entitled to the name of revival, except the results of the modern revival system.

'The whole peculiarity of the revival system consists in the adoption of extraordinary, unusual and comparatively novel measures, for the purpose of exciting the attention and feelings of men. And I may, perhaps, safely undertake to say, that there has not been a revival of religion in the whole United States, in which the minister has confined himself to the stated and settled order and amount of public duty.' p. 111.

The tendencies of the "revival system," in its bearing upon the permanent welfare of the churches, are fairly and ably described in this part of the work under review; and we commend such judicious observations to the attention of our own denomination, especially since the late strides of certain evangelists towards the subversion of ministerial parity, and the establishment of a superior order in Congregationalism. But further than this, we cannot agree with our author. We dissent from his definition of a revival. He uses the term repeatedly, but we discover no one instance in which he ascribes, even partially, "any uncommon degree of religious sensibility, or any unusual accession of numbers to the faith," to the agency of the Holy Ghost. We do not say, that the omission was intentional, but it nevertheless has an ominous appearance. We understand the phrase, revival of religion, to mean something more than "a considerable addition to any particular congregation, of converts to the gospel, brought in by the instrumentality of unusual and extraordinary public efforts on

the part of the clergy." For hundreds of years, a revival of religion has been understood to be, *an unusual manifestation of divine influence, awakening christians to a more faithful performance of duty, together with the conviction and conversion of sinners in uncommon numbers.* This blessing of the Spirit is given in answer to fervent, effectual prayer; and may be obtained in the use of either *ordinary* or *extraordinary* means. Bishop Hopkins seems to have quite peculiar views of revivals. He claims, that the church to which he belongs, "has, time immemorial, been an advocate for religious services continued day after day; or as many pious men would prefer calling them, *protracted meetings.*" Such are the "ten successive days" in connection with "Passion week and Easter;" the "three days" services "in connection with the day of Pentecost;" the periods which respect "the nativity, the crucifixion, and the resurrection of the Savior;" and "those other portions of holy time, consecrated to the great events and characters of the church's history, such as Pentecost or Whitsunday, and the names and characters of the apostles themselves." But with all this, we find these qualifying sentences: "I have not heard, that those of our clergy who are partial to revivals, ever thought of having them at these regular and appointed times. Nor has any advocate for the revival system, suggested the expediency of establishing revivals as a part of the regular course of any other church." We have one direct question to ask bishop Hopkins. Does he believe, that an extraordinary influence of the Spirit, enlivening the graces of christians and multiplying converts to righteousness, is given in answer to fervent and effectual prayer? And does he approve of seeking, in the use of *ordinary* means, for such times of refreshing from the presence of the Lord? If not, we are constrained to believe, that the bishop of Vermont, and that portion of the church which he represents, are unfriendly to revivals of religion. The allegation so often and so strenuously denied, remains therefore unanswered.

We now turn the attention of the reader to a "*new measure,*" beyond all question, in divinity, and a measure which posterity will pronounce to be at antipodes with the spirit of the gospel. It is a labored effort, professedly for the sake of Christ and his cause, to demolish a society organized explicitly for the promotion of temperance. The text on which is founded such an extraordinary lecture, is Acts xxiv. 25. "*And as he reasoned of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled.*" The doctrine attempted to be deduced from this passage is, that the church of Christ "is the true school of virtue, the true temperance society, the true preservative from all the vices which infest our miserable world;" that the church has no authorized means of promoting morality and religion, except through the instrumentality of reveal-

ed truth. The inference derived from this doctrine is, that it is unlawful to reform men in any other way than by leading them to repentance and faith, and union with the church of Christ. The argument therefore, against the temperance society, if valid, must cut its way through every other benevolent organization, designed for the promotion of morals and religion, which embraces men not religious. We presume, that bishop Hopkins will not take it amiss if we put this broad construction upon his argument, for it corresponds with the exclusive ground he has taken through his whole work. His discourse on the temperance society has been so long before the public, and has been so often dissected in the religious papers, that we shall give it a more brief notice than we intended. We shall nevertheless lay before our readers a fair specimen of the sentiments advanced, and as our limits permit, examine their validity. To prevent misapprehension, our author says,

‘I commence then, by acknowledging, that the Episcopal church, as a body, is not disposed to be active in what is called the temperance reform. But to this assertion, I must add, that there are very many exceptions, and some of them assuredly, who rank amongst our most prominent men for piety, for talent, and for zeal. I blame them not for using their liberty in this matter. I premise next, that the majority of our church who have hitherto stood aloof from the temperance society, have not done so by general concert, nor have they published their peculiar reasons. Let me say, thirdly, that in our attachment to the virtue of temperance, and in our abhorrence of the vice of intemperance, we refuse to yield to any body of christians upon earth. Nor do I believe that there is any class of men, taking the Episcopal church throughout, who have better observed the practice, not only of this, but of every other moral virtue. Far be it from me to make this assertion as a matter of boast,—it is no fit subject of boast that christians are the friends of morality,—but I say it as a necessary act of self-defense against the reckless spirit of slander, which presumes to declare, that no one can have any objections to the temperance society, unless he be himself an intemperate man.’ p. 130.

These preliminaries having been disposed of, the following formidable propositions are drawn out in battle array, namely :

‘That the temperance society is not based on religious, but worldly principles.

That it opposes vice and attempts to establish virtue, in a manner which is not in accordance with the word of God.

That if it could succeed, it would be a triumph of infidelity.

That it gives a false prominence to one particular vice, contrary to the doctrines of the bible.

That calling it an introduction or a preparation for religion, is at war with the principles of the gospel.

That it cannot be relied on as a remedy against vice, for which the religion of Christ is the only cure ; and that the good effected by it,

whatever it may be, cannot justify the christian in trying experiments to reform mankind, on any other principles than those which are set forth in the scriptures.'

Before we examine these plausible, but not unanswerable propositions, we must notice, what we believe to be an error, respecting the general views of Episcopalians, on the subject of temperance societies, as stated by bishop Hopkins. He says distinctly, that he speaks not as the advocate, nor the "organ of others;" but we are not sure that "the majority" in the Episcopal church stand aloof from this humane and christian enterprise. Not a few bishops in the mother church of England, are decided advocates for the "temperance reform," and we think a majority of bishops and other clergy in the American Episcopal church, are its open and cordial friends. We have seen in one widely extended journal, the regret expressed, that such views of temperance should be published in connection with a work on the order and government of the church, lest Episcopalians as a body, should be made responsible for the sentiments advanced, and which are so foreign to Episcopacy. We might add numerous other tokens of dissent from the same source, but will only refer to the Episcopal Recorder. "We consider the arguments of bishop Hopkins without the foundation and strength which, to make amends for the deleterious result certain to flow from them, they ought to have. Not one of them professes to arise from any actual injury which the temperance society has produced; but only from defects which are seen or are imagined in its constitution. The evil complained of, the whole evil, for which christians must be warned against the society, for which it should be dissolved, and against which the labored publication of bishop Hopkins is directed, amounts simply to this,—that though the temperance society has done much good, it has not done it upon right principles, nor in a right way." This ground of objection to the cause of temperance, fairly stated by an Episcopal writer, may be described by the following illustration: A deadly morass has in a great measure been drained, with much toil, and the beneficial results already surpass the expectations of the most sanguine. While the work is in full and triumphant progress, a spectator who has hitherto stood aloof, looks on, and says, 'my friends, you are doing a noble work here; you have saved the lives of thousands, and caused many broken hearts to sing for joy; but I object to the whole affair, because you go on wrong principles, and work with the wrong tools; and therefore, if you could succeed *in this way*, you would find in the end, that you had poisoned the living fountains of water!'

But we turn to the "chain of propositions" which, says bishop Hopkins, "I have pledged myself to prove." There is a peculiarity

which belongs to this chain, for if the first link fails, the remainder becomes useless. If the temperance society "is not based on religious, but on worldly principles," whatever it may gain, the cause of truth may suffer ultimate loss. If its principles are opposed to the gospel, the other charges which our author has tabled against it, may also be sustained. But if the first proposition fails, it will carry to the ground the remaining five. Is it true, then, that the temperance society is based on worldly principles? It had its origin in the church of Christ. Men deeply imbued with the spirit of piety and holy philanthropy, were its founders. The first annual report of the parent society, informs us that a meeting, previous to its formation, was held for consultation, and "after uniting in prayer," the following resolutions were adopted :

1. That it is expedient that more systematic and more vigorous efforts be made by the christian public, to restrain and prevent the intemperate use of intoxicating liquors.

2. That an individual of acknowledged talents, piety, industry, and sound judgment, should be selected and employed as a permanent agent, etc.

The enterprise then, commenced with christian men, and they sought counsel of God. They acted from christian principles. But to all this it is objected, that christians admit irreligious men into their society, and demand a "pledge of abstinence from ardent spirits, as the single condition of membership." From this, it is affirmed, that the association is not a christian society, because "the principle on which we are commanded to abstain from sin, is the authority of the divine law." We are required to do all to the glory of God, whether we eat or drink, and without faith it is impossible to please God.

'Now the temperance society, as such, adopts nothing of all this, but simply demands a written pledge of abstinence from ardent spirits, as the single condition of membership,—the unbeliever is on an equal footing with the believer; the infidel with the christian,—it asks no religion in its members,—an avowed atheist might be its president,—and there can be no christian society which does not acknowledge Christ.' p. 132.

We reply, that the temperance society does acknowledge Christ. Its most influential members are his disciples; they depend on the grace of God for success in their efforts; the meetings of the society in its various branches, are opened with prayer; in most of the public addresses, the authority of God is urged, and the various persuasives to morality and religion contained in the gospel, are made to bear upon the subject of temperance. The allusion to banks and insurance companies, established by christian men, will not be in point, till it can be shown, that these companies have

in view the promotion of morality and religion, and commence their meetings with prayer, and employ revealed truth as a means of accomplishing their objects. If the temperance society is not christian, it can be deprived of this title only on account of the pledge and the admission of members not religious. We never considered this society to be a *church*, and therefore cannot see how piety should be a necessary qualification for admission. Bishop Hopkins will not deny that christians might, on gospel principles, sign a written pledge to abstain from the use of ardent spirit, after the apostolic example of Paul, who said, "It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to *drink wine*, nor any thing, whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." (Rom. xiv. 23.) But his argument denies the lawfulness of admitting irreligious men to such an agreement with christians, except on condition of repentance, and faith in Christ. Believers may unite with unbelievers in mere earthly associations, but not in societies designed for the promotion of morals and religion. In banks and insurance companies, they may co-operate, but not in a society organized for the suppression of intemperance, although the constitution of that society declares it to be the duty of its principal agent "to make affectionate and earnest addresses to christian churches, to parents and guardians, to children, apprentices and servants, and all other descriptions of persons, and to set clearly before them the effect of spiritous liquors on health, on reputation, and on all the temporal and *eternal* interests of men, and to urge them by the most weighty arguments drawn from the present and the *future* world." etc.* If the argument of bishop Hopkins against the temperance society, is valid, it must exclude men of the world from all part and lot in bible, tract, missionary, and other societies organized for their moral and religious benefit. It must prohibit them also from uniting with christians in building churches, the support of the gospel, and public worship. They must not unite with believers for the promotion of any of these objects, unless repentance and faith are required of them, as the terms of union. An argument which goes this length, must be radically defective. It proves enough to demonstrate its falsity.

But the bishop after denouncing the temperance society, because it is not, as he says, "based on religious principles," confesses, that he would have cordially united with the society, had it been based on *worldly* principles. He does "not deny that the information spread before the public eye in so many attractive forms, showing the injurious effects of alcohol upon the human constitution, and the efforts successfully made to drive it out of daily use

* Constitution Amer. Temp. Soc., adopted Feb. 13, 1836. Art. IX.

as a common refreshment, have been beneficial in many ways, to the comfort, and health, and safety of the community." He has never "doubted the propriety of petitioning the legislative bodies of the land, to pass such restrictions on the manufacture and sale of ardent spirits, as should take so hurtful a temptation out of the way of thoughtless and intemperate men."

'Thus far I would have gone, hand in hand, with the most ardent friend of temperance; because my theory and practice upon the subject of alcoholic liquors, were fixed on these principles, [what principles?] more than twenty years ago. And if the temperance society had even contented itself with proposing its pledge, merely on the score of an improvement in diet, in health, in economy, or in prudence, I should certainly have viewed it as a very different thing.' p. 145.

The objection urged is, that "this novelty is presented to christian men as a part of their morality and religion,—is made the subject of sermons, and prayers, and thanksgiving,—yea it is gravely proposed as one of the conditions of church membership, and is constituted the test of a man's sincerity," etc. We shall not abet error, or imprudent zeal, but temperance, and the temperance reform, *are* "a part of the morality and religion of christian men." Now if bishop Hopkins believes, that the temperance society "is based on worldly principles," and will admit, as he candidly must, that "the adulteration of religious principle" is foreign to the constitution, and objects, and intentions of the society, he may conscientiously lend it his aid. He must allow, that the existing temperance society is more accordant with the gospel than the one he proposes; for to adopt a "pledge, merely on the score of an improvement in diet, in health, in economy, or in prudence," would be an attempt to remove the great moral evil of intemperance, without the sanction and aid of moral and religious considerations. An objector might then oppose the organization of such a society, by citing bishop Hopkins, as proof that its object would be "one of the branches of morality, already provided for by religion itself, and cannot therefore, be consistently inculcated by christians in any other manner than that which accords with christian principle." In short, the bishop has demolished his own cardinal position, and we have likewise shown that it is untenable. His remaining positions depending on the first, are consequently no less unsound.

The second proposition, "That the temperance society opposes vice, attempts to establish virtue in a manner which is not in accordance with the word of God," despite of the labored attempt at demonstration, remains a proposition still, that is, a thing to be proved. The bible does not forbid total abstinence from intoxicating drinks, as we know from the case of Daniel and his three

companions, the Rechabites, Samson and his mother, Timothy, and the determination of Paul, to drink no wine to the injury of his brother. Neither does the gospel, either in its letter or spirit, forbid us to "use all *suitable means* to induce others to" refrain from strong drink. The constitution of the temperance society authorizes only the "use of all suitable means,"—means in accordance with the spirit of the gospel, for the promotion of its object. To the trivial objection, that temperance "is one of the branches of morality, already provided for by religion itself," it is sufficient to reply, that we are, in the temperance reform, only applying this provision of religion according to the purpose for which it was intended. We know, too, as well as the bishop, that "religion calls on men, by the authority of God, to repent, not of *one* sin, but of *all* sin, and to submit to Christ, who alone has power to pardon the past, and to enable them, through divine grace, to resist temptation for the time to come." So we understand, and so we apply the gospel. We hold temperance to be only one of the many qualifications for the kingdom of heaven. We teach every man, that he must be saved by *grace*, and not by *water*. We attach far less importance, every way, to this element, as a means of salvation, than the bishop of Vermont does in his lecture on baptismal regeneration. But it is alledged also, that the temperance society endeavors to reform men on selfish principles,—on the ground of their own interest, "without any regard to their sin in the sight of heaven, or any profession of repentance for their transgression of the divine law. Is it not plain, that a reformation like this, is a sort of mockery before God?" We admit, that men should obey God from the heart, and be actuated by holy principles. But does it follow, that all outward reformation is wrong?—that men must not refrain from any vice till they can act from holy principles? How then, can the immoral ever be saved? The drunkard must not attempt to reform, till he is created anew in Christ, for until this spiritual change is wrought, his wholly depraved heart will prevent his acting from any other than "worldly motives;" and a prelate tells him, "surely it needs no argument to show that a change like this, (that is, from intemperance to temperance, on worldly principles,) could neither be acceptable in the sight of God, nor could it calculate upon his blessing." The intemperate man then, must keep on in his habit till he becomes a christian, and he cannot become a christian till he ceases to be intemperate! This is truly new divinity. But the rejected pharisees, whose religion was pure selfishness, were not condemned, but approved for obeying the law. "Ye pay tithe of mint, and anise, and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith: *these ought ye to have done*, and not to leave the other undone."

(Matt. xxiii. 23.) All reformation, logically speaking, must begin with the *head*, and not with the *heart*. The understanding must be enlightened; errors of belief must be corrected; the man must be convinced of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment, and this leads to a change in the outward conduct, and ends in the renovation of the heart. How then, can bishop Hopkins say, "that the principle of the temperance society is hostile to the principles of the gospel. It is the marked fact, that the temperance society begins with the conduct, while Christ begins with the heart." One of the three passages cited to support these assertions, is rendered inapposite, by the context, and another does not settle the point which it is adduced to establish. These passages are Luke xi. 39; Matt. xxiii. 26; iii. 2. But Christ directed the pharisees to effect the inward cleansing, by the performance of practical duties. "Give alms of such things as ye have; and behold all things are clean unto you." (Luke xi. 41.) John Baptist, another witness cited, although he said, repent ye, said also to the soldiers, "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely, and be content with your wages." (Luke iii. 14.) Christ said to the young man, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments; sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come and follow me." See also Isa. i. 16, 17; lv. 7; Ps. cxix. 60. The advocates for temperance then, are right to begin with the conduct, and the whole allegation in question, is "like the baseless fabric of a vision." They have the authority of scripture for exhorting the intemperate to break off from sinful habit, as a means of becoming disciples of Christ. But if we are wrong in encouraging men to reform by means, not strictly religious, bishop Hopkins must come in for his share of the censure. He would "have gone hand in hand with the most ardent friend of temperance," if the society "had even contented itself with proposing its pledge, merely on the score of an improvement in diet, in health, in economy, or in prudence." He says further, "as a political, or a dietetic, or a social, or a commercial improvement, we have not one word to say against it.—But we protest against it, in a religious aspect altogether." The reader may reconcile the bishop with himself at his leisure. We add only a single comment,—Ἐν ᾧ γὰρ καὶ κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον, σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ πράσσεις ὁ κρίνων.

The next remarkable count in the author's indictment is, that if the temperance society could succeed, it would be a triumph of infidelity. The argument relied on in defense, is this: If a society with its pledge, can banish the master vice of intemperance, it can banish all other vices, and can thus do more than the gospel has done in eighteen centuries. This would substantiate the claim of the infidel, that the light of nature is sufficient for the

promotion of virtue, and "christianity is not of God." But in abatement of this claim, we aver, that the temperance society owes to the gospel its origin and whole success. The temperance reform is in fact, one of the glorious fruits of the gospel, and the only reason why this same gospel has not 1800 years ago triumphed over the sin of drunkenness, is, that its reforming power was not made to bear directly on this master vice. The wise and the foolish all slumbered and slept together, over the growing evil. But if any man chooses to regard the temperance society as a separate thing from the gospel, we say, that although it should succeed in making men outwardly moral, yet the gospel would still be necessary to purify the heart, and fit us for heaven. It would be as really necessary to piety and salvation, as if neither temperance nor temperance societies were known in the world. This fact would silence the infidel. But the triumph of infidelity, if it gains a triumph, will be obviously with the opposers of the temperance reform. At the fountain of ardent spirits, they will marshal their hosts, against the Lord and his anointed. We shall be much, very much mistaken, if "the primitive church," for the sake of one single anti-temperance lecture, does not become the text-book of the retailer, and of "thoughtless and intemperate men." It is a painful thought, that a church, venerated for its antiquity, and "noble army of martyrs," should be subjected to such an unhallowed association.

In reply to the *fourth* allegation, we only say, that if the temperance society "gives a false prominence to one particular vice, contrary to the doctrines of the bible," the error is not in its constitution, and is easily corrected. We think our opponent, however, has committed an equal error. Thus:

'Drunkenness cannot produce the worst and most dangerous of the other vices, because they require art, and management, and concealment; whereas, the intoxicated man incapacitates himself for these, and becomes a fool and a beast. Therefore, the assassin, and the poisoner, and the adulterer, and the seducer, and the thief, and the house-breaker, and the incendiary, and the professional gambler, and the counterfeiter, are usually sober men in their general habits, because if they were not, the execution of their villainies would be impossible'!! p. 142.

We have but a word to say of the *fifth* charge, namely, "to call it [the society] an introduction, or a preparation for religion, is at war with the principles of the gospel." This we deny. The temperance reform, as we can show from facts, has prepared the way "for the reception of religion," in numerous instances. We have proved also, that an outward reform, preparatory to repentance and faith, is not contrary to the gospel.

The *last* objection, has been already answered. The society "cannot be relied on as a remedy against vice, for which the religion of Christ is the only cure;" and whatever good may be effected, "cannot justify the christian in trying experiments to reform mankind, on any other principles than those which are set forth in the scriptures." If the vast amount of good effected by "this novelty," as the bishop calls the temperance reform, tends to the subversion of the gospel, it is time to have done with it. But the fact is exactly the reverse. The principles of the gospel are illustrated, applied, and confirmed. For although men, so far as the outward conduct is concerned, may abandon evil habits without becoming christians; yet the gospel only, effecting through the agency of the Spirit a new creation, is able to subdue the power of sin, and to eradicate it ultimately from the heart. We do not believe, that one in a thousand of those who sign the pledge of abstinence, ever thought of substituting this for repentance and faith, or regarded temperance as a means of salvation; except as it tends to prepare the way for inward reformation, by the power of the Holy Spirit. It is one of the last things which we shall believe, that the "sudden and extensive popularity" of the temperance enterprise, can be accounted for, from the dogma, that it adapts itself to the feelings of carnal men. The scripture, in this instance, is sadly misapplied, that the "world will love its own." The world stands out in opposition, till compelled to yield, by convictions of truth, duty, safety, and philanthropy.

On the whole, we are confident, that if bishop Hopkins will candidly review his arguments, he will be convinced, that the temperance reform still rests on a firm basis, and that he has effected nothing more than to guard its advocates against error and misguided zeal; while in the judgment of all classes, he has unwittingly become an apologist for the soul-destroying vice of intemperance. We do not yet despair of his aid in advancing the cause which he has labored to destroy.

We proceed now to Lecture VII. The text is 1 Cor. xiv. 15. "*I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the understanding also: I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the understanding also.*"

The topics treated of are: the mode of worship—the use of ministerial garments—forms of prayer—the primitive liturgies—postures—responses—music, etc. We do not attach much importance to any of these topics, except *the use of forms in prayer*; and that also is a matter of no great importance, if men will pray with the spirit. The author exhibits in a style of equal beauty and force, the privilege of worshiping the Almighty, but damps the ardor of devotional feeling which he had kindled, by diverting the attention abruptly from the *spirit* to the *form* of worship.

'The peculiar mode, however, in which we conduct this all important portion of our religious service, is a favorite topic of objection with many of our christian brethren. They accuse us of using Popish garments, and of tying ourselves to a form; they think our liturgy is blameable for tedious length, and wearisome repetition; and they imagine that the extemporaneous mode of worship has the best sanction from the word of God, and is by far the most favorable to scriptural and devotional feeling.' p. 154.

The bishop before he considers the form of worship, devotes about *nine* pages to the subject of using ministerial garments. We have never thought this a matter of sufficient importance to repay the toil of thumbing the dusty fathers, nor have we thought it "worth while to carp at a body of christians, because their pastors appear clothed in a white surplice, or in a black robe." We have no insuperable objection to these ecclesiastical habiliments, unless they are designed to add "pomp and circumstance" to religious service. A dead silence, however, respecting their use, reigns through the whole of the new testament; and we see no reason to believe, that either the apostles or first christians employed them in worship; especially as the types, shadows, ceremonies, and gorgeous apparel of the Jewish priesthood had found their fulfilment and end in the introduction of a pure and spiritual worship. But to use the language of Paul in respect to abrogated meats, we think that the ministerial garments commend us not to God: for neither if we wear them, are we the better; neither if we wear them not, are we the worse. In short, this is a matter of indifference with us now, since we have no occasion to enter on a crusade against "fantastic dresses, palls and mitres, gold and gewgaws fetched from Aaron's old wardrobe, or the flamen's vestry."* Bishop Hopkins however, differs widely from us in regard to clerical costume. To establish the propriety and importance of wearing some dress indicative of the priestly office, he appeals to the custom of "princes, governors, judges and physicians, officers of the army, navy, etc." He refers us to the white robes and fine linen of the saints in heaven, the linen ephod, etc.; and affirms that "the same simple linen ephod has descended through the Greek and Roman churches to our own time"—that its origin was the command of God by Moses; and "that the apostolic church inherited it in a right line from the church of Israel, and consecrated it to the same purpose, namely, the service of God in his earthly sanctuary." We doubt both the premises and conclusion, yet the matter in debate is not worth contending for either way. But the spirit which bishop Hopkins manifests, is culpable, and we think without occasion. He confesses, that the black robe belongs to

* Milton. Ref. in England.

the University, rather than the church, and cannot be dated back beyond the era of the Reformation, and yet finds it in his heart to add, that "a peculiarity like this [that is, the black and white robe] would surely pass without the bitterness of *christian* scorn, if unhappily so many good people had not fancied that the 'seat of the scorner' had become a necessary appendage of their religion."

We turn now to the forms of worship. In defense of liturgies, bishop Hopkins appeals to the worship of the Jewish synagogue, to certain passages in the old testament, the Lord's prayer, with 2 Tim. i. 13., and the primitive church. We admit, that there were forms of devotion, or some kind of liturgy in the Jewish worship, but was this the fact in the first christian worship? As an offset to the testimony of Cyprian, A. D. 250, and Chrysostom of the latter part of the fourth century, cited by bishop Hopkins, we offer the testimony of Tertullian of the second century, of Justin Martyr half a century earlier, and as further evidence, Chancellor King. Tertullian says, "We do not pray with a monitor, reading our prayers out of a book. No, but on the contrary we pray from the heart, (*de pectore*,) our own heart and soul dictating to us what is most proper and suitable to be asked, having no need of any other monitor besides." Justin Martyr says, "The bishop sent up prayers and praises, (*ὡς ἡ δύναμις*) according to his ability."* Chancellor King, an Episcopalian, who examined the subject carefully, says, "That the words or expressions of the prayers used in the primitive churches, were not imposed or prescribed, but every one that officiated delivered himself in such terms as best pleased him, and varied his petitions according to the present circumstances and emergencies; or if it be more intelligible, the primitive christians had no stinted liturgies or imposed forms of prayer."† We add also the testimony of Neal. "We have no certain account of the use of any liturgies in the first ages of the church. It is not till the latter end of the fourth century that they are first mentioned; and then it was left to the care of every bishop to draw up a form of prayer for his own church. In St. Austin's time they began to consult about an agreement of prayers, that none should be used without common advice; but still there was no *uniformity*. Nay in the darkest times of popery, there was a vast variety of forms in different sees; witness the offices *secundum usum Sarum, Bangor, York, etc.*"‡ Bishop Hopkins admits, that liturgies were first published in the latter part of the fourth century, but supposes from the fact, that previous to this, there was no controversy on the subject, liturgies came down sanctioned by the apostles, and undisputed to the fifth century. We come to the directly opposite conclusion, that there were no liturgies to contend about in the early age of the christian church. But the

* Hawes' Tribute, p. 32. † King's Prim. Ch. part II. p. 33. ‡ Neal. vol I. p. 96.

bishop is confident, that liturgies were in use before Christ ; " were presumed to be approved by him, and were adopted generally in the ancient liturgies." He adds, that " from these liturgies our own was carefully selected ; every trace of superstition which the church of Rome had introduced, was eradicated," etc. Let us examine now the new testament. Our author thinks, that " enough is recorded" to substantiate his position. But he refers us only to the disciples of John Baptist, the Lord's prayer, and 2 Tim. i. 13. The language of Paul, " Hold fast the form of sound words which thou hast heard of me," etc. we dismiss with the remark, that it may refer only to oral instruction, or the written epistles, and therefore cannot be relied on for the purpose to which it is applied. We have then, only to examine the request of John Baptist's disciples and the Lord's prayer. On these two instances bishop Hopkins, so far as the new testament is concerned, mainly relies in defense of liturgies. He says " in the eleventh chapter of St. Luke's gospel, [we dislike the Popish appellation of Saint,] we read that as our Lord was praying in a certain place, when he had ceased, one of his disciples said unto him : Lord teach us to pray, as John also taught his disciples ; and he said unto them, " When ye pray, say our Father, etc." Whereupon our author remarks :

' Now this single passage seems to my mind conclusive as to the whole question, whether extemporaneous prayer, or a form, is sustained by the highest authority. For in the first place, it proves, that forms of prayer were then the established usage of the Jews. If the extemporaneous plan had been the prevailing custom, why should John the Baptist have given a particular form to his disciples ? If our Savior's apostles had not known it to be an approved system, why should they have asked him for a form of prayer ? And, how could our Lord have forthwith complied with their desire, by giving them a set form ?' p. 167.

This argument is drawn out at length with supposed " cumulative proof," and a seeming air of triumph. It is said to be " perfectly manifest," that if John and his converts " had been accustomed to the extemporaneous mode of conducting public worship, as followed by so many in our day, such a circumstance never could have happened as the disciples related to the Savior." This argument has two edges. If extemporaneous prayer was the invariable custom, the disciples of John and of Christ, being under a new dispensation, might probably ask, for some oral or written pattern, from which to frame their extemporaneous supplications. The same request is often made of pastors now, by young converts. But if forms of prayer were in use, what possible reason could be given for asking how to pray ? Would an Episcopalian, with his prayer book in his hand, need to make such an inquiry either of presbyter or bishop ? The man who prays extemporane-

ously might have a reason for asking such a question, but he who prays from a liturgy has no reason at all. Were the disciples doubtful whether to pray extempore, or from a written form? That point was already settled, in either case, by universal practice. Did they say, "Lord teach us to pray," on account of the new circumstances under which they were placed? This instruction they would have needed just as much in extempore prayer, as they would on the supposition, that they had been accustomed to a written form. The argument is at least as much against the liturgy as it is in favor. But the "cumulative proof" now turns against bishop Hopkins. When, and where did Christ pray from a written form? and is there proof, that the prayer he gave his disciples was *read* in worship, or ever *written*, till it was recorded in the scriptures by the spirit of inspiration? The variations too of this prayer, and abridgements by the several evangelists, we think of some importance. It is evident that the *substance* was the main thing, and not the *precise words*. If Christ wrote the prayer when he gave it to the disciples, and they had read it every sabbath in public worship, it would not have varied so much in the scriptures. So at least, we believe. But he *said* unto them, after *this manner* pray ye. Take this for a pattern. So they received it, as a *model* of prayer in brevity, doctrine, and spirit; but no mention is made of their having used this, or any other prescribed form, either by *rote* or *book*.* Most of the prayers contained in the old testament were not reduced to a written form before they were offered. The prayer of Daniel, in view of the den of lions, was evidently dictated by circumstances, and flowed spontaneously from the heart. Such was the prayer of Agur, of Habakkuk, of Hezekiah, (Isa. xxxviii. 3.) Such were many of the prayers offered by the prophets. Little is said in the new testament of forms of prayer. The prayer of the publican was neither written nor read. The same is true of the pharisee's prayer, God I thank thee etc., and we have no proof, that the prayers in general, recorded in the new testament, were pre-composed forms. Did the apostles carry about a prayer book? The ardent soul of Paul, in his devotions, would have overleaped a whole liturgy if it did not meet his spirit-

* They who idolize the *form* of the Lord's prayer, would do well to remember, that it says nothing of Christ, or of redemption through his blood. When it was given to the disciples, the great doctrines of the cross could not properly be introduced as topics of prayer, for the time had not come. But now, since redemption is completed, the Lord's prayer has ceased to be, strictly speaking, a *christian* prayer, because it has no allusion to Christ. We regard it as a most admirable form, considering its date. We approve of its occasional use, and would detract nothing from its sacredness, or value. But it is a singular fact that, for reasons already stated, it is much admired by Deists and Unitarians. See Pope's Universal Prayer. Had Christ given a form of prayer after his ascension, we doubt not, it would have been essentially different.

ual wants, and serve as a medium through which to pour forth his soul in praise and thanksgiving. We cannot believe, that Jonah needed a prayer book in the whale, or found any difficulty in framing a supplication fitted to his case. Bishop Hopkins lays great stress on the fact, that we *sing* from a form, and it is therefore, equally proper to *pray* from a form. We do not question the lawfulness of using set forms in prayer. Every prayer is more or less a form. But we cannot be restricted by an imposed liturgy. It made sad work in the Reformation, when protestants were compelled to use popish prayers in public and social worship, and forbidden the exercise of their own devotional feelings. There are insuperable objections to the invariable use even of the best liturgies. In peculiar circumstances, no adapted form of prayer is at hand. Shall we then omit prayer in those times of deep distress, when prayer is most of all needed, or employ a form which does not touch the case? Neither. Let the burdened soul vent its griefs and desires in its own natural channel, without "let or impediment." The mother of Legh Richmond lost a lovely child by the carelessness of a servant who let it fall from a window. The agonized parent, forgetting her prayer book, kneeled down and prayed out of the fulness of her heart. To her little son Legh, she said "Help me to pray, my child: Christ suffers little children to come to him, and forbids them not,—'say some thing.' 'What shall I say, mama?—shall I fetch a book?' 'Not now,' she replied; 'speak from your heart; and ask God, that we may be reconciled to his will, and bear this trial with patience.'"* We have witnessed scenes like this, and felt the total insufficiency of a liturgy. It is a stereotyped thing, and can neither encompass the range of human sorrow, nor meet the growing demands of the church. It is not fitted for the monthly concert of prayer, because it is not adapted to the missionary enterprise. It is designed for the church, and therefore, (we speak now of the Episcopal liturgy) cannot be fitted either for the grave of the sinner, or for his character in the services of the sanctuary. We have felt these evils, and especially has a jar come over every nerve, as we have heard the most sublime and unrivalled burial service, designed expressly for the pious dead, performed over the remains of the avowedly ungodly. To such contradictions, and deficiencies must the best constructed liturgies be subject. And if the cholera, or some new calamity afflict a nation, the liturgy-impeided churches cannot unite in the public prayer, till the bishop sets forth a suitable form. Is the necessity of such delay *scriptural*, or is it merely *human*? These and similar objections are sufficient grounds with us, for refusing to be tied down to any prescribed forms of devotion. Bishop Hopkins says of forms,

* Mem. of Rev. Legh Richmond. p. 234.

"We prize them the more because they insure to us the blessings of established order—the substantial benefits of peace. We deny, that they are unfriendly to any religious feeling which is of a sober, deep, and wholesome character. We deny, that they are unfriendly to any excitement which ought to be desired or approved. But we are thankful, that they keep us, under God, from being blown about with every wind of doctrine." These are privileges, we allow, but the disadvantages may be equally great. A free spirited animal in fetters, will not run too fast for the safety of his rider, but the benefit is counterbalanced by a necessarily tardy gait. Yet we are not quite so sure, that liturgies will either prevent schisms or errors in doctrine. In the Reformation they caused woful schisms, and we occasionally witness bitter contention between the two parties long known by the appellations of *high* and *low* church. As to unity in doctrine, error can never be fenced out by the form of sound words. The purity of every church in faith and practice, forms or no forms, depends, under God, upon a spirit of deep-toned and abiding godliness. Bogue, and Bennett, describing the state of religion among the dissenters from the accession of George III. to the year 1808, say, "Many who drank the cup of Arianism first, and then of Socinianism to the very dregs, ceased to be members of the dissenting congregation; and with a perfect hatred of the doctrines of the church of England, pusillanimously bore a part in her very explicit trinitarian worship."* Before we leave the subject of liturgies, we give the views of bishop Wilkins. We quote from Bickersteth's admirable Treatise on Prayer, p. 53. After allowing the use of forms for "the young and weaker christian, both in the family and the closet," and guarding them against "that lip service and formality, to which in such cases we are more especially exposed," he says,—“But, for any one so to sit down and satisfy himself with this prayer book, or prescribed form, as to go no farther, this were still to remain in his infancy, and not to grow up in his new nature. This would be as if a man who had once need of crutches, should always afterwards make use of them, and so necessitate himself to a continual impotency. And if it be a fault not to strive and labor after this gift, much more is it to jeer and despise it, by the name of ‘extempore prayer,’ and ‘praying by the Spirit,’ which expressions are, for the most part, a sign of a profane heart, altogether a stranger to the power and comfort of this duty.”—It will be perceived from an investigation of the subject of liturgies, that they cannot, either on the ground of authority or utility, be preferred to the extemporaneous mode of worship. They need not hinder the spirit of true devotion, and they cannot be essential to its promotion.

* History of Dissenters.

"Prayer is the soul's sincere desire,
Unuttered, or expressed."

To conclude this, and the remaining topics embraced in the *lecturo* under consideration, we say of *responses*, to which our author attaches great importance, that we find nothing of them in the new testament—nothing but the occasional responding, Amen. Of the "music of the church, another important department," we only say, that like the music of all other churches, it is not what the scriptures demand in this very delightful and very important branch of divine service. We dissent from our author, however, in regard to the value which he attaches to the *posture* of prayer. The pharisee, who intended to observe the precise *form* of orthodoxy, *stood* and prayed. This was a common posture, and is sanctioned by scripture in instances too numerous to require a reference. *Kneeling* was a common posture, so was *prostration*. These attitudes of devotion, all have the highest sanction. That attitude in prayer is best which is most reverent, and which corresponds with the feelings of the supplicant, and which is best fitted to aid the exercise of devotion. "*God is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth.*"

But, says bishop Hopkins, "the proper position for prayer is kneeling; for praise, standing; and sitting, for the listening to the reading of the scriptures, and the sermon." After making a few exceptions for sickness, and the infirmity of age, he adds, "but in all other cases, kneeling in prayer is a sacred duty; [what chapter and verse?] nor have I any hesitation in saying that sitting down to address the Majesty of heaven, instead of kneeling, when we have no apology of bodily indisposition to plead, is an act of irreverence, which is totally inconsistent with the directions of the liturgy, and must of itself go far to hinder the acceptance of our supplications before his throne." Since kneeling is affirmed to be a sacred duty, the reader may consult a few passages. (Gestures in prayer: Ex. ix. 29; Psa. lxiii. 4; 1 Kings viii. 22; Isa. i. 15. Standing: Judg. xx. 28; Luke. xi. 13. Kneeling: 2 Chron. vi. 13; Luke. xxii. 41; Acts xx. 36. Falling on the face: Deut. ix. 18, 25; Job. i. 20; Matt. xxvi. 29. Sitting: 2 Sam. vii. 18; Neh. i. 4.) It is not incumbent on us to apologize for sin committed against the liturgy, but as it regards the custom of *sitting* in prayer, we crave exemption from the general denunciation for two such devout men as David and Nehemiah, who unconscious of error, *sat* before the Lord and prayed.

The remaining half of the volume, our author devotes chiefly to the subject of ecclesiastical polity. We have time only for a brief notice of this endless topic.* The possibility of shedding

* It is hardly worth our while to refute the same arguments, as often as every

new light upon a subject agitated for centuries, has long since ceased. Bishop Hopkins has repeated, as a matter of necessity, the self-same arguments which have been asserted, and as often confuted, from the Reformation down to the present day. He treads the beaten track of his predecessors, and attempts, by the testimony of scripture and the fathers, to prove the descent of a "three-fold order of the ministry," from the apostles; and to obtain the sanction of their authority, for the organization of the church under this exclusive form.

In defense of this high claim, he gleans from the scriptures the little evidence which has a plausible bearing in his favor, and then supports the scanty testimony of the divine record, by plentiful citations from the fathers, appending the original to verify the correctness of the translation. The first glimmering ray which falls upon a three fold order in the ministry, is discovered, as our author supposes, in the far twilight of antiquity, even beyond the date of Aaron's consecration to the priesthood. He admits, that the "commencement of the priestly office, as distinct and peculiar, is not set forth in the scriptures." But Melchisedeck was a priest; there were priests in Egypt in the days of Joseph; Jethro, the father-in-law of Moses, was a priest; and in Exodus xix. 24. priests are mentioned. The bishop gathers from this, that previous to the appointment of Aaron, "there may have been an *instituted* priesthood; and for aught we know, the ministry exercised in the affairs of religion, may even at that time, have had a three-fold character." This conjecture has not even probability in its favor. It serves only to show the need of pressing every possible aid to the defense of prelacy. We are referred next, to the Mosaic dispensation, the distinct and "three-fold character attached to the sacred ministry, in the high priest, the priests, and the levites." But what has this to do with the institution of the christian ministry? The Jewish priesthood, excepting their common character as ministers of religion, could not typify the gospel ministry. Their office, together with the rites and sacrifices, was typical of Christ and his atonement. The apostle Paul has settled this matter in the epistle to the Hebrews. The type fulfilled therefore, what further need of perpetuating a form of the ministry analogous to the Jewish priesthood? The office of high priest, became necessarily extinct at the death of Christ, and how does it follow, from a burdensome ministration of types, shadows, and burnt offerings, that the same form and order were continued in

new advocate for Episcopacy chooses to assert them. For a thorough examination of the validity of Episcopal church government, as deduced from the scriptures, the reader is referred to the review of "Episcopacy tested by scripture." Christian Spectator, Vol. VI. No. I. and Vol. VII. No. I.

the ministry of a new, simple, spiritual, and perfect dispensation? The priesthood being of necessity changed, and the law of it changed, its *form* also might be essentially varied. This question must be decided by the new testament, without any reference to the analogy of a typical and vanished economy.

'But, [says bishop Hopkins,] the threefold form of the ministry remained till the coming of Christ, the great high priest, and in complete analogy with it we perceive, that soon after the commencement of his ministry, he chose twelve apostles, and seventy disciples, 'whom he sent forth, two and two, into every place and city, whither he himself would come;' thus displaying a strict correspondence with the threefold form.' * * * 'So that if we do truly take the testimony of the sacred word of inspiration, the Redeemer set before his disciples a three-fold ministry: himself the shepherd and bishop of our souls, (1 Pet. ii. 35.) presiding, his apostles next, and subordinate to them, the seventy.' pp. 191, 198.

The author gives us nothing but repeated assertion, that the seventy disciples were subordinate to the apostles. He affirms, that the commission of the seventy was permanent, and not for a "temporary service;" and that after the "earthly ministry of Christ was accomplished, the seventy would then become, of course, the second, as they had always been next to the apostles, and we see how soon they supplied the third order, by the appointment of deacons." We have still the same *ipse dixit* proof.

'Where do we read that the seventy disciples had only a *temporary service*? How has [it been] discovered that they were not allowed to preach again? Who has told [us] that they were not among the disciples of whom we read in St. John's gospel, (ch. iv.) who baptized more than John the Baptist himself? And from what principle of analogy has it been made probable, that our Lord ever commissioned men for his ministerial service, for a brief period only, and then cast them aside?' p. 196.

It is an easy matter to ask questions, and in the present instance, it is no less easy to answer them. If John the Baptist received only a temporary commission, the same may have been true of the seventy. This will suffice for "the principle of analogy." Our author will admit that John fulfilled, that is, finished his course for if his commission was permanent, he must have successors in office, and this will give us *four* orders in the ministry. But it is a plain matter of fact, that the appointment of the Baptist was temporary merely; and there is reason to conclude, that the seventy disciples received a similar appointment.

Like John the Baptist, they went before the Lord, to prepare his way in every place and city, whither he himself would come. The main question is, what became of the seventy after the death

of Christ? We are as much puzzled to find them, as we are to ascertain what has become of the ten tribes of Israel. But the whole scheme of tying down the ministry to a perpetual and mystical *three-fold* order, is encumbered with insuperable objections.* In the first place, it is irreverent, to say the least, to make Christ an order of the ministry in his own church. Or, if this is admissible, it does not answer the intended purpose. All authority in the church was vested in him, as its supreme head. There is, therefore, no analogy between the government of the church by one sole ruler, and its government as administered by twelve apostles, or scores of diocesan bishops. The one is a monarchy, the other an oligarchy. If Christ then, was an order of the ministry, the succession should devolve on *one*, and not upon *twelve*. The pope, the soi-disant "vicegerent of Christ," has the benefit of the argument. He has a more consistent claim to supreme authority in the church, than the bishops. We ask, in the *next* place, what is to be done with John the Baptist? He and the Savior exercised their ministry at the same time. Why cast aside one greater than all the prophets? (Matt. xi. 11.) He must have a place in the catalogue; and if the seventy were commissioned before his death, we have *four* orders of the ministry. If the seventy were not constituted an order of the hierarchy, till after the decease of John the Baptist, the advocates of prelacy, by omitting him, have in the beginning, but *two* orders, Christ and the twelve. Either way, the *triad* is broken, and the *triple* charm is dissolved. But there is a *third* difficulty. We have no evidence, that the seventy disciples were subordinate to the twelve. We are required to

* Bishop Hopkins, describing the leading principles of the priesthood, (p. 235.) says, "the first of these principles may be termed consecration. The second of these principles may be viewed in the *threefold order* of the ministry, perhaps as we may reverently conceive, adopted in reference to the mystery of the trinity, by whose glorious agency we are redeemed: set forth in the high priest, priests, and levites; then in the visible ministry of Christ, the great high priest, his apostles and elders; and then in the apostles, elders, and deacons, continued by the bishops, priests, and deacons of the present day; all admirably calculated to remind us, that as three orders concur in one service, so the divine trinity of persons concur in one salvation, and in like manner, the human trinity of soul, mind, and body, should concur in the service of heaven." The third leading principle is, that "as the triad in the Aaronic ministry, was typical of Christ, and designed to prepare the Israelites for his first coming to suffer and to die, so the triad of the christian ministry is designed to lead the world to the same Saviour, and prepare the church for his second coming in glory, to judge the world." We cannot attach to this mystical speculation, the importance even of a *reverent conceit*. The "triad of the christian ministry," is not proved. It will be time for us to admit the *antitype*, when the *type* is shown to have a real existence. The Unitarian, in the mean time, can turn this speculation to good account. As the second order in the ministry is inferior to the first, and the third is inferior to the second, so he might infer a like inferiority in the persons of the trinity, as adumbrated by a threefold priesthood! For ourselves, as we hold to an equality of persons in the trinity, the bishop's type would lead us to place his three orders on a par.

receive this as a matter out of debate. But if the reader will compare Matt. x. 1-16, with Luke x. 1-16, he will see, that the authority given to the twelve and the seventy, is too nearly the same, to support the pretension, that they constituted two distinct orders, the one subordinate to the other. This is not proved by the writings of either of the evangelists. But there is another obstacle still, which impedes the succession of a triple order. Bishop Hopkins avers, that the appointment of the seventy was permanent, and still exists in the order of modern priests. After the death of Christ, the apostles, according to his view, were exalted to the first rank; the seventy were promoted to the second; and deacons were appointed to supply the third. But the apostles ordained *leaders* in every city. If these constituted a distinct order from the seventy, we have *four* orders co-existing;—the apostles, the seventy, the elders, and deacons. What shall be done in this dilemma? The commission of the seventy, according to our author, was permanent, and as they were ordained by Christ, they could not be re-ordained by the apostles, except to a higher grade of office. But higher they could not go, during the life time of the apostles, for they held the first rank. They kept their place then, second to the apostles, of course, says bishop Hopkins, where they had always been. But if so, how shall we crowd the other elders and deacons into the triple form? One order must yield, or the assumption of three perpetual orders must be given up. Some Episcopal writers, to solve this difficulty, say, on the authority of Eusebius, Jerome, and Epiphanius, that "Mark, Luke, Sosthenes, with other evangelists, as also the seven deacons, were of the seventy, if the primitive fathers of the church, be at all to be relied upon as witnesses of facts. And these persons, even after their promotion, were still inferior to the twelve, being under their government."* But this salvo, besides giving the seventy a "promotion *downwards*," throws out the succession of presbyters; for as they derive their descent from the seventy disciples, (called elders, by way of hypothesis,) if these elders were degraded from their second rank to the third grade of deacons, the natural descent from them could be nothing more nor less than deacons. In this case, the modern Episcopal presbyter has no original. Let us look at the line of descent, as furnished by our author. "High priest, priest, levite; Christ, the twelve, the seventy elders; the apostles, the elders, (that is, the seventy,) and deacons; bishops, priests, deacons." In this arrangement, either the seventy elders, whose commission, we are told, was "not temporary," or the elders ordained by the apostles, must be erased from the venerable

* Collection of essays on the subject of Episcopacy, etc. New York: T. & J. Swords. 1806. pp. 154.

catalogue; otherwise, in spite of argument, there are FOUR permanent orders of the ministry! It will not be pretended, that the *so called* elders appointed by Christ, and the elders afterward ordained by the apostles, filled one and the same grade of office. The apostles would not profane their master's work, by re-ordaining men to the same rank. There is neither proof, nor pretense, that the seventy were ordained to the bishopric by the apostles. That honor is claimed for such men as Timothy and Titus. Besides, if the seventy, as bishop Hopkins admits, could ascend to the second grade, on the vacancy occasioned by the death of Christ, by virtue of their previous commission, they could also, on the decease of the apostles, ascend to the first rank, without a new consecration. From every investigation of this subject, we rise up with a deeper conviction, that the wisdom and the word of God can never be bound down to the perpetual "triad," so often and so confidently claimed for the ministry of reconciliation.

'The next step of the apostles, [having filled the triple form, by adding deacons to the seventy,] which we have to mark, after they had established many churches, and had ordained ministers in every quarter, is their preparing to set men *in their own place*, to ordain, and to govern the churches, after they should be no more. For we find St. Peter, in his second epistle, (ch. i. 13-15.) saying, yea I think it meet, etc. And St. Paul, near the end of his labors, writes to Timothy and Titus, charging them to exercise *apostolic* powers, in ordaining elders and deacons; and in judging and rebuking such as might be unfaithful.' p. 191.

This statement is followed by the *assertion*, that "from this we see, distinctly, that the three-fold ministry was designed to continue after the apostolic day." We see no such thing, either distinctly or indistinctly. Nor are we enlightened by the further asseveration, appended in immediate connection, that "the primitive church declares with one voice, that such was the universal custom: that bishops, priests and deacons, were every where the regular officers of the christian church, and that there was no church without them: and that as St. Paul placed Timothy in Ephesus, and Titus in Crete, to preside over the churches in those regions respectively, so the other apostles had ordained the first bishops in every other city of importance, which had received the gospel." It is easy to show, that the "one voice" of the primitive church, is not *one*, but *many* voices. But we are at present concerned with the argument from scripture. The reference to Peter, (2 Pet. i. 13-15.) is extremely unfortunate. There is not an iota in the chapter, respecting the ministry. The things which the apostle would have the saints, after his decease, *keep always in remembrance*, were known to them, and they were es-

tablished in the present truth. (ver. 12.) He reminds them of the practical duties of religion, growth in grace, and of the precious promises, and the sure word of prophecy. Not a syllable does he intimate about the appointment of a successor. And he *thought* as little as he *says* of this uninspired topic. His epistles are addressed "to the strangers scattered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bythinia, elect, etc.,—to them who have obtained like precious faith with us." The object of both his epistles, as he himself informs us, is to stir up the *pure minds* of his brethren, by way of remembrance. This should be the object of every preacher, whether apostle, bishop, presbyter, or deacon. The ministry is set, not for the defense of *forms*, but for the defense of the *truth*. The assumption, that the apostles ordained diocesan bishops in every important city, is entirely gratuitous. Nothing of the kind is recorded in their writings. As it respects the *apostolic powers* of Timothy and Titus, this is no precedent for after times. Moses was a *layman*, and consecrated Aaron to the priesthood. But this furnishes no warrant for such a layman as Henry VIII. to assume the dignity of *head and law-giver* to the church; nor could he, on the ground of any precedent, human or divine, receive those remarkable "spiritual powers," conferred on him by the "judicious Hooker."* The powers granted to Timothy and Titus, prove nothing in favor of the jurisdiction claimed by bishops. These, own sons of Paul in the faith, were vested with his authority to ordain *elders*, not *bishops*, and to complete the business left unfinished by the apostle. They ordained elders in his name, rebuked them, if necessary, and rejected heretics. This proves, we admit, that the elders were subordinate to Paul, and to those who were sent by him, to regulate the churches which he had planted. But how does it hence follow, that this apostolic authority, necessary in the infancy of the christian church, has been transmitted to the present time? How does it hence appear, in the face too of Matt. xviii. 15-17, and 1 Cor. v. 1-5, that the sole power of excommunication, as our author claims, (p. 290.) "is committed to the bishop alone." As for the sending of Timothy and Titus, "to preside over the churches in those regions respectively," nothing of the kind is intimated in the epistles directed to them, or elsewhere. They were Paul's traveling companions. In the second epistle, (iv. 5.) Timothy is called an *evangelist*,—a traveling preacher; and in the same chapter, we find that Tychicus is sent to Ephesus, Crescens to Galatia, Titus to Dalmatia, and Paul having only Luke with him, sends for Timothy and Mark to come diligently to him. Titus is sent about in the same manner. He is left awhile in Crete, "to set in order the

* Eccles. Pol. B. viii. §8.

things that are wanting." (i. 4.) He was a while at Dalmatia. (2 Tim. iv. 10.) He carried Paul's epistle to the Corinthians, and returned to him in Macedonia. (2 Cor. vii. 6.) We might as well call Crescens, and Tychicus bishops, as Timothy and Titus. The effort to prove, that these two spiritual sons of Paul were by him constituted *diocesans*, with authority to ordain successors to the same office, is and forever *has been* a failure. It is vain to talk about "the office of apostle, afterwards called bishop." The scripture knows nothing of such a transmutation of the name, or transmission of the power. Eusebius, the most ancient writer extant of church history, whose testimony bishop Hopkins relies upon, confesses, (book iii. ch. 4.) "That it was no easy matter to tell who were those that were left bishops of the churches by the apostles, more than by what a man might gather from the Acts of the apostles, and the epistles of St. Paul, in which number he reckons Timothy for bishop of Ephesus; so as may plainly appear, that this tradition of bishoping Timothy over Ephesus, was but taken for granted, out of that place in St. Paul, which was only an intreating him to tarry at Ephesus, to do something left him in charge."* Paul charged the elders, (presbyters,) at Ephesus, summoned to him at Miletus, to *feed*, (rule, govern) the church, and take heed to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost had made them (*ἐπισκοπούς*) overseers. (Acts xx. 28.) We are told by Episcopal writers, and by our author, too, that the bishops were not yet appointed. Where is the proof, that the Ephesian church ever had an officer higher than a presbyter? The scriptures are silent; and Clement, the disciple of Paul, more than twenty years after the apostle's death, shows in his epistle to the factious Corinthians, who had been left *unbishoped*, that they were still governed by presbyters. Hermas, as cited by Salmasius, says the same of other churches.† Here again, the chain of descent becomes weak from its length, and is broken beyond repair.

Bishop Hopkins proceeds next to examine the main positions in Dr. Miller's letters, which he claims to have "discussed and refuted in their order." These positions, summarily expressed, are the following, to wit: "Christ gave but one commission for the office of the gospel ministry, and of course, the office is one. The words bishop and elder, or presbyter, are uniformly used in the new testament, as convertible titles for the same office. The same character and powers, ascribed in the scriptures to bishops, are ascribed to presbyters, establishing the identity of order and name. The christian church was organized after the model of the Jewish synagogue, and was presbyterian in its form." We

* Milton's Select Prose Works, Vol. i. p. 75. Boston: 1826. † Ibid. p. 121.

shall not assume the office of umpire in this case, but will only offer a few remarks on these propositions. To begin with the last, Buxtorf, Prideaux, and bishop Hopkins, have clearly shown, that the synagogue service more nearly resembled the Episcopal than any other; that is, forms of prayer were used, and the scriptures were read by a fixed calendar. After a portion of the law or the prophets had been read, some one expounded, as appears from the custom of Christ and of Paul, (Luke iv. 16-21; Acts xiii. 15; xvii. 3.) There were several officers, but no stated preacher, and we are unable to discover in the synagogue much that looks like a model for the christian church. Prideaux shows, that synagogues were unknown till after the Babylonish captivity, and were established, the better to instruct the people in the law; the Hebrew, at the public reading, being repeated in Chaldee by an interpreter. From the use of written prayers, and the dividing of the scriptures into lessons, he infers two things, for the consideration of dissenters. "1st. That our Savior disliked not set forms of prayer in public worship; and 2d. That he was contented to join with the public in the meanest forms, rather than separate from it." We do not stand convicted by these inferences, for Christ and the apostles were Jews. They necessarily conformed to many Jewish customs, which were afterward abolished by the new dispensation. Paul purified himself, circumcised Timothy the Greek, abstained from meats. The simple inquiry is, What was the mode of worship and order of government in christian churches? Bishop Hopkins says that it was Episcopal, and that the model of the christian church was borrowed, not from the *synagogue*, but from the *temple*. But Prideaux, an equally competent witness, and dean as he was, shows conclusively, that the Jews, till after the Babylonish captivity, "had not any set forms for their prayers; neither had they any solemn assemblies for their praying to God at all, except at the temple only." Of the men who prayed within and without the temple, at the offering of the sacrifices, he says, "Neither of these had any public forms to pray by, nor any public ministers to officiate to them herein, but all prayed in private by themselves, and all according to their own private conceptions." He proves also from the parable of the publican and pharisee, and other instances, that Christ, and the apostles, and the first christians, prayed without the use of forms, as the custom had always been in the temple.* Hence it follows, that liturgies are *human*, and not of *divine* origin.

The three remaining propositions which bishop Hopkins says he has refuted, may all be grouped into one. For if the words

* Prid. Connex. Vol. ii. B. vi. p. 170. See also Lightfoot's Temple Service.

bishop, and elder, or presbyter are uniformly used as convertible titles for the same office, the commission for the ministry is one, and its character and powers belong to one and the same class of men. Our author admits the community of names—that the apostles and public teachers were called indiscriminately, bishops, elders, presbyters, and deacons. But he says, nothing can be proved from this. “These names were at first not so much proper as common; although they became official and distinctive afterwards.” We dissent from this explanation, with which we have been furnished thousands of times. The names in scripture had, in the beginning, a distinctive and official meaning, however they might be used in common. When Paul calls himself the apostle of the Gentiles, we understand at once, that the word apostle describes his peculiar office; and his distinctive title is not obscured by styling himself a messenger, elder, or servant of the church. So too, when he sends for the elders of Ephesus, we have no doubt what offices he meant. But if the names and titles appropriated to the first christian teachers were common, and did not become distinctive till afterward, how is one office known from another, and how can the Episcopal succession of three orders be deduced from the scriptures? The titles were originally distinct, and the powers of each office were defined, and therefore, from the interchange of names we can identify the presbyter and bishop. These two words are used promiscuously, and by consequence, signify the same thing. But the other titles are not so used, and they signify different grades of office. We should not say, (describing the duties of an *apostle*,) a *presbyter*, or a *deacon* must be blameless. But we find (Tit. i. 5–7.) the qualifications of *elders*, and (πρεσβυτερος) presbyters thus described: “If any be blameless, the husband of one wife etc.; for a *bishop* (ἐπισκοπον) must be blameless.” If the words bishop and presbyter here do not signify the same office, there is no sense in the language. The same character and powers therefore, are given to the bishop and presbyter. They are commissioned to *feed* the church, a word which embraces the highest powers of government, for it is applied to Christ the good shepherd, (Matt. ii. 6.) All the powers given to the ministry in the new testament, are ascribed to presbyters. See in the original Heb. xii. 7, 17; 1 Tim. iii. 4, 5, 12; 1 Thess. v. 12; 1 Tim. v. 12; Acts, xx. 17, 28; 1 Peter, v. 2, 3. In the salutations to the churches, only bishops and deacons are mentioned. (Phil. i. 1.) These bishops synonymous with presbyters, ordained Timothy. He could not have received ordination “by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery,” unless they had power to consecrate him to his office. Paul, as one who had aided in the ordination of his son in the gospel, might properly and very naturally remind Timothy of his share in the transaction. But if the

presbyters did not possess the full power of ordination, the apostle could not use the language which he does in 1 Tim. iv. 14. The evidence is complete, that bishops and presbyters are one in office and authority; and that after the apostolic office and power ceased, bishops, (called also elders, and presbyters) and deacons, are the only orders remaining in the church. This is admitted by all moderate Episcopalians. The Christian Observer for March, 1804, says, "that Episcopalians found not the merits of their cause upon any express injunction or delineation of church government in the scriptures, for there is none." Paley, notwithstanding his archdeaconship, admits, that "it cannot be proved, that any form of church government was laid down in the christian scriptures, with a view of fixing a constitution for succeeding ages." When Charles I. struggled between the relinquishment of his life, or the *jus divinum* of Episcopacy, he sent for Usher, and asked him, "*Whether he found in all antiquity, that presbyters alone ordained any?*" To which the archbishop replied frankly, that he could show his majesty more than that, *even that presbyters alone had successively ordained bishops*, and instanced in St. Jerome's words, in his Epis. ad Evagrium, where he says, the presbyters of Alexandria chose and made their own bishops, from the days of Mark the apostle, till Heraclus and Dionysius.* In the reign of Elizabeth, the archbishop of Canterbury gave Mr. John Morison, a Scots Presbyterian, a license to preach and administer the sacraments through his whole province. "As much as in us lies, and as by right we may, approving and ratifying the form of your ordination, etc."† In those two remarkable works, called the *Institution of a Christian Man*, and *A necessary Erudition for a Christian Man*, (the first named the Bishop's book, and the second the King's book, and both licensed by Henry VIII.,) the one "maintains but two orders of the clergy, and avers, that no one bishop has authority over another, according to the word of God;" and the other in the sacrament of orders, "maintains no real distinction between bishops and priests." And concerning the order of deacons, it says, "*Of these two orders only, that is to say, priests and deacons, scripture maketh express mention.*"‡ The early reformers were of the same opinion, and the godly men who bore the burden of the subsequent Reformation, maintained the same doctrine. They found no difficulty in refuting the arguments of their popish opponents, but were crushed by the civil power. Says Milton, "The prelates bore sway, in whose time, the books of some men were confuted, when they who should have answered, were in close prison, denied the use of pen or paper. And the divine right of Episcopacy, was then valiantly as-

* Neal Vol. iii. p. 508. † Ibid. Vol. i. p. 386. ‡ Ibid. p. 73-81.

serted, when he who should have been respondent, must have bethought himself withal, how he could refute the Clink or the Gatehouse."*

We have not time, nor is it necessary, to follow our author through his many citations from the primitive fathers, occupying the space of a long lecture. He quotes Irenæus, Tertullian, Cyprian, Eusebius, and Jerome, of the ancients; supporting their testimony by extracts from Calvin, Melancthon, Grotius, etc., and *instar omnium*, Hooker. As for those modern fathers who yielded so much to the Episcopal claim, their concessions prove nothing more than their strong desire to preserve the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. This was the object of the Geneva reformer, and if it were not so, we, as Milton says, shall not "be put off with Calvin's name, unless we be convinced with Calvin's reason." Selden and Stillingfleet, and other eminent men in the Reformation, refuted the high claims of Episcopacy, but they were induced by flattery and preferment, or compelled by persecution, to retract their arguments. With a word, we must also dismiss the *primitive* fathers. If their testimony is valid, it favors alike both sides of the controversy. Ignatius, the oldest of the fathers, so often quoted by our opponents, writing to the Philadelphians, says, "that it belongs to them as to the church of God, to choose a bishop." Much more to the purpose, we might cite from the same author; but as bishop Hopkins prudently omits Ignatius, we leave him, and pass on to the fathers he has cited, as furnishing an unbroken line of Episcopal bishops, from the apostles. He begins with Irenæus, who tells us, that Polycarp "was made bishop of Smyrna by the apostles." That the apostles delivered the Episcopal office to Linus, (mentioned by Paul in his epistle to Timothy,) and to him succeeded Anacletus, and to him Clement, etc. But Irenæus confesses to Florinus, that he saw Polycarp only when a *boy*, and if his boyish testimony can be relied on, Polycarp was "an apostolical presbyter," for so the young witness calls him. But Eusebius, near the close of his third book, speaking of Papias, an old writer given to "new doctrines and fabulous conceits," and who had heard St. John, says, that "divers ecclesiastical men, and *Irenæus* among the rest, while they looked at his antiquity, became infected with his errors." The same Irenæus was as much a patron of papacy as of Episcopacy, for he says, (Book iii. against Heresies,) that "the obedience of Mary, was the cause of salvation to herself and all mankind."† Next, Tertullian. He repeats the argument of Irenæus, but with no increase of authority. Neither of them says, that bishops were above presbyters, nor does it appear, that they are speaking of

* Apol. for Smectymnuus. †Milton Prelat. Epis. p. 83.

diocesans. The apostles, say they, placed a bishop at Smyrna, another at Rome, etc. But what bishops were these? And who will assure us, that authors so infected with popish sentiments, have not been corrupted in their passage through the channel of Rome? Tertullian calls "St. Paul a novice, and raw in grace, for reproving St. Peter at Antioch."* If prelacy is supported by such witnesses, it must go hand in hand with popery. The third father is Cyprian. By the Romish argument, he makes Peter the rock of government, and deduces bishops from him. But this same Cyprian says, (Epis. 55th and 68th,) "A bishop is made by the suffrage of all the people. The people chiefly hath power either of choosing worthy ones, or refusing unworthy." This he repeats often, and proves from the scriptures, "and with solid reasons; these were his antiquities." In Epis. 6th, 41st, and 52d, also, we add, that Cyprian calls presbyters, his *compresbyters*, and they call him brother Cyprian and dear Cyprian. The first council of Nice, in a synodical epistle to the African churches, warning them of Arianism, "exhorts them to choose orthodox bisheps, in the place of the dead, so they be worthy, and the people choose them."† Eusebius, as we have already seen, confesses, that he knew nothing of bishops, except from tradition, and what might be gathered from the Acts of the apostles, and the epistles to Timothy. And Jerome, the last on our author's list, is the man who opposed prelacy, and tells us it came in "*paulatim*," by abuse of the power given to the "*primus inter pares*." We add to these ancient fathers, the testimony of "a fast friend of Episcopacy, Camden, who cannot but love bishops as well as old coins, and his much lamented monasteries, for antiquities' sake." Writing of Scotland, he says, "that over all the world, bishops had no certain diocese, till pope Dionysius, about the year 268, did cut them out; and that the bishops of Scotland executed their function in what place soever they came indifferently, and without distinction, till king Malcom III., about the year 1070."‡

We have done with citations from the fathers; but since bishop Hopkins, and all Episcopal writers, rely more upon Hooker than upon any other champion, ancient or modern, we beg leave to insert here an extract from Orme's Life and Times of Richard Baxter, vol. i. p. 23.

'In Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, the strength of the Episcopal cause is to be found, and from the almost superstitious veneration with which his name is mentioned, by the highest, as well as the more ordinary members of the church, it is evident how much importance they attach to his labors. Of the man whom popes have praised, and kings

* Ref. in Eng. p. 19. † Ibid p. 15. ‡ p. 14.

commended, and bishops without number, extolled, it may appear presumptuous in me to express a qualified opinion. But truth ought to be spoken. The praise of profound erudition, laborious research, and gigantic powers of eloquence, no man will deny to be due to Hooker. But had his celebrated work been written in defense of the popish hierarchy, and popish ceremonies, the greater part of it would have required little alteration. Hence we need not wonder at the praise bestowed upon it by Clement VIII., or that James II. should have referred to it, as one of the two books which promoted his conversion to the church of Rome. His views of the authority of the church, and the insufficiency of scripture, are much more popish than protestant: and the greatest trial to which the judiciousness of Hooker could have been subjected, would have been to attempt a defense of the Reformation, on his own principles. His work abounds with sophisms, with assumptions, and with a show of proof, when the true state of the case has not been given, and the strength of the argument never met. The quantity of learned and ingenious reasoning which it contains, and the seeming candor and mildness which it displays, have imposed upon many, and procured for Hooker, the name of "*judicious*," to which the solidity of his reasonings, and the services he has rendered to christianity, by no means entitle him.'

We have noticed the fathers, ancient and modern, merely to show that their testimony cannot be relied upon in support of Episcopacy. The arguments from this source go to prove Congregationalism, even more fully than prelacy. The oldest of the fathers, uncertain traditions excepted, had nothing but the scriptures for their guide. The wisest of them confess, that they knew nothing sure but what they gathered from this source. "Thus, while we leave the bible to gad after the traditions of the ancients, we hear the ancients themselves confessing, that what knowledge they had in this point was such as they had gathered from the bible: therefore, antiquity itself hath turned over the controversy to that sovereign book, which we had fondly straggled from." Bishop Hopkins also has subscribed to certain articles, of which Art. VI. saith, "Holy scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be provided thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation."

In view of the whole evidence in the case, we are confident, that diocesan Episcopacy cannot be established either from the scriptures, or the traditions of the elders. Whence then its origin, we are asked. We answer, it came in by degrees upon the simplicity and purity of gospel institutions. The cardinals of Rome, as an old English writer shows, were originally parish priests. The primitive bishops, as Cave and Mosheim have proved, were simply pastors. By time and corruption, a new

order of the ministry was invented, and the name of bishop was elevated to correspond with it. The church and state became at length cemented together, and spiritual powers were fashioned by the civil. He who should have fed the flock like a shepherd, began to trample on the "liberties and lawful titles of God's freeborn church." The superstition of Helena, the mother of Constantine, is well known. Her son, the first christian emperor, having found the cross of Christ, as he supposed, "put some of the nails into his helmet, to bear off blows in battle; others he fastened among the studs of his bridle, to fulfil, as he thought, or his court bishops persuaded him, the prophecy of Zachariah, "And it shall be that which is in the bridle shall be holy to the Lord." Superstition and corruption prevailed till the dead mass was broken up by the Reformation. But the reform in England, so far as those in power were concerned, was rather *political* than *evangelical*. Henry VIII. lived and died a bigoted papist.* Mary was worse still. Elizabeth was but half a protestant, and the Jameses and the Charleses were staunch Romanists. Such were their supporters; and the brief labors of Edward VI. scarcely availed nothing. So late as the reign of Charles I. great stress was laid on the uninterrupted succession of the Episcopal character from the church of Rome. "Miserable were we, (says Dr. Pocklington) if he that now sits archbishop of Canterbury could not derive his succession from St. Austin, St. Austin from St. Gregory, and St. Gregory from St. Peter." The author of the English Pope (1643) says, "Sparrow paved the way for *auricular confession*, Watts for *penance*, Heylin for *altar worship*, and Laud for the *mass*."† In view of such historical facts, and the persecutions which in the reign of Elizabeth, suspended a fourth part of the best preachers; and in the reign of Charles II. expelled two thousand of the most godly ministers from the church, we are surprised to find bishop Hopkins saying, "We are justified in disclaiming all part or lot in the dissensions and divisions of the church of Christ. It is an unfailing ground of humble thankfulness with those who belong to the English branch of the Reformation, that this grievous multiplication of schisms did not arise in the communion of that church." (p. 3.) Schisms! The godly reformers, driven out for conscience sake, would have remained, had they not been compelled "to use the popish habits," and to observe idle ceremonies. Had a few of these indifferent things been left discretionary, there had been no schism. This

* His funeral was observed with popish ceremony. And he left £600 a year to the church of Windsor, for priests to say mass for his soul every day, and for four obits a year, and sermons and distribution of alms at every one of them, etc.—*Fox's Martyrs*, p. 321.

† Neal, vol. ii. p. 315.

was the date of the separation, (says Strype,) "a most unhappy event, whereby people of the same country, of the same religion, and of the same judgment in doctrine, parted communions; one part being obliged to go aside into secret houses and chambers, to serve God by themselves, which begat strangeness between neighbors, christians, and protestants."

We did not, on looking at the exclusive ground which bishop Hopkins has taken through his whole work, anticipate near the close, such sentiments as the following, on p. 312, "I frankly avow my abhorrence of all party names and distinctions. High church, and low church designations should be held in reprobation by all true *churchmen*." There is nevertheless a vital and evangelical distinction between the two classes of Episcopalians, denoted by the terms high and low churchmen; and it has existed from the time of Dr. Bancroft's sermon, (Jan. 1588,) on the *jure divino* right of bishops. Dissenters have no disagreement with the first mentioned class: their difficulty is wholly with the latter. We must pass over "the official character of a bishop" with his three-fold duties of "father, governor, and judge," and the "accordance of Episcopal government with republican principle." We are not convinced, however, that the sole power of ordination, and excommunication, and the highest powers of government, are of right vested in one ruler. As to titles, we perceive that our author explains the separate terms of *Reverend*, and *Father*, and justifies their application, but omits to prefix *Rt.* Why so? If we may hazard a conjecture, the whole array of titles, *Rt. Reverend Father in God*, etc. etc. would differ too much from "Paul the apostle;" and "our beloved brother Paul," and shew a startling departure from the republican simplicity of the gospel. In the closing Lecture from Gal. iv. 16, "Am I therefore become your enemy because I tell you the truth," our author (who by the way tells a different kind of truth from Paul) deploras the evils of disunion, and proposes a remedy. But he still defends his exclusive principles, and inculcates the duty of churchmen to keep aloof from union with other denominations. Nevertheless, says he, "We are a peaceable people, seeking no dissensions, but truly desirous to avoid them whenever we may." We too are a peaceable people, willing that our Episcopal brethren, of the common faith, should enjoy unmolested their own mode of worship. But we must occasionally, for the love of truth, examine the high pretensions which exclude us from covenant mercy, and pronounce our ministrations irregular and invalid. If we are compared to "a body maimed or mutilated," (p. 347,) we must maintain our soundness, and now and then *re-church* ourselves. We doubt not, that we shall be relieved at length from this unwelcome labor, for in the progress of holiness, every christian church

will return to more simple and scriptural views of religion, and then our claims will be the better appreciated. Dr. Morrison, writing from China to the Congregational Union of England and Wales, expresses his congratulation at its formation, and his conviction, "that the Congregational form of church government is, besides being more scriptural, more adapted than any other for planting christianity in heathen lands, on account of its being more simple and less sectarian. The longer he lived, the more he saw of the evils resulting from the exclusive pretensions of Episcopacy." In view of the work submitted to our readers, we admit, that it is written with as much candor as could be expected from one who views every thing in the same light. But we confess, that the plan of union offered by bishop Hopkins, which he properly calls "*a reverie*," seems to us, at present a hopeless matter. He proposes "an universal council,"—a vast Episcopal congress, gathered from the four quarters of the globe, to meet at Philadelphia, on *Christmas eve*, to examine the bible and "Apostolic traditions," and make "the 'holy Catholic church,' ONE CHURCH again." Such a glorious result cannot be looked for, till the *jus divinum* of Episcopacy, of Presbyterianism, and of every other *ism*, shall be given up, and a deeper spirit of holiness shall pervade the church universal, and godliness become, with all saints, the main thing. As a means of conducting us to such a consummation of bliss, we refer ourselves, and bishop Hopkins, (who is familiar with the ancients,) to the diligent study of a passage or two from one of the wisest and best of the apostolic fathers: "Ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ οὔτε περιτομὴ τι ἰσχύει, οὔτε ἀκροβυστία· ἀλλὰ πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη.—Οὐ γάρ ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ βρωσὶς καὶ πόσις, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη καὶ εἰρήνη καὶ χαρὰ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. Ὁ γὰρ ἐν τοῦτοις δουλεύων τῷ Χριστῷ, εὐάρεστος τῷ θεῷ, καὶ δόκιμος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις."

ART. IV.—AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE SOUL.

The objects of sense occupy so large a share of our attention, that we sometimes find it difficult to gain a proper apprehension of spirit though ourselves spiritual. Our views of material objects are clear and abiding, those of spirits, and of things pertaining to them, are often confused and transient. The former present themselves to our mind, as undoubted realities, the latter as almost imaginary and unsubstantial. But why is it, that our conceptions of our own and of surrounding spirits, are so imperfect and defective? Why is our knowledge of spirit so uncertain and unsatisfactory? Why is it so limited in its extent, and in its influences upon our characters? Do we labor under these embarrass-

ments for want of the capacities and means of better and more useful knowledge? or is our ignorance with its attendant evils, the result of negligence and criminal imperfection in the use of those capacities and means of knowledge, which we possess? The latter is unquestionably the fact. Did we study with suitable attention and diligence the phenomena of spirits, did we carefully observe and consider their operations as developed in ourselves, in others, and in the word and providence of God; we should doubtless attain a degree of knowledge in relation to them, proportioned in some degree to the vast importance of this subject. Under these impressions, the following inquiry has been entered upon, as one of high practical interest. If the writer has been in any degree successful in his search after truth, and in his present attempt to exhibit the same, he indulges the humble confidence, that so far, at least, important neglected interests will be promoted.

Our remarks on this subject will naturally embrace a variety of topics. And first, as most convenient, we will say a few words respecting

Material objects. All useful knowledge has relation to beings either created or uncreated. Created beings are of different kinds and orders. Those which are extended, solid, moveable, divisible, inert, and the subjects of attractions and repulsions, are denominated material. The earth is material. So are the numerous chemical and vegetable products which occupy its surface, and the bodies of all its animals. Larger material objects may be resolved into smaller, and complex ones into simple, but no resolution or analysis of them can make them any other than material. In respect to the properties of extension, solidity, mobility, inertia, attraction, repulsion, etc. the part is similar to the whole, and the simple to the compound. The existence of material objects is placed beyond doubt. We have the greatest possible assurance in respect to this subject. It is one in which we feel, that we cannot be mistaken. We know, that the earth is a real existence, and that the land and water, minerals, vegetables, and animals, which occupy its surface, are not all an illusion. They cannot be so. We know this of our own bodies as well as of thousands of other objects. But how do we know it? By the evidence of our senses, of testimony, and of reason.

Material objects are objects of sense. We have handled them, and thus been assured of their existence, and informed of their properties by the sense of touch. We have seen them, and been confirmed in the revelations of other senses by the agency of sight. The contemporaneous and harmonious exercise of the different senses, has uniformly led to the perception of material objects. The perceptions of every sense have concurred in

forcing upon us the conviction of the reality of those objects to which they relate.

Some knowledge of the existence and properties of material objects being obtained by the exercise of the senses, this is increased and perfected by information derived from others. The former constitutes the basis on which the latter is capable of being firmly built. The revelations of sense are preparatory to those of testimony. They are necessary as the elements of knowledge, and lay a foundation for certainty in the apprehension of many truths, which are evidenced to us directly by other means. By far the greater part of our knowledge, in respect to the existence and character of material objects, is derived from others. This is particularly true in the wide fields of history and geography, as also in many more. We are as certain of the existence and character of many objects, which have never been brought under the cognizance of our senses, as we are of any thing within the sphere of knowledge.

Reason is a further source from whence we derive our knowledge of the existence and character of material objects, analogous to that of the senses and of testimony, and subsidiary to both. This faculty is chiefly concerned in the attainment of that knowledge which is the result of comparison and inference. The perceptions of reason though less direct are not less certain than those of sense. The knowledge of which it is the occasion, is extensive and valuable.

Our knowledge of material objects, relates to the *fact* of their existence, and to *some* of their *properties* and *relations*. As to their existence, it is in many cases certain and perfect. The same is true in respect to some, but not all, of their properties and relations. The properties and relations of material objects, comprehend a field of inquiry which is of vast extent. It has never been fully surveyed by any human mind, or by all human minds taken together. None but God is competent to understand it perfectly. Our knowledge of any material object comprehends; (1.) its existence; (2.) some of its properties and relations. Nothing more. Our knowledge of the existence of an object, is consequent on that of some of its properties and relations. A single property or relation, indicates an existing object to which the property or relation belongs. This indication of existence is unambiguous and decisive. It establishes that fact beyond reasonable doubt or successful cavil. Evidence of this kind is all the proof of the existence of external objects, which we can obtain. The nature of the case admits nothing more; but this it demands and affords. The extent and limitation of human knowledge in respect to material objects, ought to be carefully marked previous to en-

tering on a higher field of inquiry. Clearness and discrimination are preparatory to the investigation of those objects which are not material. If our views of matter are indistinct and dim, those of mind will be still more so. If those of the former are clear and well-defined, we shall be able to prosecute with some pleasure and success the investigation of the latter.

Spiritual or immaterial objects. The existence of spiritual like that of material objects is indicated to us by their phenomena. The essence of spirit like that of matter is not subject to human apprehension. It is high as heaven, what can we know of it; deep as hell, what can we do in respect to it? Indeed nothing. If, therefore we cannot learn the existence of spirits from their properties and relations, we cannot learn it at all; and if we cannot ascertain some of their properties and relations, we can know nothing about the objects which they characterize. This is a very important department of knowledge, not merely of speculation and conjecture. Upon our proficiency in it, our final allotment and eternal destiny will in a measure depend. Ignorance of our spiritual natures and interests, is of the most dangerous tendency; and the voluntary indulgence of it, is the height of folly and sin. The phenomena which indicates the existence of spirits, are perception, affection, memory, imagination, reason, conscience, volition, consciousness. Men are the subjects of all these phenomena. They perceive, feel, remember, imagine, reason, will, and are conscious of performing all these mental processes. These phenomena therefore, must be referred exclusively to the human body, or else to a higher principle connected with it. The various modes of thought and feeling are affections and states of the body merely, or else of a different or higher kind of existence connected with it.

1. They do not belong to the body exclusively: because, that can exist in a perfect state without them, and in an imperfect state with them. Death may be produced without disorganizing any part of the body; thus showing, that life and its attendant phenomena are not material. So life may be continued in all its power after very great disorganization and derangement of the bodily organs has taken place, thus establishing by a different method the same conclusion.

2. Because the organs of sense may be impaired or entirely destroyed without injuring in the least the agent of perception. The eye the organ of sight, or any other organ of sense may be impaired or entirely destroyed while the agent of perception—that which saw through the medium of the eye, or perceived in any way, through the medium of any sense—remains as vigorous as before. The agent of perception in Milton lost none of its energy when the organ of sight was destroyed. It was still clothed with

immortal strength, and girded with celestial radiance. That agent must have been something different from the body in which its phenomena were for a time exhibited.

3. Because the capacities of men are entirely different from the properties of matter, and such as cannot result from any modification of them. The properties of matter are of two kinds, chemical and mechanical. It has no intellectual or moral properties; no combination and arrangement of material particles, so far as we know, can invest them with new and different properties. It can only modify the properties already possessed. If the elementary particles of matter therefore, do not possess life, no possible combination and arrangement of them can confer this principle. If the elements are without life, so will every possible combination of them be. This is manifest from the design of organization which is simply to combine, modify and direct the properties and powers of the bodies organized, but not in any case to confer new powers. There is no instance to be found, in which power is originated by organization, though it is always modified by that means. The body is indeed material. Every particle of matter in it, retains not only its material but its peculiar character. The arrangement and organization of those particles are wonderful. They accomplish in behalf of man, all that the most perfect organization can accomplish, but they do not and cannot accomplish the phenomena of thought and feeling. These are of a higher nature than mere chemical or mechanical effects, and bear the unequivocal marks of a higher agency. Thought and feeling, memory and volition, are phenomena which cannot be referred to attraction and repulsion, or any other properties of matter combined or uncombined, as their causes, without manifest and gross absurdity. Still less can they be resolved into the properties of any class of material objects. No modifications of extension, solidity, mobility, inertia, attraction, or repulsion, the properties of all matter, can possibly constitute an intellectual sentiment or moral exercise. The existence therefore of phenomena which admit of no rational explanation on any of the principles of matter, demonstrates the existence of that noble agent denominated the soul or mind.

4. Because the hypothesis, that the body or any part of it, is the ultimate agent of thought and feeling contradicts our consciousness. We are conscious of different intellectual and moral exercises, of thought, feeling, pleasure, pain, etc. The subject of all those exercises of which we are conscious, and of our consciousness itself, is of course the ultimate and real agent of thought and feeling. This subject is not the brain or any part of the body, but something entirely different and distinct from the bodily organs. It is something present alike in every part of the body, but

capable of being identified with nothing that is material. The objects of consciousness are the states and exercises of that which is the subject of thought and feeling whatever it is. Were the brain that subject, their consciousness would have respect to the states and exercises of the brain. But this is not the case. The agent of thought takes no more cognizance of the state of the brain, than it does of that of other bodily organs. It is susceptible of pain in any part of the body, and in the several senses it takes accurate cognizance of the impressions appropriate to those senses. In respect to the brain it does nothing more. Consciousness has no subjective reference to the body, considered as a whole or any part of it. Therefore the subject of consciousness must be something different from the body, though connected with it. It must be the soul.

5. Because the bible teaches, that man has a soul to which all the phenomena of human thought and feeling ought to be referred. Gen. ii. "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." Here is first the formation of the body out of the dust of the ground; and secondly the bestowment of the breath of life, or of a living soul, added to the body, and intimately connected with it. The body is represented as one thing, and the breath of life or the soul another. To this soul, and not to the body, the phenomena of human thought and feeling are in the bible universally and distinctly referred. The soul is spoken of in the bible as that which loves and hates, which rejoices and is troubled or filled with sorrow, which exercises fear and confidence, and is concerned in all the functions of life and in all the modifications of perception and feeling. See Cant. i. 7; iii. 1-4; Ps. i. 14; vi. 4; xvii. 9; lvii. 2; lxxxvi. 4; Job xix. 2; xxvii. 2; xxx. 25; Matth. xxvi. 38; Mark xiv. 34. In Matth. x. 28 it is said; "Fear not them that kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Here soul and body are manifestly distinguished as constituting the higher and lower departments of human nature. The former is not only represented as different from the body, but as surviving its destruction, and as incapable of destruction by man; but as liable to be destroyed by the wrath of God. In numerous passages both of the old and new testament, and in various modes of expression, the soul of man is spoken of as being distinct and different from the body. The doctrine of its separate existence, one of the most obvious of the doctrines of the bible, implies this, and is inconsistent with any other hypothesis. The bible is a system of truth established by the strongest and most decisive evidence. We cannot suppose it to be false in any of its clear and obvious instruc-

tions. Decisive evidence does not lie, and if faithfully interpreted cannot mislead. That therefore, which the bible clearly teaches must be true, because supported by an amount of evidence which cannot exist in favor of falsehood and delusion. The doctrine, that the soul, the agent of thought and feeling, is different and distinct from the body, thus having the undoubted support of the bible; and the bible having the support of evidences which are the infallible indications of truth; this doctrine therefore, is entitled to our utmost confidence from its relation to the bible, and inspection of other sources of evidence in its favor. Having determined with certainty, that thought and feeling are not affections and states of the body, the conclusion is inevitable, that they must be the workings of a higher agent and more etherial element included within the body. This agent is denominated the soul, mind, spirit, and is that which invests man with his high pre-eminence in the scale of being. The soul is not a part of the body though included within it. It is not capable of amalgamation with the body, though acting upon it and by its means, and being in turn acted upon thereby. The souls of men are a single class of objects not material, a class which we have great facilities for studying and understanding, and a competent knowledge of which, is of the greatest possible consequence to us as free, responsible, and immortal agents.

The phenomena of mind equally with those of matter are objects of perception, testimony, and reason. They are also, to a considerable extent, in the case of our own minds, severally objects of consciousness. Consciousness, is the highest and primary source of information on this subject. We are conscious of the exercise of thoughts and feelings, which cannot be referred to our bodies exclusively, or even at all. This is the case with perception, affection, memory, imagination, reason, conscience and volition. They are all matters of consciousness and indicate to ourselves the existence and character of our own minds. They are also matters of observation and testimony, and are capable of being clearly established as such. Those facts in relation to the mind, which are matters of consciousness, together with those which we learn from observation and the testimony of others, are the materials for the appropriate and successful exercise of reason, in the discovery of still higher and less obvious truths pertaining to the same and related subjects. From consciousness, observation, testimony and reason, all our knowledge of mind, whether our own or belonging to others, must be derived. Beyond what can be learned from these sources, we cannot push our investigations or make the least discovery of truth. Our knowledge of mind therefore, analogous to that of matter, comprehends (1.) the fact of its existence; (2.) some of its qualities, powers, relations and op-

erations. Nothing more. More than this we have no capacity to determine. Within the sphere to which our capacities and means of information in respect to the mind extend, our knowledge of it is capable of being as accurate and certain as on any other subject. We need not be doubtful whether we have souls or not. The indications of their existence are as unequivocal and decisive as those of the existence of material objects ; or even of our bodies, that class of material objects with which we have most to do, and are best acquainted. A clear perception of the existence of our souls need not be a singular or rare attainment, though it probably is to a greater extent than most suppose. It is the starting point in reference to all satisfactory and certain faith in spiritual things. A man who perceives clearly the existence of his own soul, will be assisted by that perception in ascertaining kindred truths. He will be able to perceive with more facility than he could otherwise do, spiritual objects generally, as they are revealed in the scriptures. Without a clear perception of the existence of our own souls, and those of our fellow-men, every thing spiritual will appear to us imaginary and uncertain. We shall perceive the existence of no spiritual object whatever with clearness, and shall attain no unwavering confidence in spiritual truth of any kind, however distinctly and demonstrably set forth. A general and vague impression, that we have souls is not enough ; we need a clear and distinct perception of this truth ; one in which we can rest with an assurance equal to that which we have of the existence of our bodies. Such a perception is doubtless attainable and is adapted to exert an efficient agency in promoting the high ends of our spiritual being, our immortal as well as corporeal and perishable nature. The precise relation of mind to matter we cannot tell. It is obvious however, that they are substances generically different. Matter has none of the susceptibilities and powers of mind, neither has mind the properties of matter. All that we know of natural objects, is their properties and relations. Equally limited is our knowledge of mind. It embraces the susceptibilities and powers of this mysterious agent. That to which power and properties belong is utterly beyond the sphere of our knowledge. Our perceptions relate to properties. The idea of substance is not gained simply by perception. It is an inference or judgment to which perceptions sustain the relation of evidence.

The soul is uncompounded. This is not true of every material object with which we are acquainted. Material objects of any appreciable magnitude, are made up of a vast number of separate particles existing perfectly independent of each other ; and connected only by mutual attractions. They are capable of being divided almost indefinitely, and have no necessary connection with each other. A single indivisible element is far too small

to be detected by the nicest inspection of which man is capable in the present state. With mind however the case is different. It bears no marks of composition. It is not capable of being resolved into simpler elements, or of being divided. It stands alone, a single existence, incapable of being added to, or subtracted from. We cannot detect a part of the soul, and yet we seem to have ample means of doing so, were there parts to be detected. We have a distinct consciousness of a variety of mental exercises. A mental exercise is nothing but the mind in exercise. If the mind therefore consisted of parts, our consciousness would doubtless afford in some way and on some occasions, evidence of that fact. But the evidence derived from consciousness in relation to this subject, is universally of an opposite character. Consciousness always has respect to the mind as one and the same in all respects; unextended and indivisible. In respect to its simplicity, the soul is opposite to the body. The body is a compound consisting of innumerable elementary particles. Those particles duly arranged constitute the several organs and members of the body, and these organs and members constitute the body. But the soul is simple in every respect; (1.) in respect to composition; (2.) and consequently in respect to members and faculties. All its faculties belong to the same identical subsistence. It is one and the same thing which perceives, feels, reasons, judges, remembers, and performs all the mental processes.

The relation of the soul to the body. Man is a complex being, partly spiritual and partly corporeal. During its sojourn in this world, the soul is united to a body. All that we learn of it, by experience and observation, relates to it, in its embodied state. The body is entirely material. It consists of a great number of organs so constructed and arranged as to form one harmonious system altogether adapted to the spirit's use. These organs are the apparatus of the mind, useless of themselves, but highly useful under the mind's control. The connection between the soul and body, is a mystery that we are not able fully to comprehend. Some facts however in relation to it, are obvious and worthy of attention.

1. *It is intimate.* This fact is indicated by a variety of considerations. It is obvious from a consideration of the bodily senses. The body is the medium of sensation. The slightest impression on a bodily organ of sense, instantly reaches the mind. This could not be the case, unless the connection between the mind and body were intimate. It is farther evinced by the effect of a healthy or unhealthy state of the body, on the mind. When the body suffers by sickness, the mind suffers and sympathises with it; thus showing, that the connection which exists between them, is such as to make the well-being of the former, dependent on that of the latter. The effect produced on the body by the

state of the mind demonstrates the same fact. A cheerful and tranquil state of mind is felt by the body, and is universally known to be promotive of its well being. Fear, terror, remorse, despair, and all other strong mental emotions, produce corresponding and often highly injurious effects on the corporeal tenement. Death, an entire separation of the soul from the body, consigns the latter to immediate corruption. All these facts strongly indicate the more general one, that the soul and body are intimately connected during the present life. Hereditary predispositions of mind, are indications of the same fact. They do not occur on account of any relationship between the souls of kindred directly, but through the medium of the body, and the influence of it in determining our mental exercises.

2. *It is easily dissolved.* Death is but another name for the separation of the soul from the body. It passes upon all mankind, and is produced by a great variety of means. Most generally, it is the result of causes acting directly on the body. Sometimes it is produced by causes acting directly on the mind, and through that affecting the body. Of the former class are those deaths which result from violence or disease; of the latter, those which are produced by fear, terror, or despair, or even by joy, as has sometimes been the case.

3. *It is general.* The soul is connected with the body considered as a whole, not with any particular part of it. This is evident from the fact, that sensation occurs in the most remote parts of the corporeal system, as truly as in the centre, or as it does any where. This could not be the case if the soul were not present in every part of the body. The soul's connection with the body has relation to it as a system of material organs, not merely as an accumulation of matter. It is not a connection therefore with matter in its elements, but with the organs into which these elements are formed.

4. *It is involuntary.* It does not depend upon volition merely. Our wishing it to continue, does not secure its continuance; our wishing it to cease, does not dissolve it. It is not the direct result of choice or of voluntary effort, but exists irrespective of either. It does not come within the sphere of our consciousness. Still less does it come under the cognizance of sense.

5. *It is spiritual.* It does not depend on any affinity of the body for the soul, but on affinity of the soul for the body. The body does not confine the soul, but the soul inheres in the body. This may be inferred from the fact, that the soul is infinitely the noblest of the two which are brought together in this union. It is unnatural to suppose, that the nobler should be bound by the comparatively mean. The affinity by which the soul retains possession of the body is obvious from the fact, that such possession is maintained.

6. *It is divine.* God is the immediate author of it. God has determined the conditions of its commencement and continuance as

it pleased him. What those conditions are, we learn to some extent from observation and experience ; but the manner in which they secure the object attained by them we cannot tell.

7. *It is subsidiary* to the exercise and development of the mental powers. The union of the soul with the body does not invest it with new powers. It only affords an opportunity for the exercise of powers possessed independently of any connection with matter whatever. The powers of the soul belong to it as spirit. The body is merely its instrument. The soul of man when united to the body is still a spirit, possessed of spiritual susceptibilities and powers, and furnished for the time being, with a complex material organization for the due exercise of these powers. While connected with the body the soul must use it, or not act at all. This limitation of its exercise however, does not arise from any necessity of its nature, but merely from divine appointment. Such an arrangement is expedient in order to secure the modes of mental action to which the body is adapted. The body is for the present the dwelling of the soul, and its medium of perception by the senses. Of its impressions the mind takes direct and immediate cognizance. It does not take direct cognizance of the state of other objects, but perceives them only through impressions which they make on the body.

The relation of the soul to space. Matter has a definite and known relation to space. It occupies a portion of it to the exclusion of all other material bodies from the same. If the soul possessed the properties of solidity and extension, its relation to space would be similar to that of matter. It is difficult to conceive of a positive existence, which does not possess these properties, and yet it is impossible to detect them in the soul. The only known relation of the soul to space, is secondary to its relation to the body. Whatever may be the size of the body, the soul is present in every part of it. Within its dimensions, whatever they are, the soul is comprehended. If those dimensions are small as is the case in infancy, they comprehend the whole soul ; if they grow to be large, they are still only co-extensive with this mysterious agent. Should we conceive of a human body growing to the size of a mountain or of a world, we have reason to believe, even then, that it would be fully pervaded and occupied by the spirit which now pervades it. According to this view, the relation of the soul to space, is not fixed or determined by any thing in its own nature, but by its higher relation to a medium of perception, etc. That medium in this world is the body. In putting the soul in possession of a body, and in disposing of it, during its state of separation from the body, God acts according to his own sovereign pleasure. In the disposal which he makes of our souls, we have no voluntary agency. Our souls are entirely in his hands, like the clay in the hands of the potter.

The relation of the soul to human life. Life denotes the peculiar condition of living beings. The objects of the material world are divided into two great classes, denominated living and without life. All material objects are subject to physical laws, both of affinity and motion. Living bodies are subject also to other laws in addition to those that are merely physical, which are denominated the laws of life. Under the influence of these, they exhibit a variety of interesting phenomena peculiar to themselves. The laws of life induce a mode of union in the elementary particles of matter, entirely different from that which results from the laws of chemical affinity acting alone. All the animal fluids and solids are formed under the influence of the laws of life, acting contemporaneously with those of chemical affinity. They cannot be formed under any other circumstances or by any other means. The moment life ceases in any body, the formation of animal fluids and of other animal substances ceases, and chemical processes of entirely a different character immediately commence, solely according to the laws of chemical affinity. Human life is continued by the human soul. The connection of the soul with the body constitutes life, the separation of the same from the body, death. All the influences therefore, peculiar to a living body, are influences of the soul; and the laws according to which they are exerted, are laws of spiritual action on the body and within it. The phenomena of life, therefore, are to be attributed to the joint action of soul and body; just as the phenomena of lifeless matter are to be attributed merely to the laws of chemical affinity. The agency of the soul in sustaining life is involuntary and unconscious. But it is not on that account the less real or obvious. The activity belonging to a living body, is not the result of material influence or organization. It cannot be accounted for intelligently without referring it to the soul. The material particles composing the human body have their chemical and mechanical properties as any other portions of matter have. But they have nothing more. Chemical and mechanical laws can produce only corresponding results. They can do nothing more. Those results therefore produced in the living body, not by the mere force of chemical affinity, and not in accordance merely with the laws of motion, must be the results of the spirit's influence. Such are all the phenomena connected with life. The notion of a principle of life separate from the soul is a mere hypothesis. It has no solid foundation either in scripture or reason. Man is described in the scriptures under the title of *body and soul*. Consciousness and observation indicate nothing more. To suppose, that there is a principle of life separate from the soul, is equivalent to the supposition of man's possessing two souls, one rational and the other irrational and instinctive; a supposition that is unnecessary and embarrassing. The phenomena of growth, preservation from decay,

and the other subsidiary functions of life, some of which, are constantly going on in every living body, admit of as easy and natural a solution by being referred to the soul, as on any other conceivable hypothesis.

The physical properties of the soul. The soul is a substance possessing peculiar properties. In this respect it is analogous to a material object. Some of the properties of the soul are obvious to the most superficial inquirer; many of them may elude the grasp of the mightiest human intellect, and remain concealed from the eye of the most inquisitive and accurate human observer. That which may be known on this subject however, is important, and if duly considered, cannot fail to be useful. It comprehends the following specifications:

1. *Locality.* The soul of man is located within the body. The limits set to it by the body it does not transcend, however narrow they may be. These limits may be contracted by amputation, or extended by growth, but they in all cases include that portion of space which is pervaded by the soul, and determine its locality. The locality of the body is identical with that of the spirit which pervades it.

2. *Affinity for the living body.* The adherence of the soul to the body during life, is the manifestation of an affinity for it. It is not an affinity for matter as such, but for that peculiar organization of matter, denominated the body, into which it is introduced by God. The strength of this affinity is determined by the force requisite to destroy it; an effect uniformly produced at death.

3. *A capacity of being affected by the state of the body.* All sensation is an effect on the soul produced by the state of the body. This is the case with sight, hearing, feeling, etc. The same is true of every kind and degree of pain, and also of mental derangement arising from disease. In all these, and similar cases, the soul exhibits a capacity of being affected by the peculiar state of the body. Its susceptibility of being affected in this way, is wonderfully acute and delicate. The number and variety of its bodily affections is inconceivably great.

4. *Involuntary power over the body.* The involuntary power of the soul over the body is exercised in all the functions of life. It is a constant check on the laws of chemical affinity, and prevents their taking the effect which they would have, if uncontrolled, in the entire destruction of the body. It is under the influence of the soul, that the organization of the body is preserved from the immediate and fatal encroachment of chemical affinities. Let this spiritual influence be suspended, and disorganization would instantly commence.

5. *Voluntary power over the body.* The voluntary power of the soul over the body is exercised in all voluntary muscular ac-

tion. The raising of a hand or foot is an exercise of mental power over those limbs. So of all voluntary muscular action. It takes place by the force of mind operating mysteriously on the body. Every voluntary corporeal act is the result of mental power. The limitation of this power does not arise from any thing in the nature of the mind, but simply from the weakness and imperfection of the organ on which it terminates, or by which it operates.

6. *The power of operating directly on itself.* Voluntary corporeal action has been shown to be, in all cases, the result of mental power terminating on the body. The same is true of all voluntary mental action. It is the result of mental power terminating on the mind itself. A large proportion of all the mental action we perform is voluntary, and is of course performed under the direction of the mind acting on itself and controlling its own exercises. This department of mental power is of the highest importance. It is the foundation of free agency and accountability.

7. *The natural susceptibilities of thought and feeling.* All our susceptibilities of thought and feeling have their foundation in the nature of the soul. It is a part of our nature to possess them, just as it is a part of the nature of matter to possess the properties of extension, solidity, etc. The exercise of these susceptibilities depends upon contingencies, but the possession of them is held by the high tenure by which we hold our existence as spiritual beings. These susceptibilities are of unlimited extent. In this world they are developed but in part. But they are destined, as we believe, to a more full and perfect development in a future state, and one which will continue to increase through eternity. The present modes of developing the mental faculties are such as God has been pleased in infinite wisdom to appoint. The faculties developed are faculties of the soul. They belong to it as a part of itself. The particular modes in which they are brought into exercise may cease to be available, but the faculties or capacities of the soul can never cease. During this life, mental activity is in a great measure dependent on the state of the body, and of particular bodily organs. After death it may depend on something else, or take place in a different manner. But were the soul to possess no means of developing its capacities, it would still possess those capacities, unemployed for the time, but ready whenever an opportunity should occur, to resume its career of conscious activity.

The relation of one soul to another. Animal bodies have a natural relation to each other. One is instrumental in the formation of another, and determines in a great measure its character. This relation, however, is only that of the instrument to the work it is used to accomplish. It is not creative. In the formation of the soul, there is no room for instrumentality, because this part of our nature is uncompounded,—a simple indivisible existence,

independent of all other created ones, whether material or spiritual. The production of such an existence can be no other than the immediate and entire work of God. Created beings cannot co-operate with the creator in the work of creation. That work is all the Lord's, as it ever has been. Souls, therefore, are not derived from each other, or framed by the instrumentality of ancestors, but are created simple, entire, and unchanging in their essences by the immediate power of God. The time of the creation of souls by God, corresponds to the time in which their material dwellings are fitted to receive them. They are not selected out of a pre-existing, unconscious spiritual mass, but are first formed when an opportunity is afforded for the commencement of their agency, and a material lodgment is provided for them. Being formed, they begin the exercise and development of their powers, both voluntary and involuntary. They begin, to continue through eternal ages, a course of honor or infamy. The construction of an appropriate material organization is the occasion, but not the cause, of the existence of a soul destined to occupy it. That cause is nothing less than a creative act of God. In conformity with this sentiment, God is styled the Father of Spirits. Zech. xii. 1; Heb. xii. 9. Men are fathers in respect to the bodies of their descendants, but God is the sole father of spirits. But though souls have no natural relation to each other, they have important social and moral ones, in which their interests are deeply implicated. These extend to all men, and all moral beings with which we are permitted to hold intercourse. They are not however the same in respect to all, but widely different. The relations of parent and child, brother and sister, companion and friend, subject and sovereign, etc., are of this description. Considered in respect to the soul, they are entirely of a social and moral character, and are treated as such in the word of God. Many of them are peculiar to the present life, result from the circumstances in which it is commenced and continued, and will cease whenever those circumstances shall be essentially altered or modified.

The relation of the soul to the material universe. The material universe is a vast and glorious structure. The earth, with its extended continents and oceans, its lofty mountains and deep ravines, is but a speck in comparison even with the visible creation. To a mind that could view all material objects within the circumference to which human vision extends, in their true magnitudes and proportions, this earth would appear like a single particle of dust amid the extended fields of a continent, or like a grain of sand among the innumerable multitudes that line the sea shore.

The sun with his attendant train of revolving spheres, is but one of a countless multitude of suns which gleam upon us from afar with diminished brightness, but with unrivaled glory. They

are insignificant only in appearance, distance immeasurable having robbed them of the profusion of their beams, but in reality they are of vast extent, and of brightness unsurpassed. Suns and planets are sublime, considered merely as insulated objects called into being by the power of the Almighty. But when considered in their mutual relations to each other, as organized into stupendous systems, existing, moving, and operating harmoniously together, in the production of the stupendous effects which are daily developed before our eyes; that which was before sublime becomes invested with a still higher sublimity, and the solitary glory of the noblest single object is annihilated by the full tide of splendor which bursts upon us from the one vast structure to which it belongs. Not only do the general arrangements of the universe awaken interest in the observing mind; the same is true in respect to those which are particular. The internal structure of minerals, vegetables, and animals on the earth, and their mutual relations show them to belong to one extensive and varied system of things. The most remote and general agencies are often concerned in the most minute and limited changes; that of the sun and of the revolutions of the earth for example, with the phenomena of vegetation, animal life, the winds, etc. etc.

But to what purpose is all this profusion and adjustment of material beings? For what high end does the sun shine, and the earth revolve? For what general and worthy purpose are the thousand agencies of the visible creation unceasingly at work? Is the material universe formed for itself, or for the ultimate use of a higher order of beings? This question is easily answered in the light which is reflected upon it by the soul. Let the material universe exist alone, without a single created spirit to observe and enjoy its existence and operation, and it would be difficult to conceive of any useful end to be answered by it. But with souls constituted and located as ours are, material objects do not exist in vain; their uses are obvious and important. The relation of the universe to the soul is in some respects peculiar and mysterious; but to a certain extent it is sufficiently obvious to be entitled to a place amongst the items of our most assured knowledge.

1. *The material universe is the soul's place of residence.* Man during this life is confined to the earth. He cannot leave it. Still less can he leave the extended system of material being which surrounds him on every side. Judging from analogy, we have reason to believe, that the soul will be securely lodged in some part of the material creation after death. This is not only probable as a hypothesis suggested by analogy, but the contrary is so improbable, even on philosophical grounds, as to be scarcely distinguishable from the absurd. The scriptures favor the hypothesis of a material heaven and hell. The doctrine of the

resurrection requires it. No part of the christian system is incompatible with it. The material universe, therefore, sustains to the soul the relation of a place of residence, circumscribed by impassable limits.

2. *Matter is subservient to mind.* This is true of the body, the earth, and the numerous material objects connected with it. Every part of the visible creation, even that which is most remote, sustains this relation to the human soul. The earth contributes of its substance to the nutriment and clothing of our bodies, and thus subserves the comfort and welfare of our souls. Our relation to it as its tenants, leads in various ways, to the development and exercise of the mental faculties. Perception, reason, affection, and will are kept constantly at work by it. Whatever can become an object of knowledge must by that means exert some influence on our mental faculties, and may exert a salutary one. The mind exercises a lordship over surrounding material objects. It is allowed to regard them as the instruments of its activity and happiness. When rightly improved they obviously are of this character. Mind is not made for matter, but matter for mind. Mind is not controlled by matter or material influences, but subordinates to its own good all known material things.

The history of creation and providence, as given by the Holy Spirit, the infallible witness, accords with the voice of reason in exalting the spiritual above the material, and in representing man as standing under God at the head of the material creation. Viewed in this light, how deeply interesting does the material universe appear! How dignified is the character and position of the human soul! The earth is its platform, the heavens its present canopy, all material objects from the immeasurable and the remote, to the diminutive and near, the instruments of its wonderful activity, and as far as rightly improved, of its happiness. How much has such a spirit, so constituted and so furnished with facilities for the effective and profitable exercise of its powers, to be thankful for! Surely, as creatures, we are the objects of inconceivable beneficence from God, but as redeemed creatures, our debt is truly infinite. How invaluable the soul! "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?"

ART. V.—CHRISTIAN INTERCOURSE.

Hints Designed to Regulate the Intercourse of Christians. BY WILLIAM B. SFRAGUE, D. D. Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church in Albany. With a recommendatory preface, by W. Urwick, D. D. Second edition. New-York. D. Appleton, & Co. pp. 307.

THE subject of this volume is one of great importance, and the niche which the work was designed to fill, has remained too long

unoccupied. The demand for a second edition, may doubtless be supposed to indicate a disposition in the christian community to consider the subject, and it will be a source of gratification to the author, to believe that something may be done through his instrumentality, towards rendering the intercourse of christians, more christian-like and useful.

The "Hints" of Dr. Sprague, are very naturally and happily divided into two parts :—the first, treating of the "Intercourse of Christians with each other,"—and the second, of the "Intercourse of Christians with the world." As to space, the two parts are nearly equal, although the first part is subdivided into twelve chapters, while in the second there are only half that number. The titles of these chapters are in the main judiciously selected, tastefully expressed, and logically arranged. The author has, however, in our view, in one instance, either inadvertantly or out of regard to the symmetry or sound of the table of contents, introduced a chapter representing a very slight distinction. We refer to the 6th chapter as following the 5th. In running over the outline, the inquiry involuntarily arose, what can be said under the head of "*opportunities for christian intercourse*," which might not have been just as well said under the head of "*occasions of christian intercourse?*" And after reading the two chapters, our mind was not entirely relieved from its perplexity, by attempting to remember things as distinct and different, which are exactly or very nearly alike.

With this plan of the work before us, instead of proceeding to furnish a more minute account of its contents, in manner and form, we shall present to our readers several trains of thought just as they arose in our mind on reading the book.

1. We advert then to the subject of *haste* in the preparation and publication of books. We are of opinion, that haste in preparing books for the church, at the present day, can hardly be too much deprecated.

In the preface to the first edition, which by the by is done up in the usual style of despatch, we are informed, that the subject, or the thought of writing a book upon it, was suggested by an indifferent incident; and it is strongly intimated, that we are indebted for the early appearance of the work, to the author's tact in writing. "The reader will scarcely need be informed, that it has been prepared in great haste," is an acknowledgment which we think peculiarly unfortunate; for we regard that haste which allows not of maturity in deliberation, and discrimination in judgment, as one of the most prominent and hurtful features in that system of "new measures," against which Dr. Sprague has so stoutly, and with such an array of authorities contended in his *Lectures on Revivals*, and in some more recent publications. Although "the

author is not disposed to urge this as an apology for its imperfections," it is, we think, the cause of the principal defects which an intelligent or critical reader may find in the work. Since, too, the *cause* is one which a mind of slender powers and attainments might remove, we intend to dwell on the point long enough to make it evident, that we do not regard the *effects* with all the complacency which we should feel towards more unavoidable offenses.

It is usually the misfortune of haste, to omit particulars which are essential to the completeness of its productions,—to substitute diffuseness, and a passing consideration of important topics, for conclusive argumentation,—to take positions which are untenable,—to introduce matter which is foreign to the main design,—and to make admissions which more thought would discover to be unnecessary. There is no remedy for these evils in a book, but the pruning or enlargement of a second edition, or the substitution of an entirely new work. But these remedies will fail to reach the evil, because the defective work will still maintain its ground, either on the shelves of the bookseller, or in the family library. Thus it sometimes happens, that the unadvised publication of a hasty production entirely prevents, or greatly retards the appearance of something more like a standard work on the same subject. Or if the more valuable work is brought forward, its predecessor, like an unworthy office-holder, stands directly in the way, and the simple fact which has contributed to its perfection,—that it appears a little later in the day,—will prevent its being read by a portion of the reading community. For who that has gone half through the year with a meager almanac, will think, at that late hour, of treating himself to a new and more expensive one?

Hardly any thinking person can have failed to observe, that there is a deteriorating process going forward in the two grand means by which the church sustains herself, and propagates her doctrines in this world. The exercises, or exhibitions of the pulpit, are fast sinking to the common talk of the conference room, and the religious press turns off its books, which are to remain and make a more lasting impression upon the religious community, with as little ceremony as if they were the weekly sheets of an Observer—the voice of an Evangelist—a Chronicle—an Intelligencer, Recorder, or Telegraph. Unless we entirely mistake the aspect of our times, there is a strong tendency to the superficial and showy parts of religion. There is a more general call for extemporaneous preaching, than has ever before been known in the land of the puritans; and a more common disposition among ministers to gratify the prevailing taste for immediate effect. If the books which are to supply the church with reading are to fall under the same influence, and are to be *written extemporaneously*, what ground is there to hope that the character

of religion, not as revealed, but as embodied by faith, and as exhibited among men, will not suffer in passing through our hands? The lovers of popularity, and of the profits of popular book-making, have a strong temptation to seize the right moment, and to humor the taste of a community which is aiming at something new and stirring. But we put it to their consciences to say, how far they can go in this business, and *do good*, or *do right*.

Never, probably, were there more persons speaking the English language, who felt themselves qualified to write a meritorious book—never were there greater facilities for publishing the books that are written, and never more readers of any thing and every thing that comes in the way, than at the present moment. Any one upon whom the poor honors of authorship, together with the sanguine, though often baseless hope of pecuniary reward, can operate far enough to induce him to satisfy the very moderate demands of the printer and binder, may throw himself before the gazing eyes of the wondrous public at any time, in the shape of a book. But if the christian religion must be volatilized and evaporated, we beg, that this work may be left to the ephemeral agency of the living preacher, or the common journalist, rather than that this influence should be put into the more substantial form of a book, and the evil be perpetuated to future generations. The periodicals of every hue and temperament, will do enough of that sort of work. It may be a sufficient apology for those who must deliver their usual weekly tale of brick, whether they have straw or stubble, that they sometimes write in haste, or speak from the impulse of the moment,—especially as their frequent and regular periods for appearing before the same readers and hearers, affords them an early opportunity for correcting mistakes and supplying deficiencies, which the writer of a book does not enjoy.

We know not, that a re-action has been generally dreaded, but to us it seems as much to be feared as to be deprecated. Nor is there any thing which tends more directly to hasten on a surfeit of the reading portion of our population, when men will cease to read from fulness and disgust, than the incessant publication of hastily written books. We know, and we are willing to admit, that the eagerness for every thing that is new, constitutes this a reading age, and that the demand for books will create a supply. But this peculiarity of the age was not entirely produced by evanescent publications, and if we attempt to sustain it upon them, it will soon pass away: nor can it, or will it pass, like the "airy fabric of a vision, and leave no wreck behind." It will be remembered,—its influence will be felt long after the mushroom productions to which it has given rise, have been forgotten. If the love of excitement is amply fed, even with truth, yet served

up in a frothy instead of a substantial form, this age of activity and bustle will be succeeded by a death-like torpor and stagnation,—such as has too greatly followed those frequent protracted meetings and church conferences, which have been resorted to by many, as seasons in which christians are to do up their work in the Lord's service for a long time at once, instead of becoming habitually obedient to the truth. This being over, then too often comes the sad and heart-rending sequel; days, weeks, and months of inaction and hopeless declension ensue; the sweetly breathing and all-subduing influence of the Holy Spirit is withheld, and their house is left unto them desolate.

The author seems to have prepared himself for some blame, on account of the haste with which his "Hints on Christian Intercourse" were thrown together for the public eye; he will not, therefore, we trust, regard what has been said as ill-suited to his case. But if an apology is needed, we cheerfully admit, that prolific brains and ready writers, have become so common, that if a happy train of thought is hit upon, the only way to secure the benefit of it, is to write a book at once, obtain a copy right, and publish before we sleep. To "keep a piece nine," nay two "years," would be to destroy it forever: for either some equally happy thinker would place himself in the way, or the world would be filled with books.

The work under review, is not indeed peculiarly subject to censure for the defects which have been mentioned, as distinguishing the most of those which have been written "in great haste." It was by no means our intention to make a general application of these remarks to the volume before us, or to have it thought, that any thing more than just the *topic*, was suggested by the "Hints on Christian Intercourse." Our author has given security to the christian world, that he will never knowingly contribute, in the smallest degree, to that kind of religious excitement which is promoted by extemporaneous declamation and novel measures, rather than by the plain and deliberate inculcation of his views. Nor have we any apprehension, that these hints will foster in the public mind a feverish state of feeling, without ultimate and solid benefit. The subject of christian intercourse is generally discussed in this book, with a courteous regard to the views and feelings of those whose faults it was designed to correct, and a fair reference to the soundest principles of practical godliness.

2. A *second* topic naturally suggested by Dr. Sprague's "Hints," is the difficulty of "*regulating* christian intercourse," without annihilating it, or reducing it to a mere ceremonious existence. We like the title of the book, and we think that the author has in general, happily succeeded in making his suggestions harmonize therewith. It is something like a recurrence to the first principles of Congre-

gationalism. For what power has Christ intrusted to his church, but the power of exerting on men a moral influence? Every man who moves a thought, or gives a hint which is calculated to send us back to that influence, and to turn it into the right channel, deserves our thanks. We most sincerely wish, that the churches of the Lord Jesus could be made to see, that without the thunders of the vatican, or the terrors of the inquisition, they have the power in their own hands, or in their lives and conversation, to elevate religion up to the bible standard, and to carry it through the earth. As long as we look to some miracle of the Almighty, or to some extraneous aid, we shall fail to use and appreciate the resources within our own reach.

The more mechanically the powers and operations of machinery are applied and governed, the better. Absolute precision in every part of the most complicated and delicate machinery, is necessary; for there nothing can be left to intelligence and discretion. But not so with free agents, placed together and governed as men are. The very attempts which are kindly intended to render their acts perfect in their character and effects, often make them any thing but what they should be, and entirely destroy their usefulness. The acts of free moral agents, cannot be very specifically regulated. This truth is strongly marked in the revelation of God to man. Hence the negative, instead of the positive form adopted in the decalogue. The lawgiver could pointedly prohibit, where he could not specifically command. It is, for instance, wrong for a man to violate the rest of the sacred sabbath; but there is scarcely an act of external worship, which it would be safe to command, or a secular one which could be prohibited, so as to admit of no exception. Hence also the general character of many of the positive injunctions of the divine word. Thus it might be ordered, that every man should do unto others as he would that others should do unto him, when the particular course which every man should take, in every circumstance of human life, could not be prescribed. Nor is there any department of conduct, to which it would be more difficult to apply particular rules, or in which it would be more embarrassing to conform to particular regulations, than in our religious efforts and intercourse.

A disposition has been manifested to subject the efforts of christians for the promotion of revivals, to high-church dictation, of which Congregationalism has a right to complain. We are willing, that those church organizations which have something more mechanical in their constitution, should manage things in their own way. But there is something both inconsistent and injurious, in attempting to regulate every movement of voluntary associations by rule; and such, in a peculiar manner, are Congregational

churches. They are allowed to prepare their own creed, expressing their views, not of doctrinal theology as a system, but of what the bible teaches, and no one not belonging to the body, has a right to object or require an alteration. But if the Spirit of the Lord is given in answer to their agonizing supplications, and a revival of religion is the blessed result, does that sink the pastor and church into a state of incompetency, to say what measures should be used to forward the work of grace? The obtrusion of particular rules upon the churches in such circumstances, produces an evil effect, by preventing the good that would be done by untrammelled efforts, and by rendering the course of men, when the restraint is finally thrown off, reckless and ungovernable. Many ministers have been intimidated by the clamors against new measures, so that they have not dared to do what was really necessary. Thus it is with a strong desire for the salvation of souls, and the advancement of Christ's glory, when laid under restraint, as with the broad and deep current of a stream across which a barrier has been thrown and raised, until it can be held in no longer; when it breaks away it pours on with a wildness and fury which would not have been witnessed, had it been left to pursue its own course unmolested. Indeed many of the evils which have attended the course of reformers, have resulted from the attempts made to bring them to work by rules which others prescribe. Those who have been *very* anxious to regulate the churches, may regard themselves as having been instrumental in causing, to a great degree, the evils which they have so much deplored.

Equally difficult is it to regulate the common sociabilities of religion, laying out of the account the embarrassment which often attends the introduction of religious conversation. There are a thousand circumstances in the life of every active christian, that might serve to illustrate this point. We will give two of the most common. Let an inquirer approach, who has so long neglected what was once plain and apparently easy, as to have become perplexed with the plainest and easiest things to the willing soul, and say,—“Now sir, I wish to converse with you on the subject of religion.” The probability is, that being thus urged to conversation, when only the general subject of religion is spread out before the mind, we should be perplexed, if not speechless. The field is too vast to allow our thoughts to settle on every single point. Produce the difficulty, and conversation begins. Or let us suppose ourselves in company where we suspect, that prejudice lurks and watches for heresy in our sentiments, or for homely phraseology in our dialect, freedom in conversation will be impossible. The reason is plain. The mind is thus abstracted from what should be the subject of thought, and what would enliven it into an impressible and active state, and is employed in arranging

ideas and choosing words, so that no flaw may be found in the one, or any thing which can be perverted in the other. Where such regulation begins, there all ease in the intercourse of men ceases. The truth is, that this part of christian intercourse, although it may receive gentle, or as it were, indirect hints, which will serve to give it direction, cannot be regulated by definite rules. It must arise from a fountain of kind feeling in the soul; and gushing up like a free and clear spring from the earth, be left in a great measure, to pursue its own course; or, like that, it will soon mingle with the soil again and disappear.

We do not say, that the intercourse of christians should not be under the direction of religious principle. Nor do we think their commercial intercourse is not in need of specific rules and reproofs, such as are to some extent given in the book under consideration. We think with the author, that it should be the fixed purpose of the christian to make his intercourse with men, of every kind and in every place, such as becometh the gospel. There is no virtue in being occasionally drawn into religious conversation, or in falling into it, as it were, by accident. But that purpose of the mind to aim at securing a religious influence upon the individuals with whom we usually associate, and in those circles in which we mingle; which does not spring from a deep seated and habitual desire to do the will of Christ, and a prevailing love for the souls of men, will be of but little avail. It may produce some formal and awkward onsets upon the impenitent and upon faulty professors; but these will more frequently beget prejudice than conviction, and oftener result in increased hardness of heart, than conversion to God.

3. These "Hints" are wanting in a *clear statement of the relative importance of the subject*. The very title of the book seemed to us to clothe the writer with interest, and to lay upon him a weight of responsibility, beyond that which belongs to ordinary topics. So it still appears to us. Whether he thought this would be granted by all, and therefore needed not to be asserted, or purposely omitted it, calculating that the whole work should make this truth clearer and more impressive than a discussion of it would do, we cannot say. But he has no where directly undertaken to impress the minds of his readers with the immense evils, that grow out of the unsanctified intercourse of christians, and the great and glorious results which might flow from a strict observance of christian principle in their intercourse with each other and with the world. We regard it as a defect in the work, that the importance of the subject was not impressed upon the reader's mind near the beginning, all glowing with the warmth of the author's own feelings. The christian reader should be made to feel, that the prosperity and adversity, the advancement and decline of religion in this world, are intimately connected with the sanctification or per-

version of his intercourse with his fellow-christians and the unrenewed.

It should be observed, that when the intercourse of christians is secularized or grossly perverted, there is not simply a loss of the influence which they have pledged to God and religion. Great positive injury is done. We are quite sure, that most christians think but of withholding what they had vowed to give,—or at best, it is in their mind, only a sin of omission,—whereas they inflict a deadly wound on the cause of salvation. They are at once neutralizing all the influence of the positive institutions of the gospel, and as far as their example goes, licensing all the worldliness of the world around them. The subject did not call for a single remark, to *give* it importance. Such was not the character of its dependence. It only asked for the aid of the author's pen to utter the truth.

We would have those who are *careless*, urged to a consideration of the place which the intercourse of christians holds among the means of maintaining and advancing the cause of righteousness in the earth. Could their intercourse be made and remain what it should be, even were all other means to be withdrawn, how long could this earth be the desolate place which it now is? Other means derive their principal value to the cause of salvation, from their tendency to make the intercourse of men what it should be. This point secured, the work of the earth's rescue from the pains and penalties of its direful revolt, is done. But on the contrary, ply all other means as we will, while men, in their common intercourse, forget God and righteousness, we accomplish next to nothing.

In no feature of society, does a revival of religion produce a more remarkable change, when many are thus brought into contact, and led to regard each other's spiritual interests, as the objects deserving their highest esteem. Take the case of perhaps the most extensive manufacturing town in this country, where there has been a revival almost from its commencement, and onward for at least seven years, if not to the present time. So far as any thing can be learned from personal observation, and from those intimately acquainted with the means and measures there employed and blessed, nothing was more noticeable than the steady maintenance of a christian intercourse. In the earlier years of this revival, it was common for members of the church to go into the boarding houses, week after week, and hold what were termed, "family meetings" for prayer and conversation. When females left this scene of their labors and religious privileges for a few days, on a visit to their friends, or finally separated from the establishment, and thus retired from under the care and influence of their overseers; it was not unusual to dismiss them with some kind-

ly and warmly written cautions and admonitions, suited to their characters and the supposed state of their minds. The secret of this continued revival, may, we believe, be found more than in any thing else in this single characteristic of christian faithfulness, Who indeed cannot see, that a reformation in the intercourse of christians, is the most natural approximation to that state, when the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord?

Christians are sadly bewildered, when they suppose, that the religious state of the world can be much improved without their personal aid. How long will they dream prayers over an ideal kingdom, that is to come and hold dominion over ideal subjects? The truth is, they are practising a deplorable imposition upon themselves, when they believe, that much progress can be made by a series of set labors officially performed by ministers; producing, as a matter of necessity, where the church does not enter into the work, a constrained and unnatural state of society. It is in vain to look for any desirable or lasting improvement in the religious state of society, where that improvement does not move on in the natural channel. Now what is that channel, but the intercourse of men, in which all the practical part of society consists? No reformation in manners will extend its beneficial effects through a single generation, which does not begin or end in an improvement of christian intercourse. As well might we expect all the genial warmth of summer, or the pleasures of a May day, because the winds of January have cleared a few patches of earth from its covering of snow; as to expect, that we shall see the glories of the millennium through the labors of the ministry, while christian intercourse in general remains unimproved. It is an absurdity which would be tolerated in nothing but religion.

We would have it seen and felt, that the importance of this subject is vital: and as we believe the work under consideration is calculated to affect the intercourse of the churches of the Lord Jesus, we wish its usefulness to be greatly extended.

4. A *fourth* topic, which deserves attention, is the *consideration due to earthly, or providential distinctions*, as they are represented in the work under review. In mentioning the intercourse of different classes, the writer adverts to two considerations which, he says, "seems to lie at the foundation of all proper views of the subject." The first is, the common nature, lot and destination of all christians in the higher and lower ranks of life. "The other is, that God, in his providence, has been pleased to constitute various distinctions in society; giving to some, measures of talent, and wealth, and influence, which he withholds from others." After having thus exhibited the proper grounds of a common christian intercourse, and presented the fact, that the natural distinctions among worldly men, in this imperfect state, extend themselves in-

to the kingdom of the Redeemer, he proceeds to administer to the classes concerned, some most wholesome instructions and admonitions, which we would commend to the prayerful perusal of all professed christians. For while the natural distinctions among men must remain what they are, it is desirable, that they should be as much as possible under the influence of christian principle. When once consecrated to God and human salvation, they cease to be used for evil purposes, and ought no longer to be the marks of envy and bitterness.

It is admitted, that the distinctions constituted by different measures of talent, wealth, and influence, "may be improperly magnified, and greatly abused;" and it is maintained, that "they were ordained by infinite wisdom and goodness, notwithstanding; and that for most important purposes." Now if the native talents of men can be improved by a proper, or an idolatrous devotion to study,—if the hereditary portion of wealth may be increased, by means fair or foul, and if the modicum of influence with which they set out in life, may be extended by the practice of honesty or art,—then these acquisitions have no higher claim to providential exemptions than any others. Nor do the distinctions founded on them, deserve to be guarded with such an air of sacredness as is thrown around them by the application of the term, "providential." If they are altogether the work of divine providence, instead of writing as we do, we should call upon the lower orders in the church to beware, lest by laying presumptuous hands upon God's ordinance, they should provoke his displeasure. All the distinctions which God has really ordained, in manner and measure as they appear, we call upon every man to admire and reverence. But if in that system of superiority and subordination, the hand or the foot aspires to be the head, we would, that those who witness such a spirit of usurpation, should make their disapprobation known. For we believe, that men of talents, wealth, and influence, do sometimes not only "improperly magnify, and greatly abuse" those distinctions, but claim a divine right for the *abuse*, as well as for the distinction itself. While men remain what they are, so great is their liability to claim the right of exemption, on providential or some other grounds, that they might do well to apply the rule of our Lord,—If thy hand or foot offend thee, make it a sacrifice to thy spiritual good; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members perish, rather than that thou be cast unmaimed into hell fire.

Notwithstanding the evident attempt of the writer, to guide himself between the high and low in the church, and to give them both, as he passes, some plain hints as to the course which they should pursue in respect to each other; there is a tendency in this chapter, as some may think, to uphold in the church the distinctions of

earth, however "improperly magnified," provided they are not "greatly abused," to purposes of pride and overbearing. He has given the higher classes the ground of providence to stand upon, with all that can be built upon hereditary talents, wealth, and influence,—while the lower classes have no apology left them for a single thought which calls in question the right of others to the honors which they claim on this foundation. We would not however intimate, that, in all this, there is the least partiality to either class. It was obviously the writer's intention, to spare neither, but to show both classes, since such distinctions are ordained of God, how they may be borne, under the direction of gospel principles, so as to make them a blessing, instead of a curse. The tendency of which we speak, belongs rather to the manner, than the matter. He treats the way of truth, as if it lay in obscurity, and was to be reached by inference. He holds his light so that he may see the evils on either hand,—whereas, by the light of the sun of righteousness, we might see the truth itself which lies between them. This would be justifiable, if the truth could not otherwise be discovered. But when the way of righteousness is so easily seen, the method of pointing out all the wrong paths, and leaving us to infer, that the one not mentioned, is of course right, shows either a bad habit of thinking, or an unbecoming timidity.

The way of truth, in respect to the point under review, lies in no obscurity. The great and infallible Teacher from heaven, has marked out the path, and said as plainly as language can express it, "this is the way, walk ye therein." It is, to cause the distinctions in the church on earth, to conform as nearly as possible to the distinctions which prevail in heaven. This is always expressed in the petition, "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven;" and it is most obvious, that the will of our Father can never be done on earth, in the sense here intended, until christians act on this principle. As to the distinctions which prevail among the sanctified, it is equally obvious, that those of a moral character are superior to all others. Thus the Lord from heaven commended to the observation of his disciples, his own meekness and lowliness. When too he saw a spirit of ambition rising up in the circle of his friends, he cast it down by referring to the distinctions among the unsanctified nations, and saying, "So shall it not be among you: but whosoever will be great among you, shall be your minister: and whosoever of you will be the chiefest, shall be servant of all. For even the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister."

But why adduce further proof of the explicitness of the way of truth, since all we ask for is admitted? The author of these hints, has himself adverted to the distinctive characteristic of the divine kingdom which is destined to annihilate all other distinctions. Addressing himself to the possessors of earthly distinctions in the

church, who on that account are liable to the unholy aspirations of ambition, he asks,

‘Has it not occurred to you that these distinctions of which pride is so ready to take advantage, will all pass away with your breath ; that they exist independently of moral character ; that a distinction which infinitely outweighs them all, that of earnest and elevated piety, may be possessed by the obscurest individual you meet, and in a degree which, peradventure, may cast into a deep shade your own spiritual attainments ?’ p. 124.

We would add another interrogation to this, addressed to the same characters: Has it not occurred to you, that a distinction which is so soon to eclipse all other distinctions, or to survive them all, ought to begin its influence as the leading distinction in the visible church of the Lord Jesus Christ here on earth ? How else shall the church ever come to be served by the “men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom,” according to the example given us by the apostles ? How else shall the new Jerusalem descend to us, or the main characteristics of the kingdom of heaven, reach that pre-eminence which must constitute the glory of the millennium ?—Christ and his apostles fail not boldly and fully to assert the claims of Almighty God ; nor hesitate to maintain, that entirely yielding to those requisitions is the way to holiness and to heaven. Do they turn to expose the errors and sins which line the path on either side ? It is, that the light may shine with increased brightness upon the strait and narrow way in which the redeemed shall walk and in which the way-faring men, though fools shall not err.

Not, that we expect the distinctions of talent and wealth, and the influence which they give to men, so far as they are really or entirely providential, will be annihilated in this world. These can be annihilated only by a change in the same providence which constituted them. But in the church of Christ they may be superseded by another and more worthy distinction. For just so far as religion shall be more perfectly the ruling passion of Christ’s disciples, holiness, intelligent piety will become the ruling distinctions in his church on earth. We long to see the day, when the followers of the Lamb shall find a way open to the affections of their brethren, and to usefulness in the church, which may be traveled by all, and we look with regret on any thing which seems to have a tendency to hinder the approach of that day. The difficulty now is, that instead of being satisfied with the real distinctions of providence and grace ; we take these for the foundations, and build a larger structure upon the distinctions of providence, and perhaps some indifferent one upon that of grace ; and then claim more regard for these works of man’s device, than for the works of God.

5. Another subject discussed is *parties of pleasure*. This is, summarily the general subject of several chapters in part II. of "Hints designed to regulate the intercourse of christians *with the world*." Before we proceed to specify the particular aspect of this subject we would express a hope, that we have not read this second part of the work without some degree of profit. If too, we may judge from what we have heard others say, we think that no sincere christian can peruse it without deriving from it much advantage. The hints here given are so important, and given in a manner so admirably adapted to promote practical godliness, as leads us to think, that this portion of the work may be often read to great advantage. Indeed, but for some tendency in it to make the danger of doing wrong seem so imminent as to induce a despair of doing right, we should mark the first chapter and many portions of the following chapters, as entirely suited to the purpose for which they were written, and unexceptionable.

In the introductory remarks to the subject of the "christian's intercourse with the world in the common concerns of life," we find the following beautiful passage; which we transfer to our pages both for the benefit of our readers, who have not the work itself, and for the illustration of our own views.

'It is a mistake into which many professors of religion have fallen, that nearly all that is to be done for the spiritual benefit of unrenewed men, is to be effected by means of direct personal efforts; leaving little or nothing to the general influence of a pious example. That it is the duty of every christian to make direct efforts with reference to this end, and to make them frequently, and to persevere in making them, is surely a point too obvious to require proof; but it is equally certain that, in order to secure to them their legitimate influence, they must be accompanied by an exemplary daily deportment. I have known men—and who has not known them?—who have done much less by direct efforts for the salvation of sinners than I could have wished, who were nevertheless so unexceptionable in the general tenor of their lives, so humble and conscientious, so upright, and charitable, and forgiving, that though their influence was as noiseless as the dew, there was still an energy in it which made it deeply and extensively felt. They were an epistle known and read of all men; and even infidelity itself could not come within the atmosphere which surrounded them, without feeling itself impressively, though silently, rebuked.' pp. 166, 167.

For ourselves, we would not for the world, say or do any thing which should seem either to undervalue such examples, or to show an exclusive preference for them, when divorced from all active and direct efforts for the salvation of the souls of the impenitent and unrenewed. If those who are the light of the world, shall ever be the blessed means of so illuminating this earth, that there shall be no darkness nor shadow of death in which the workers of iniquity

can hide themselves ; it will be when they are persuaded to add to an example, such as that described in the above extract, well-directed and unremitted efforts to deliver men, and keep them free from sin.

What the author regards as parties of pleasure may be learned from the following descriptions :

‘ I refer to those scenes which are designed merely as an exhibition of the pride of life ; in which, though there may be nothing positively immoral, in the common acceptation of the word, yet there is nothing to benefit the understanding or the heart ;—scenes of vapid conversation, and ostentatious parade, and thoughtless gaiety, and foolish amusement ; in which those who are averse to all serious reflection, expect to find, and actually do find, all the means of killing time made ready at their hands. I do not mean that, in such a scene as that to which I now refer, every individual who is present is of course an equal sharer in the levity and folly by which it is marked : on the contrary, it is very supposable that there may be those who are not interested in it at all, and whose conduct is, in every respect, discreet and decorous ; I only mean that the controlling influence is such as I have described.’ p. 190.

‘ And that I may be sure of being understood, I will say again, that I mean those “ parties ” which, however free they may be from the grossness of open vice, are yet designed chiefly to furnish an opportunity for a vain show, and an appropriate element for mirth and gaiety ; scenes in which it is understood, that the spirit of worldly levity is to have the predominant influence, and in which a christian cannot mingle without laying aside his religious character on the one hand, or exhibiting a spirit which is felt to be most inappropriate to the occasion on the other.’ p. 200.

For the author’s views of this species of entertainments we must refer our readers to the book itself ; and especially to “ Considerations prohibiting the christian from the gayeties of the world,” and to the remarks designed to neutralize the “ Pleas of the professed christian for mingling in the gayeties of the world.” Part II. Chap. 3 and 4.

We take our first extract from that part of the third chapter in which the author attempts to show, and, in our estimation successfully, that the christian who adopts the course of attending parties of pleasure, is himself injured there. “ Admitting that he is a true christian, it obscures his *evidences*.” “ It diminishes his *comfort*.” “ It inflicts a wound upon his *character*.” It is a part of this third particular which we have in our eye, although, “ It impairs his usefulness,” is another, which is no less worthy of the christian’s consideration. After stating it as an undoubted and indubitable fact, that the pleasure-seeking professor “ inflicts a wound upon his own character in the view of his fellow christians who keep themselves in a good degree unspotted from the world,” he proceeds :—

‘But this remark holds true of the world as well as the church. I acknowledge indeed that the votaries of fashionable folly are always glad to see the professed christian coming to mingle with them; and they will sometimes take pains to show him how much they honor his independence and freedom from vulgar prejudices; but I know that these same persons, when his back is turned, will not unfrequently triumph in his inconsistency; and when their consciences are pressed with the obligations of religion, they will even appeal to his conduct as proof that religion does not make men better. The truth is, that worldly men have an understanding and a conscience, and they know the right and the wrong of this matter; and that professor who thinks to mingle freely in the world’s gayeties, and have it unobserved, cheats no one but himself. Were I at liberty, I could write a chapter of facts in illustration of this point, which would show most conclusively, that every member of the church who places himself in such circumstances is marked; and though no murmur of disapprobation may ever reach his ear, yet the secret feeling of all around him is, that he is out of his proper place, and is forfeiting his consistency as a christian.’ pp. 204, 205.

The next division of the third chapter treats of the injury which is done by the party-giving and party-going christian to his fellow christians. Then comes the injury done to “the vain and irreligious with whom he associates.” Here it is abundantly shown, that the abettors of such amusements and pleasures cannot properly avail themselves of the plea, that they injure no one but themselves, and that therefore it is no one’s business but their own. The extract which we make, follows some remarks showing the tendency of the lax lives of christians to strengthen in the irreligious a disposition to scepticism, and thus prevent their ever embracing in sincerity the religion of the gospel.

‘But this conduct tends to the same result still farther, inasmuch as it arms the careless world with a weapon by which to ward off the blows which are aimed at their consciences. The result of any appeal that is made to the conscience of a sinner, depends, under God, upon the state of mind in which it happens to find him; for if his understanding be stored with truth, and his conscience be sensitive and wakeful, there is good reason to hope that his duty may not be urged upon him in vain; but if his mind be blinded, and his moral sensibility impaired, by prejudice and error, and especially if he have fortified himself against every effort to arouse and convince him, by objections which he has taken up against religion, (no matter how he may have come by them) there is little reason to expect any good effect even from the most faithful and honest dealing.’ * * * * ‘Say you, that there is no harm in what you are doing, when you go to mingle with the vain and the gay in their appropriate pleasures? But is there no harm in supplying them with weapons by which to oppose the spirit of God? Is there no harm in furnishing them with an apology for putting off the claims of religion? Is there no harm in increasing their facilities for self-destruction?’ pp. 213, 214.

As a specimen of the author’s happy and effective manner of rea-

soning with the consciences of his readers, we give a small part of his reply to the plea that "Other professors of religion mingle in such scenes, and it is no worse for me than for them." Passing by what would have been conclusive without the following, to wit, that this plea is an admission of the wrong; and that the example of professed christians are not the divinely constituted rule of life, our author thus expostulates with such transgressors :

'Have you reflected where this principle, if carried to its legitimate results, will land you? If you are justified in pleading the example of professed christians as your warrant for mingling in the gayeties of the world, why may you not with equal reason plead it in justification of participating in the views of the world? If there are professors who enter fully into the amusements of fashionable life, so also there are those who are unjust and oppressive in their dealings, and who are found in the haunts of dissipation and excess; indeed there is hardly a vice, but if you should look through the annals of christianity, or even consult the record of your own observation, you would find that it had been acted out in the life of some one or more who have had a place in the visible church. You may not perhaps have occasion to place the example of professors for any thing beyond a participation in worldly gayeties; but suppose your neighbor should be inclined to extend the principle a little farther, and urge it in defence of open and flagrant vice, what have you to object to such an application? If the apology is good in your case, it is good in his; and when he points to the dishonest professor in justification of his own dishonesty, to the intemperate professor in justification of his own intemperance, whatever others may say in the way of condemning him, *you* can say nothing but at the expense of condemning yourself.' pp. 229, 230.

The author of the "Hints" has taken a pretty full and fair view of these clustering places of gayety and fashion. To those who have indulged in occasional sallies among the worldly and gay, and who still have some doubts as to the propriety of their course; these chapters will furnish valuable hints, and as far as they have confidence in the judgment and wisdom of the writer, they will tend to settle their minds. Indeed we have heard several individuals express their satisfaction in this portion of the work, and their belief in its utility as a directory on this subject. But the practical improvement has been, at least in some cases, to attend all parties to which they have been invited; and then if religion has been entirely excluded, the ready apology was, that "they hoped or expected, that it would have been otherwise." For our own part we care not how soon the whole christian community comes to regard this fashionable spicing of worldliness and vanity with religion, or that nice admixture of the two, which is sedulously countenanced by many and which is fast tending to excess, as the enchanted ground of Bunyan's Pilgrim. The whole system proceeds upon the presumption, that if we are to have religion in the best state to cultivate

the social powers and affections of the soul, it must undergo a reduction by being duly attempered with worldliness and vanity. But there is no certain rule given for making the most wholesome and happy mixture.

In the conclusion then, to glance at the whole work, we cannot do better than to use the author's own language, in the commencement of the last chapter.

‘Hitherto I have considered the christian in some of the more general attitudes in which he is placed by the relations which he sustains to the world. I have exhibited him as the man of business, as mingling with his fellow men from day to day in the common concerns of life; and have endeavored to sketch an outline of the course which becomes him in that relation. And I have contemplated him in the social circle, associating for purposes of enjoyment or amusement with those who have not the like precious faith with himself; and I have attempted to discriminate between those social meetings which he may, and those which he may not, encourage by his presence. It only remains to contemplate him in the more particular attitude of communing with men of the world in respect to their immortal interests; a duty which most professors are equally ready to admit in theory, and to neglect in practice.’ p. 254.

In contemplating the execution of the whole work according to this outline, it is painful to have a fear remain, lest the final impression upon the minds of the readers may not be exactly what the writer desires. But if it was his design to throw a strong light upon the feelings of christians, and thus in the conclusion to recommend in a most powerful manner the holy standard of the gospel, we fear that he will not entirely gain his object. While this grand design of the work does not become perfectly and impressively apparent to the minds of the readers, the conviction of guilt and duty will be vague and transient. Those hints which make an indistinct impression upon the minds of the sincere and upright, are almost sure to make a wrong impression upon the minds of such as are not fully established in their principles and habits. Here is the ground of our fears. There are those who never need any thing more to justify them in any course, than indefinite instructions, a want of perspicuous solemn directions.

Few christians, there are, who do not often need to deny themselves; and all circumstances calling for self-denial are temptations to unfaithfulness. To maintain a single eye in respect to the salvation of sinners and to perform the duties which their situation demands from us, is often exceedingly trying. In such cases it is natural to look about for something to satisfy us, that duty does not require us to take up the cross. Now it is to a mind thus situated, that we fear the announcement and treatment of the subject of the last chapter in connection with the preceding book, will suggest

the idea, that the salvation of sinners is only a secondary object, to be taken up and sought only on select and special occasions. Not in protracted meetings and the like, for the author is no advocate of these, but in seasons of revival, and when providence favors by visiting persons with sickness or other afflictions. We should be sorry to have such an impression prevail; for we believe, that when the intercourse of christians with each other and with the world is what the word of God requires, every act and every movement of every christian will contribute in some way, directly or indirectly, to the work of bringing sinners to God and salvation.

There are multitudes also in the churches, who are wishing to gather the fruit of a quiet conscience from the present measure of their piety; while they have always about them a dreamy consciousness, that this is not sufficient to justify their hopes of heaven, nor to accomplish the design of heaven in calling them into Christ's kingdom. In general the disquietude of their souls is relieved by a comparison of themselves with wrong standards. One of these is found in the character of their fellow-christians, another in the style of preaching on which they attend, and another still in the books they read. Do these favor the enticements of their own inclinations and lusts; they easily persuade themselves, that conversion has done so much for them, that a little more excitement in the course of their lives and the shock of exchanging worlds, will set all right. Here then we must once more say, that we do not feel as sure as we should be glad to do, that this book will not help professed christians to think themselves not much further from the work at which they should arrive, than what might be expected of fallen creatures, in a sinful world.

In a word, our only desire is, and in this we have not the least reason to believe, that we differ from the writer of these "Hints," that the seal of truth may be fixed upon the minds of christians, and that its practical results may be seen in their lives. We look, confidently and anxiously, for the day when the converts to righteousness will understand; that they have but just begun to realize the influence of those great moral truths which are destined to subdue and bring the whole man into obedience to Christ. The time is coming, when those who are sanctified in part, by looking at the standard of God's word, will see clearly how much more is to be done. If the work under review shall be the means of turning away the eyes and hearts of professed christians from the expectation of signs and wonders; as if the kingdom of God were to come with observation; and of fixing them upon the resources of the associated and united church; the author will have occasion to bless God for the agency which suggested the thought of sending this circular to the "saints who are scattered abroad" throughout the world. Let those who are looking for salvation from the hills, who are ex-

pecting to see miracles wrought by ministers alone, and without their own agency, or by great and protracted meetings accompanied by no lasting reformation in the every day intercourse of christians, "look to themselves, that we lose not those things we have wrought, but that we receive a full reward." Then the light of the moon will be as the sun, and the light of the sun sevenfold. Nor do we hesitate to predict, that when the intercourse of christians with each other and with the world, shall become conformed to the divine standard; the hopes of ages passed in respect to the Messiah's kingdom will be fulfilled with a rapidity which will mock imagination, and seem more like a vision than reality. Indeed nothing but the flight of the angel through the midst of heaven would be able to keep pace with the light; for then, like the blush of morning, it would glance from one hill-top of the earth to another, until the vallies would be vocal with the praises of God, and the handful of corn in the top of the mountains would shake like Lebanon.

We perceive affixed to the second edition of the work before us a commendatory preface taken from the English re-print and written by W. Urwick, D. D. Of this writer we have no knowledge but the name. We see nothing however in his pages demanding particular notice. His views of the importance of the subject are clearly though briefly expressed, and the work is by him especially recommended to four classes of persons;—young christians, heads of families, deacons and leading members of the churches and ministers of the gospel. He approves most decidedly of the author's remarks on the subjects on which we have commented, but gives no particular reasons in support of the conclusions advanced. It is unnecessary for us to pursue the topic, and we dismiss the volume merely remarking, that it is characterized by its author's well-known ease and gracefulness of execution, and we would add our best wishes for its success in accomplishing that object for which we doubt not it was written,—the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom and the good of mankind.

ART. VI.—ETYMOLOGIES AND CRITICISM. BY NOAH WEBSTER, LL. D.

THERE are few subjects on which literary men have occupied their time and attention, which appear to be less understood, than the origin and formation of languages. The *first* principles of etymology seem to be wholly unknown, or imperfectly understood. The writer's attention has been called to this subject by some examples of this imperfect knowledge of the origin and primary signification of words, presented in recent publications.

The author of the *Lives of the Apostles*, in the beginning of his work, has attempted to ascertain the primitive signification of the Greek word *στella*, from which is derived the word *apostle*. He cites a great number of authorities to show the various senses in which this word and its compounds are used by Greek writers; and comes to the conclusion, that the primary sense is not to *send*, but to *equip* or *prepare*. But accurate investigation will show, that such a complex or indefinite signification as is expressed by these words, is rarely or never the primary sense of any word whatever. The primary or radical sense of a word is some *simple physical action* or *property*; and the more complex significations proceed from subsequent use and appropriation.

The Greek *στella* is the same word as the German and Belgic *stellen*, to put, place, lay, set; Swedish *stalla*, or *stacla*. In Danish, it is *stiller*, to put, lay, set; and also to *still*, to quiet. This word, like hundreds of others, was introduced into the Greek by tribes of the Teutonic race, who settled in Greece, either as original inhabitants, or more probably, as conquerors. No small portion of Greek and Latin words are of Teutonic origin.

Now the original meaning of this word is not to *fix* or *make firm*, but to *send* or *throw down*; the sense of *fixing*, *setting* or *stilling*, is secondary; the consequence of the action of *sending*, *throwing*, or *laying down*.

The sense of the word under consideration, may be illustrated by words of like signification in other languages.

In Latin, *mitto*, *mittere* signifies to *send*; in French, the same word, *mettre*, signifies to put, lay, set. The same word, *mettere*, in Italian, has the same meaning as in the French. The Latin *lego*, *legare*, signifies to send; the same word in Saxon, *legan* or *leccan*, signifies to put, set, or lay, and we have this word in *lay*. In all these words, the radical or primary sense is to *send*.

Another example will show how imperfectly the origin of the various derivative senses of words has been understood. The Hebrew word *ben*, a son, is connected in origin with a verb which is rendered to *build*; and hence, say lexicographers, a son is one who *builds up* his father's family. But the same word signifies also the young of a beast, and surely this can hardly be said to build up a family.

Now in this case, the mistake arises from taking a *secondary* meaning for the *primary*. The primary sense of building, in this word, is to *send* or *lay down*, to set as on a foundation; the erection or superstructure, is a secondary sense. The primary meaning of *ben*, a son, is *issue*, that which is *sent forth* or produced; *offspring*, as we express the sense in English.

I am confident no example can be produced, in which this *simple*

action of *sending* can be deduced from the more complex one of *equipping*, *fixing out*, or *preparing*. Such a deduction is an inversion of the usual order of formation or derivation of words.

Take for example, the word *dress* in English. This word must be very complex and indefinite in most of its uses, and therefore, this cannot have been the primary sense. On tracing the word to its original, we find it derived from a word that signifies to *make straight*. It comes to us, through the Italian, from the Latin *dirigo*, Italian *dirizzare*, French *dresser*. The root is the Latin *rego*, *rectus*. *Rego*, is rendered to *rule* or *govern*; but this is a secondary sense; the primary sense is to *strain* or *stretch*; this act makes *straight*, *right*; and government is *restraint*. To *dress*, then, is to make *straight* or *right*, and military men have retained the original sense, in the phrase "look to the right and *dress*." In the appropriation of the word to the adjustment of apparel, and to cookery, the sense is to *make right*; that is, fit, prepare for the use or occasion.

We have a similar process of derivation in the word *array*, which is from the root of *rod*, *radius*, *ray*, the primary sense of which is to shoot, to thrust or send out, as rays of light, or as the branch of a tree.

We use the word *set*, with another word, to express a similar idea. We say to *set off*, when we express the sense of *arranging*, *embellishing*, implying enlargement or display. So to *fix out*, is to prepare what is necessary.

That the radical meaning of the Greek *στελλω* is to send, we have evidence in the compound *επιστελλω*, from which is formed *epistle*. This word signifies, that which is *sent* to another. But this sense cannot be deduced from the radical sense of *equipping* or *preparing*. This Greek compound signifies also to *compose* or *adjust*, as garments; that is, to *send* or *put on*, or make to *sit well*.

The primary signification of *αποστελλω*, whence *apostle*, is to *send away*. So from the Latin *lego*, we have *legate*, and from *mitto*, *missionary*, *committee*, *commissary*, *commissioner*; and from the French *envoyer*, to send, we have *envoy*.

We have great confidence in German commentators, in the science of interpretation. Whatever can be done, by examining the uses of words in authors, the laborious and learned Germans have done. But in the knowledge of the primary signification of words, and the process of deriving from that the various secondary applications, their works are yet very imperfect.

Remarks on Matthew v. 21, 27, 33.—In these passages of Matthew's gospel, the words "ἤκούσατε ὅτι ἐβόησεν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις" are, in our English version, rendered "Ye have heard, that it was said by them of old time."

Rosenmueller remarks on these words, that some persons think

the words τοῖς ἀρχαίοις are put for ὑπο τῶν ἀρχαίων ; and others suppose they are put for πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους. He prefers the latter interpretation.

Campbell and Doddridge translate the words, "Ye have heard that it was said *to* the ancients;" and Doddridge cites Grotius and Whitby in confirmation of this rendering.

In the French bible, published by the American Bible Society, the translation is according to that of Campbell and Doddridge. "Vous avez entendu qu'il a été dit *aux* anciens."

Montanus renders the phrase by the dative, as do most other translators. Beza renders it by the ablative, in accordance with our version. Indeed his authority may have had weight with the English translators.

There are two authorities in point, which, one would think, may settle the true sense of the passages in Matthew.

In Romans ix. 26, we find these words, "καὶ ἔσται, ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὗ ἐβλήθη αὐτοῖς." "And it shall come to pass, that in the place where it was said *to* them."

In Galatians iii. 16, we find these words, "τῷ δὲ Ἀβραάμ ἐβλήθησαν αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι, καὶ τῷ σπέρματι αὐτοῦ," "Now *to* Abraham and his seed were the promises made," (spoken.)

In these latter passages, we see the same verb passive followed by the dative, and so rendered in our version. There are other examples in the new testament ; but these are mentioned because they occurred to me incidently, and they appear to justify the translation of Campbell and Doddridge, showing most conclusively, that our English version is erroneous. And it is somewhat singular, that such an accurate investigator as Rosenmueller, should have neglected to cite several passages in the new testament, confirmatory of his own opinions.

The version, as it now stands, gives the precept the appearance of being a *common saying*, a kind of *proverbial maxim*, among the ancients. This aspect would very much impair its authority ; for the *ancients* were not *law-givers*. It is far more probable, that Christ referred directly to the commands of Moses, which were given *to* the ancients ; and that his own subsequent precepts were intended to show the greater strictness and excellence of the moral law under the gospel.

P. S. On further examination, I find that *to* instead of *by* is the translation in the bishop's bible ; and with this correspond the versions of Jerome, Erasmus, Castalio, Calvin, and the Geneva bible. Luther also has *to* ; De Wette, has *von*, by, but sets *zu*, *to*, in the margin.

The editor of the *Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge*, under the word *Adam*, has adopted the common opinion, that this name was given to our progenitor, because he was made of *earth*. This

opinion seems to have no foundation except the resemblance between the Hebrew word for *earth*, and this *name*. A similar resemblance is seen also between this name and the Hebrew word for *red*, whence Josephus affirms that Adam, signifies one that is *red*, because he was formed out of red earth. B. 1. Ch. 1. Now I have learned by long and laborious research, that nothing is more deceptive than such an inference. What should we say if an etymologist should deduce the word *man*, from the Latin *mano*, to flow, because of the identity of the radical letters? or if one should deduce the word *pine*, a tree, from the verb *to pine*? Yet many, very many, of the etymologies of writers stand on no better foundation.

But the word Adam has a nobler origin. It signifies *form*, *shape*, *image*, and probably, in the description of Adam and his creation, allusion is made to this signification. He was made in the *image of God*; not that God has a corporeal form, but the phrase is intended to express the dignified and majestic form of man, representing his superiority to all other animated beings on earth. This was also the opinion of pagan nations, which is elegantly expressed by Ovid,

Os homini sublime dedit; coelumque tueri
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus. Met. Lib. 1. l. 85.

Adam, in the primary sense of the word, is the name of the human race, the whole species, like the word *man*, in English. In this sense, the word is frequently used in the bible. Job, xiv. 1; Deut. iv. 32; Ps. cxviii. 6, 8, and cxliv. 4; Prov. xvi. 1.

I would not be understood as questioning the common opinion, that the *image of God*, mentioned in Gen. i. 27, has reference to the moral qualities of Adam. I suppose the words to include the *bodily form*, and the *moral* and the *intellectual powers* of man at his creation.

The account of the creation of Adam, Gen. i. 26, 27, is an account of the origin of the *species*, *mankind*, although one pair only was first created. And hence we understand the propriety of the use of *them* in the plural. "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he *him*, male and female created he *them*."

This description is given *before* the creation of the woman, and is to be considered as the general account of the creation of the species, in correspondence with the general account of the creation of plants and animals, in the preceding verses. The *particular manner* of the creation, is mentioned in chap. ii. 7.

It is no feeble evidence of the justness of my opinion, that *man*, in English, the common term by which the race of mankind is expressed, has the like signification. See the explanation of the

word in my quarto dictionary. This same word is seen in the Latin *hominis*, the nominative *homo*, being contracted. Hence we see the precise word in *humanus*, the prefixed aspirate and termination being removed. In Latin also the word signifies the whole race or species.

Parkhurst, the author of a Hebrew lexicon, is, in my opinion, correct in assigning this name, Adam, to its proper origin; although in a multitude of instances, his etymologies are fanciful, and still more, his deductions from them.

The opinion here given, of the meaning of the word Adam, seems to be countenanced by the apostle Paul, 1 Cor. xi. 7, and by James iii. 9.

Under the word *atonement*, the editor has admitted the common opinion, that the Hebrew word thus rendered, which is *cofer*, or as I should write it, *cofer*, signifies a *cover*. Lexicographers seem to be agreed, that this is the signification; and they have, from this Hebrew word, deduced the English word, *cover*. This deduction is demonstrably erroneous. Our word *cover*, is from the French *couvrir*; this from the Italian *coprire*; and this from the Latin *cooperio*. The French *couvert*, English *covert*, is only a contraction of the Latin *co-opertus*.

One reason assigned for this opinion, that *cofer* signifies a *cover*, is, that the Hebrew word has this signification in Genesis vi. 14, where it is commanded to Noah, "thou shalt pitch it (the ark,) within and without with pitch." This, say the lexicographers, was a *covering* of the ark with that substance. In this opinion there is a mistake which is very common, in supposing the verb to be the word from which the noun is formed. The reverse is the fact. The name *cofer* was first formed from the general sense of the verb; it is the name of the substance, and then converted into a verb, or applied as a verb; just as we should say, in using the noun, *pitch*, "*pitch* it with *pitch*;" or *oil* the cloth with *oil*; *water* the field with *water*. The command to Noah was, to put on *cofer*; some bituminous substance, which had that name. And here let me observe that, through the Arabic, we have *camphor*, from the same verb. The original spelling was *cafor*, the letter *m* being adventitious. We may not be able to ascertain from what circumstance these substances were named. Gums are substances often *exsuded* from plants, and are sometimes named from this circumstance, from the sense of a verb signifying to *send out*, or to *issue*. Sometimes substances are named from their qualities, or most common and obvious quality. To ascertain facts of this kind, it would be necessary to have a perfect acquaintance with the language in which the word was first used.

The word *cofer*, *atonement*, is rendered in English by various verbs, as to appease, to forgive, to purge away. The *atonements*

prescribed in the Levitical law, were often made by the *sprinkling* of the blood of victims. This was considered as *purification*. So also was the use of oil. See Leviticus xiv. and xvi., and Numbers viii. In all the injunctions on this subject, the essence of the ceremony consisted in *purification*, or *cleansing*. Hence it was applied to a house and to the tabernacle, the holy place and the altar.

In order to obtain a clear view of this subject, we must resort to the use of the same word, *cofer*, in the cognate languages.

In the Chaldee, the word signifies to *turn away*, to *reject*, to *deny*, to *forsake*, or *apostatize*, to *wash*, *cleanse*, or *remove filth*. In Proverbs xxx. 20, it is rendered to *wipe*. "She eateth and *wipeth* her mouth." In Matt. xxvii. 24, it is rendered, *washed*.

In Syriac, it is rendered to *deny*, *reject*, *wipe*, or *wash*, and to *purify*. Hence in 1 Cor. iv. 13, it is used for filth, off-scouring, that which is removed from any thing by washing; as we should say, the *washing*.

In Arabic, this word signifies to *deny*, *reject*, or be an infidel. Hence the Mohammedans call those who reject their religion, *caffars*, and hence the name *Caffraria*, in Africa. The word signifies also a village, whether from its being remote or detached from a city, I do not know,—but christians also denominated those who did not receive the gospel, *pagans*, from *pagus*, a village. In Arabic, however, the name *caffar* was given to those who would not receive the religion of Mohammed, because they *denied*, or *rejected* that religion.

The true sense then of the word *cofer*, is to cast away, to reject, and in religious rites, to remove filth or defilement, and hence to cleanse and purify. In some of its uses, it may be rendered perhaps, to *cast behind the back*, or at least, it may convey this idea, and in this use, the sins of men may be considered as *covered* from the eyes of the offended person. But the primary sense is to *reject*. So in English, we use *forgive*, the negative of give, that is to give back or away. *Pardon*, from the French, has a like signification. But perhaps, *remit*, from the Latin, will better express the sense, or at least render it more obvious.

From these authorities and facts, the inference, in my view, is clear, that the *atonement* of the old testament consisted, not in *covering*, in its proper sense, or spreading over, but in *cleansing*, or *purification*. In this sense, it coincides well with *holiness*, in the new testament.

The effect of *purification* from sin, is *reconciliation*. The divine Being is appeased, and rendered propitious. This sense, therefore, is secondary.

In regard to the meaning of the Greek word *aion*, often rendered *eternity*, there is no difficulty, as we can trace the word to its

original and true sense. The Greek *aei* is a contraction, the original palatal consonant being lost, as in a thousand other words. It is also lost in the Latin *ævum* and *aetas*. So it is in most of the modern languages of the Teutonic family. In German, it is lost in *ew*, *ewig*, eternal; in the Dutch, *eeuwig*; the Danish, *evig*, and Swedish, *ewig*. The termination *ig*, is the same as occurs in other words, and which in English is generally contracted into *y*, as in *holy*; Saxon, *halig*. But in the Saxon, our parent language, we have it both contracted, and in its original form. It is seen in *ece*, eternal, contracted as *ea*, water is from *aqua*. But it occurs also in *eca*, eternal, and in *ecelice*, eternal, and in *ecnesse*, eternity, and all these are of one family, which belongs to the verb *ecan*, to increase, which is the English *eke*. Thus we find that the verb, the radix, signifies to increase, to extend; eternity then is *indefinite extension*. The application of the word depends on appropriation by usage. The sense of the verb being general, it may be, and is applied to limited periods, as in the Latin *aetas*, an age. So in regard to other words, the primary general sense has been restricted by usage. The Greek word *ora* signifies radically, *time* in general or season, but after men began to measure duration, it was used also for an *hour*. So the Latin word *ager*, a field indefinitely, has been limited by an English statute, and now we see the word in *acre*.

It will easily be seen, that as the human mind cannot comprehend *eternity* in duration, any more than it can infinite space, no word which men can form would express the whole idea. All that men can do, in this case, is to express their ideas by a word of *indefinite meaning*. And what better mode can men take to convey their *limited* ideas of what is *unlimited*, than to use a word which expresses *enlargement* or *extension*?

Eternity then is *unlimited extension in duration*; and that the Greek word above mentioned, is often used in that sense, is a fact which no critic can disprove, and no rational critic can deny.

The true principles of etymology are little understood; and with the books now generally used, and the course of studies now pursued, in the colleges and universities, both in Europe and America, these principles *cannot* be fully understood.

I close these remarks, by cautioning my fellow-citizens against placing much confidence in the etymologies of European writers, except such as refer English words to the languages, which may be considered as *modern*; the Greek, Latin, French, etc. The derivation of most words from these sources, is usually very obvious, and easily understood. No great research is necessary, to show, that *nation* is from the Latin *natio*, and this from *natus nascor*; or that *geography* is from the Greek *γη*, the earth, and *γραφη* description. But an attempt to proceed further, and deter-

mine what is the origin and primary sense of *nascor*, γη and γραφη requires a far more accurate knowledge of original languages, of the modes of expressing ideas, in early ages, and of deducing one signification or shade of meaning from another, than is possessed by learned men in general. Hence it is, that men very learned in other things, are far from being learned in etymology. The study of etymology is yet in its infancy.

ART. VII.—KAUFMAN'S TRANSLATION OF THOLUCK ON JOHN.

A Commentary on the Gospel of St. John. By A. THOLUCK, D. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Halle. Translated from the German, by REV. A. KAUFMAN, minister of the Episcopal church, Andover, Mass. Boston. 1836.

The most inartificial way of reviewing a book, is to begin with the title page, and to go through the work, page by page, to its conclusion. In the present instance we begin, inartificially, at the beginning; and we devote our attention not so much to Dr. Tholuck as to his translator.

Opening then at the title page of Mr. Kaufman's work, we notice a departure from the text of his author in the interpolation of the title "St." before the name of the apostle John. We believe that the Protestant German divines, whether Lutheran or Calvinist, whether rationalist or evangelical, agree in the omission of such prefixes. What reason, or religion is there in speaking of *St. John*, or *St. Paul*, or *St. Ignatius*, more than there would be in speaking of *St. Luther*, *St. Calvin*, or *St. Tholuck*. This exclusive application of a title which in the new testament is the common designation of all Christ's followers, may be a small thing in itself; but when it is thus foisted into the translation of a title page, it is not too small to be noticed.

On the same page we notice also the distinct annunciation of the fact, that the Rev. Mr. Kaufman is a "minister of the Episcopal church,"—a fact which may serve to explain not only the interpolated "St." but some other things which we may find as we proceed.

Turning over the leaf, we come to the "translator's preface." And here we read as follows:

'Professor Tholuck is so well known, and his writings are so universally appreciated by American scholars, that it is unnecessary to offer any apology for presenting the public with his annotations on the gospel of St. John, in an English dress. Irrespective of the fact, that these annotations come from his able pen, nothing is perhaps more wanted in the theological domain, than a good commentary on the gospels.'

Certainly no apology is necessary for presenting Tholuck's com-

mentary on John "in an English dress." But it is not too much to say, that the man who undertakes to translate a German theologian into English, ought to have at his command a pretty abundant vocabulary of good English words, and ought to understand how sentences are put together. "*Irrespective of the fact,*" etc. What is the meaning of *irrespective*? Such English sends us to the dictionary. If Mr. Kaufman will take his dictionary and grammar, and try to "parse" *irrespective*, he will probably find that it is, in the school-boy phrase, 'a word farther than he has studied.' "*Theological domain,*"—what is that? We can indeed guess at Mr. Kaufman's meaning. We presume he means that Tholuck is an able writer, and furthermore, that at present no book is more needed in theology than a good commentary on the gospels. But if that is what he means, why did he not say so?

A few lines below, we find this sentence.

'In commenting on St. John particularly—the Plato of the inspired circle—it requires a mind of a peculiar order.'

No man who understands English, will use the verb 'require,' as an impersonal verb. But we proceed with the quotation.

'This mind Tholuck possesses :—a happy combination of *deep* and meditative thought with a christian heart; a quick apprehension, a glowing imagination, an accurate acquaintance with language and a nice perception of its force, together with a clear insight into the spiritual nature of man. These characteristic excellencies are more or less exhibited in the work before us; and with these traits of excellence there is no man more interesting than our author upon the *theatre* [?] of Germany, nor indeed upon the literary arena of any nation. He stands forth pre-eminent among the learned ones of that learned people; he yields to none in versatility of mind, in *depth* and compass of thought, or in variety of knowledge. The principal languages of modern Europe he speaks with ease and fluency, as well as the Latin and Greek; with the oriental dialects he is familiar, and is, moreover, extensively read in the poetry and philosophy both of the east and west. His contributions to the theological and philosophical literature of his country have been very important, *having written and edited* a number of works rich in learning and *deep* in thought. Some of these, treating of oriental philosophy and theosophy, have met with the approbation of the Baron De Sacy, the most illustrious Arabic scholar in Europe.—But a luster is thrown over all these attainments by his *deep* and earnest piety.' pp. 4, 5.

Deep! deep! deep! Dr. Tholuck is a learned man, a man of genius, a man of unquestionable and fervent piety, a man pre-eminentely qualified to serve the church of God by his expositions of the holy scriptures; but to make him so unfathomably *deep*, is to create prejudices against him, and to warn off those readers who

are disposed to insist, that whatever is rational must be intelligible. We take leave to say therefore, that so far as we have examined his writings, there is far less in them of the unintelligible, the mystical, the puerile, than might be expected by one who knew only such specimens of transcendentalism as are furnished by some who on this side of the Atlantic attempt to be "deep," "deep," and talk about a higher philosophy and a higher consciousness, and all that sort of thing. It is possible, that our translator may have had some peculiar meaning in these reiterated assertions of his author's depth. We have been studying that sentence above, in which it is said in illustration of the importance of Tholuck's contributions to German literature, that they, the contributions aforesaid, have "written and edited a number of works rich in learning, and deep in thought." May it not be, that Mr. K's admiration of his author's profundity is grounded on this remarkable fact? If a man's contributions are so important as to have written and edited works deep in thought, what must the man himself be? No wonder, that deep answers to deep in the vain attempt to describe the qualities of such a man. Let us proceed to the next paragraph.

'Perhaps the strongest objection which can be urged against such commentators as Tholuck and Olshausen, is the fact that they give too much prominence to the *spiritual* aspect of religion and of our nature, to the almost total exclusion or suppression of the material and *outward*. They seem to forget that we are beings of a compound character, possessing our souls in material, sensuous bodies; and that the institutions of christianity are adapted to the latter as well as to the former. They seem to forget that the feelings and sentiments of the soul are oftentimes created or colored by the peculiar outward circumstances under which it has been reared; and that as a consequence, the religion which is designed for man in his present state, must have external rites and ordinances as well as inward feelings and hopes. Hence they seem to place too low in their estimation every thing of an external character; forgetful, meanwhile, of the intimate relationship which subsists between the inward and the outward, and of the almost absolute and controlling influence which the latter exerts over the former. These remarks might be fully exemplified by adducing what is said on the Ministry, on Baptism, on the Lord's Supper, and on the nature of external ordinances generally.' pp. 4, 5.

It is to be regretted, that "these remarks" were not "exemplified;" for then the reader might have made a guess at their meaning. If the meaning is, that Tholuck's commentaries are written on the idea, that man is a disembodied spirit, or that christianity has not, or need not have external rites and ordinances, we have only to say, that the remarks are all "fudge." If, on the other hand, Mr. Kaufman means to ascribe it to Tholuck, as a fault, that in a commentary on John, he has not inculcated the popish doc-

trine of the efficacy of sacraments, and has not reiterated the old common places about the unbroken succession and the duly constituted ministry,—then most readers will agree with us in saying, that the fault, if indeed it be a fault, is one which may be pardoned.

The writer next proceeds to argue, in what seems to us a very original method, for the importance of external ordinances, which, in his argument, make all the difference between China and England, nay between the Hottentot and the German Transcendentalist. “Why then,” he says, bringing the argument to a point:

‘Why then should we not regard the offices and sacraments of the church as the channels or golden conduits, through which the streams of the Spirit’s influence are made to flow into the heart? Or why should we hesitate to believe, *that* whilst an inward and direct power must be brought to act upon the apostate will, *that* these ordinances are yet most important media employed by the Spirit of God to operate upon the spirit of man? and that of a consequence they should be devoutly received, and every infringement upon them carefully avoided?’ pp. 5, 6.

Now it is possible, that all this means only what Paul meant, when he said, “How shall they believe on him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent?” But if this is the meaning, surely the writer has found out an unfortunate way of setting it forth. The apostles never say, “Of his own will begat he us by the offices and sacraments.” They never say, “Seeing ye have purified your hearts by receiving the offices and sacraments.” Nor did Christ say concerning his disciples, “Sanctify them through the offices and sacraments of the church.” Were we to find such language in the new testament, we should think it was designed to teach that external ceremonies rightly administered, have power to sanctify the soul. Finding it in the preface to Mr. Kaufman’s translation of Tholuck on John, we cannot but suspect, that the translator’s episcopacy is recent, and does not yet sit easily upon him. We proceed to another paragraph:

‘There are not wanting in our own country those who regard all external forms in religion as fit only for the human race in its infancy; but since it has thrown off its swathing bands, and stands forth matured in manhood, these are by them considered as mere trammels to the soul. They have outgrown, they tell us, the necessity of every thing formal in its character; they think themselves able to rise up to heaven by the energy of the Spirit alone.’ p. 6.

These despisers and rejecters of all that is outward, are surely the Quakers. We are at a loss to conceive of any other denomination of men in this land, to whom the description can be applied. And the reader will be at a loss to imagine what could induce

the translator of Tholuck to go out of his way in order to belabor Quakerism. We have not been informed, that the principles of George Fox are making any alarming progress among those readers to whom this commentary is likely to have access. If the writer means to intimate, that those who do not become Episcopalians, regard all external forms as mere trammels to the soul, the ingenuity of the insinuation is about equal to its ingenuousness.

The next paragraph begins thus:

‘The external ordinances of the church, are “the living creatures and the wheels” which the holy prophet saw in the visions of God that were given to him, whilst he sat among the captives by the river Chebar, when the heavens were opened. To humanity they are the Cherubim, on which “the living Spirit” is to sit enthroned, and by which it is to be upborne in its aspirations after God.’ pp. 6, 7.

The external ordinances of the church are “the living creatures, and the wheels”!—“They are the cherubim, on which the ‘living Spirit’ is to sit enthroned, and by which it is to be upborne in its aspirations after God”! To us, this is entirely unintelligible. We may presume therefore, that it is “deep.” Yet as we pause over this palpable obscure, we cannot but ask, Had the writer any meaning? If he had a meaning, was it a meaning too shadowy to be expressed? If his meaning was indeed inexpressible, why did he try to express it? If it was expressible, why did he not express it? And if a writer cannot set forth his own meaning, how shall he set forth the meaning of another man?

One more passage from this preface, and we will proceed to what is far better:

‘It is known that this work was originally announced under the name of Mr. Hermann Bokum. A train of circumstances which need not here be detailed, led to a transfer of the work from him to *its present hands*.’ p. 7.

The hands of a man, and the hands of a clock, are familiar expressions; but we never heard before, such a phrase as the hands of a book. Yet this most awkward expression occurs a second time in this brief paragraph.

Taking our leave of Mr. Kaufman’s prefatory disquisition, we find ourselves on the whole happily disappointed with his work as a translator. We have had occasion to compare the translation with the original in many passages; and we cheerfully testify to the general correctness of the version. Perhaps we might point out some blunders as when (p. 112.) in giving the English of a quotation from Calvin’s Latin, he renders Calvin’s *theologastri*, ‘belly theologues,’—a translation about as accurate as it would be to render *poetaster*, belly-poet. We might censure some strange liberties taken with the people’s English, as when he writes

"clumb," for climbed, which is worse than the vulgarism of *pled*, for pleaded. We might refer to some German idioms which have found their way into the translation, to perplex the English reader;—such as the rendering of the particle *schon* by the adverb *already*, in many an instance in which it were far better not to render it at all. But a faithful translation of such a work as Tholuck on John, which shall on the whole convey the meaning of the author, is truly a benefaction to ministers and students of theology, even though it is not quite so spirited and elegant as it would have been, had it come from the same pen that translated Herder's Spirit of Hebrew Poetry. Mr. Kaufman generally *sets over* the sentences of Tholuck into the vernacular, faithfully if not elegantly, like a man who understands German well enough for the purpose, and English tolerably well; and when the untranscendental reader is compelled to pause, and to wish for a commentary upon the commentary, we suspect, that in many instances, the author rather than the translator, is responsible for the obscurity.

We would not undervalue or lead others to undervalue, Tholuck's commentary on John. We have used it in some recent studies on this gospel, with equal pleasure and advantage; and we do most earnestly recommend it to all pastors and students who desire to enrich their minds with enlarged and spiritual views of the doctrines and the character of Jesus Christ. Yet we are far from acknowledging, that Tholuck with all his learning and genius, and with all his piety, is a guide whom it is safe to follow implicitly. The reader who is to receive his opinions on the mere authority of his commentary, without distinctly understanding what those opinions are, or on what grounds they rest, ought rather to resign himself to the guidance of Doddridge or of Henry. The sound sense and satisfactory learning of the one, and the sober old fashioned piety of the other, will never lead him far astray.

The excellencies of Tholuck as a commentator on the scriptures, are obvious. In respect to philology, he is learned, exact, ingenious; and yet he makes far less parade of critical learning, than most of his brethren. Where a rational doubt can be raised respecting the meaning of a word, he gives his opinion and his reasons,—where the reader can be supposed to need information, he gives it; often his minute attention detects in the grammatical form or construction of a word, some shade of meaning which others have overlooked; yet he does not, like many commentators, overload his pages with mountains of information and disquisition which nobody needs, and which too often serve to perplex rather than to enlighten. Let us compare him with Kuinoel in a single passage.

We open to John iv. 1-3. On this passage Tholuck's comments are as follows:

‘The labors of John the Baptist, which were always restricted within the limits of the old testament service, did not appear to the Pharisaic Jews to offer any hostility to their attachment to the law. Nevertheless, he had laid open their hypocrisy so earnestly, Matt. iii. 7, that they felt by no means favorably inclined towards him. Nothing but the general authority which he enjoyed on account of his strict adherence to the law, had prevented them from giving expression to their hostile disposition, Matt. xxi. 26. He had now been thrown into prison by Herod. But Jesus appeared in his place, a man who reproved hypocrisy much more strongly, Matt. xxiii. 1–31, who also subjected himself much less to the outward human enactments of those learned in the scripture:—his hearers increased. (The *praes. ποιῶν* and not the imperf. because at that time the thing had not yet ceased, Viger, p. 214.) This disquieted those members of the Sanhedrim who were of a Pharisaic disposition. They persecuted Jesus. But as he knew that he had not then arrived at the end of his labors, he leaves Judea, in order to escape from their persecutions. It seems that but few Pharisees resided in Galilee.’ p. 123.

This is all the philology which Tholuck deems it necessary to expend upon so simple a piece of history. On the same passage, Kuinoel expends nearly two large pages of solid Latin. He first shows, that κύριος is often a name of honor, and in the present instance, synonymous with διδάσκαλος; and he refers for proof to what he has said on Matt. xxi. 3. In a similar style he shows, that *φαρασαῖος* means the members of the council belonging to the sect of Pharisees. Then he asserts that ἤκουσαν means ‘had heard with indignation.’ He states, that John had been imprisoned by Herod; and is very full in respect to the estimation in which John was held by the Pharisees, and the reasons why they were alarmed at the movements of Jesus. He says, that the use of the noun Ἰησοῦς instead of the pronoun αὐτός is a Hebraism, and refers to a work of Storr to prove it; at the same time he proves it to be very good Greek, by referring to another learned writer. On the word βαπτίζει, he remarks, that Jesus was said to baptize, because his disciples baptized under his direction; and he tells us how Chrysostom says, that those who carried this report to the Pharisee chiefs, lied, saying that Jesus himself baptized, in order to make the thing more odious. In explanation of the record that Jesus himself baptized not, he gives several obvious reasons why the Savior chose to commit that function to his disciples. On the third verse, he says, that Jesus, after having thrown out the rudiments of his doctrine in Judea, prudently withdrew from the Pharisees, who were ready to lay violent hands upon him, because he knew that the time for him to die had not yet come;—and departed into Galilee, because there the authority of the Pharisees was not so great as at Jerusalem.

Now to us, not a little of this minute criticism seems to have been written for its own sake, rather than for the sake of the text. Tholuck, as quoted above, omits nothing which seems important to the illustration of the passage, and introduces nothing which does not bear upon that purpose.

Another of this commentator's merits is, he seems to know, that the sensibilities of the mind to what is beautiful and to what is grand or tender, are necessary to the right performance of his work. As you read, you soon become conscious of being under the guidance of a man whose quick imagination realizes whatever is described, and who has feelings, that respond to all the sublimity, and all the tenderness in this most wonderful writing. How unlike to all this is Kuinoel, cold, dry, hard, unfeeling.

But the great contrast between Tholuck and other German commentators with whom American students are acquainted, is yet to be mentioned. Kuinoel and all the tribe of which he may be regarded as the prince, seem to proceed continually upon the idea, that there is nothing extraordinary in the books they are attempting to explain. Thus, under their comments, the strong impressions which the language of the new testament makes upon an unsophisticated mind, are continually explained away. Tholuck, on the other hand, proceeds on the idea, that these books contain vast and momentous truths, truths from the bosom of God, truths which, if rightly apprehended, are light and life to the ruined soul. He goes to his work therefore reverently. He sits at the feet of Jesus, or listens to the inspired disciples, with a believing and adoring mind. Such a mind alone can enter fully into the meaning of that which is written, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but in the words which the Holy Spirit teacheth. Thus while most German commentaries tend to scepticism, the tendency of Tholuck's is to devotion and faith.

Why then do we qualify and limit our commendations of this writer? Because we find him wanting in that strong, clear English good sense which characterizes such writers as Doddridge. We find in him a vein of mysticism, exceedingly likely to bewilder young men of an imaginative and dreamy temper;—for example, he says, that in Christ, "that inward light which constitutes the living substratum of every human spirit, appeared impersonated among men." (p. 70.) We find him distinctly affirming, that the doctrine of correspondences as held by Swedenborg and the allegorizing Cabbalists, is right in principle. (pp. 357, 358.) We find him even referring to the charlatanry of animal magnetism, for an illustration of the mode in which "the supernatural energies of Christ" operated in his miracles of healing. The want of sound instinctive good sense, is a want which no wealth of learning, no splendor of genius, no attractiveness of piety, can fully supply.

On the whole, however, we are glad to see Prof. Tholuck introduced to the American public as a commentator ; and are truly sorry, that he has not the advantage of a more favorable introduction. If the translator will expunge his preface from such copies as remain unsold, and if he will ask some intelligent friend familiar with English to look over his next edition, his book will be better, and Prof. Tholuck and the public will be obliged to him.

ART. VII.—MENDON ASSOCIATION AND HOPKINSIANISM.

Franklin, Mass., April 27, 1836.

To the Conductors of the Christian Spectator.

GENTLEMEN,—You have been pleased, as a matter of courtesy, to give my letter respecting the views of Mendon Association on moral agency, an insertion in the last No. of your Quarterly. For this “courtesy” on your part, you will accept our thanks. Whether your remarks on that letter are courteous or otherwise, I will not here say. The following statements may enable your numerous readers to determine.

The members of Mendon Association were quietly pursuing “the even tenor of their way,” preaching the doctrine of repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and enforcing the *ability of man to perform his whole duty*, when, without provocation on their part and altogether unexpectedly, they found themselves classed, in a respectable and popular periodical of the day, with “the fatalists;” and were represented as denying that man has power to be the real author of his own moral actions. Knowing this to be a palpable misrepresentation of their views on this important point, and feeling that it was calculated to circumscribe their influence and impair their usefulness, by holding them up in an odious attitude before the christian public, could they consistently be silent, and thus implicitly assent to this false representation? Had it been right for them, to permit this gratuitous attack upon their theological character—and hence ministerial usefulness—to pass without rebuke or notice? The Scribe of that association thought not; accordingly transmitted to the conductors of said periodical a correction of the misrepresentation which they had been instrumental of sending forth to the christian world. He supposed, that an explicit denial of the accuracy of their representation coupled with an unequivocal statement, that his brethren believe precisely *the opposite* of the sentiment charged upon them, would be sufficient to show “the Conductors,” that they had entirely mistaken the views of Mendon Association on the point of moral agency, and of course misrepresented them. It was no part of his object to provoke controversy; and hence, it was a matter

of no little surprise to him, to find in the last No. of that publication some five or six pages of remarks appended to his short letter. Whether those remarks are more or less accordant with truth and facts, than the misrepresentation which called forth that letter, may appear in the sequel.

You acknowledge, gentlemen, that the language which we use respecting human freedom and responsibility is *susceptible* of a meaning which would render it certain, that we have no more claim to companionship with fatalists, than yourselves. But you have endeavored to make it appear, that while we "use the words *power, action, author, etc.*" we do not employ them in their usual, appropriate signification, but in a sense 'by which we ourselves have been misled, and by which others have been not a little perplexed.' To do this, you have appealed to Dr. Stephen West, whom you represent as "the father of the divine efficiency scheme in this country." And after making several extracts from his work on Moral Agency, you have appended to them the following exclamations: "The *action of a man* denotes *only* a certain mode of his existence—a mere *accident* of which man is the *subject*! The mind is merely *fitted* to become the subject of certain effects produced by an influence from *without itself*! This is the *whole idea of power* which can be predicated of any *mere creature*! Man has no power to *operate* or act, but merely a power to be *wrought upon*; he *exerts* no influence, but is only the *subject* of it!" etc.

Now in answer to all this we have only to say, that while we venerate the name of Dr. Stephen West, as that of a distinguished theologian and able minister of Jesus Christ, we do not claim or admit, that he is our theological father. True, we believe many things in common with him; and so we believe many things in common with Pres. Edwards, or Dr. Dwight, or Dr. Hopkins. But we do not believe all, that either of these celebrated divines have taught. We do *not* believe what the extracts which you have made from Dr. West's writings seem to teach—that *passive power* is the *only* power which can be predicated of the human mind. Even Dr. Emmons, of whom you speak as "the ablest defender of the divine-efficiency scheme in this country," would deny this as promptly as yourselves. There is not a member in our association, that has any more sympathy for that sentiment, than have the "Conductors of the Christian Spectator." This assertion is not thrown out at random; but is made advisedly. When we use the term *power*, we *mean* power, in its strict and proper acceptation. When we employ the terms "action, author," we *mean* action, author. We say a man has *power* to choose. We mean by this, not simply that he has the "passive power," or susceptibility of being wrought upon and having choice produced in him, but that he is really able, or actually has the

power without compulsion or constraint, to choose for himself in view of the motives apprehended by the intellect. It is our belief, that man, being created in the image of God, is as free in his choice, and has the same power *in kind* to choose, as his Maker; that before he can be deprived of this power, he must be divested of the *intellectual* as well as *moral* image of his Creator, the *essential elements of his nature* must be taken from him. In other words, he is essentially "*unmade*," or he is no longer a moral and accountable agent, if he has not the power, and *all* the power, requisite to choose in view of moral motives. True, he is a *dependent* moral agent, while God is *independent*. True, it is in God he 'lives, moves, and has his being.' No doubt 'it is God who worketh in him to will and to do of his good pleasure;' but then it is himself who is capacitated to 'work out his own salvation with fear and trembling.' And in order to do this he must, as we believe and contend, have the power—we do not say, *of being made* to repent, and love, and believe—but *actually to perform* the conditions of salvation.*

From these statements you will perceive, 'that while we predicate of man the *word* power, we also predicate *the thing*, and do not deny that he has it even in the least degree.' You will perceive, that your illustration of the 'man who affirms, that the African race are black, and then explains himself to mean by the term, *not black, but white*,' can have no manner of application to those for whom it was intended. You will also see, that we believe as firmly as you, that man's acts are his own acts;—that his love, repentance, faith, etc. are *his own, truly, properly, strictly*; that they are as really and essentially his own, as the acts of the Creator and *his own acts*. Hence your questions, "Does a being act, when the whole truth is, that he is merely *acted upon*? Is that an act of a being or thing who does not act? Can God cause a being to act, who has not power to act? Can he cause non-entity to act? Can he be the sole agent in an act, and man be an agent in the same act?" receive as decided and hearty a negative from us, as from yourselves. We have no hesitance in subscribing to your proposition, "that the *necessary conception of an act of a being, involves in itself, as an essential element, the conception of active power in that being*."

* Should it please you to accompany this letter with any remarks in your next No. allow us to solicit answers to the following questions: Is man, or is he not, a *dependent* moral agent? Has he, or has he not, the power to choose *independently* of any influence *ab-extra*? Is he free and accountable *no farther* than he *acts independently*? Is he dependent for his existence and the preservation of his mental powers merely, and independent as it respects his choice? These questions, varied as they are in phraseology, contemplate one and the same fundamental principle in theology; and an unequivocal, unambiguous statement of your views respecting this principle, will oblige us.

Such, gentlemen, is an explicit avowal of our sentiments on the great point in question. We hold no opinions respecting the *divine agency* or *efficiency*, which militate against the views above presented. We call no man our master, or theological guide, who denies the truth of these sentiments, or whose writings cannot be fairly construed so as to support them. We are fully aware, that you may find statements in the works of Drs. West and Hopkins, which seem not to coincide with what we have advanced in this letter. But these eminent theologians were never members of Mendon Association; and we hold ourselves responsible for their sentiments, no farther than they accord with the sentiments herein expressed. We are also aware, that you may point us to expressions in the writings of Dr. Emmons,—on whom, perhaps, you have had your eye as a corps du reserve,—which, at first view, may appear to be otherwise than accordant with the foregoing exposition of our belief. But Dr. Emmons by no means harmonizes with Dr. West, in the extracts which you have made from the latter. And, although he has made use of some strong language to express his views of divine efficiency—such as “God moved, hardened, caused,” etc.—yet it may be questioned, whether he has employed any stronger language on this point, than the inspired penman; and it is certain that he denies explicitly, any intention of ever asserting what would militate in the least, against “the intrinsic power of every moral agent to be really and truly the author of his own moral actions.” But suppose he had made assertions of this kind. Suppose he had dwelt so much on divine efficiency, as to throw human freedom and accountableness into the shade. Nay, more; suppose he had advanced sentiments which cannot possibly be made to harmonize with man’s possession of *active power*. What then? Are all the members of an association to be charged with holding sentiments which they publicly and explicitly disavow? Nay which, as a body, they hold in utter abhorrence!

We repeat it, gentlemen, we call no man our master, or theological guide, who denies the truth of the sentiments expressed in this letter, or whose writings cannot be fairly construed so as to support them. Have we not, then, reason for saying that we have been *unfairly* classed in your publication with “the fatalists?” Since we “affirm, not the self-determining power of the will, but the intrinsic power of every moral agent to be really and truly the author of his own moral actions,”—since we do “admit,” and are ready to advocate, “the *active*, and not merely *passive*, power of the mind,” is it right to proclaim to the religious community, that we agree with the fatalists,—not designedly, perhaps, but really,—in subverting “the moral responsibility of man?” Have we not good reason to expect, that the preceding exposition of our views,

will secure in your next number, a fulfilment of the promise, "we will confess our mistake?"

Yours respectfully,

E. SMALLEY, Scribe of Mendon Ass.

On the above communication we wish to make a few remarks.

1. We would inquire of Mr. Smalley, whether we are to consider his letter as an official document forwarded by direction of the Mendon Association. Does he make the avowals and denials which it contains at their request, and as acting for them? We observe, that the letter is signed E. Smalley, Scribe of Mendon Association. Are we to understand this designation subjoined by himself, as officially authorized? Or is it merely the communication of an individual who is the Scribe of that association, stating what are his views and his impressions respecting the opinions of his brethren? This is a question of some importance to us; especially as we see no evidence, that this letter has ever been submitted to the other members of the association. We might, as we conceive, without any violation of courtesy, decline publishing the letter of an individual, while we might feel under more obligation to notice an official document. By the letter itself it seems, that he and his brethren do not agree with what have generally been considered their standard authorities. How can we be any more sure that his brethren will entirely accord with his statements and views? Such, indeed, are his impressions. But what evidence have we, that they may not disclaim what he has avowed for them, or avow what he has denied, and as a matter of justice require us to publish such a disclaimer? We cannot be sure, that in publishing his letter, we are authorized to consider its opinions as those of Mendon Association as a body. Has there been any meeting of that body, or even a majority of them, with reference to this subject? The most that we can do, then, is to take it as the opinion of one who has had opportunities of becoming acquainted with their sentiments, and who claims to speak for them; for he has not furnished us with a particle of evidence, that they have authorized him to publish what they do, or do not believe, or that they will consider themselves bound by his disclaimers. Mr. Smalley is, no doubt, honest in his belief; but we apprehend he did not perceive the delicate situation in which he was placing himself, or the discourtesy there would be in urging the publication of a private communication, as if it was forwarded in an official capacity, as scribe of Mendon Association.

2. Our inquiry in the original article which gave offence to Mr. Smalley, referred to the *Hopkinsians* of the Mendon Association. Now if there are no Hopkinsians belonging to Mendon Association, we were in an error in supposing that there were. Or if Mr.

Smalley and any of his brethren disclaim Hopkins as an authority, of course, they cannot feel themselves aggrieved by any remarks which place Hopkinsians in such an unfortunate juxtaposition with fatalists. One cardinal point of Hopkinsianism, properly so called, is this, that God, by direct efficiency, produces the volitions of men, sinful as well as holy. We supposed, that this doctrine was decidedly maintained by Dr. Emmons, and other members of Mendon Association. Are we now to understand, that this association unanimously wish to disclaim this doctrine, and to be no longer regarded as Hopkinsians? We wish to ask, and we hope if any answer is given, it will be an official one,—Do *all* the members of Mendon Association disclaim the doctrine of divine efficiency as taught by West, Hopkins, and Emmons? Are none of them Hopkinsians, or Emmonsites, properly so called? If so, we shall rejoice in the fact, and own our mistake. But if some of them maintain the doctrine of divine efficiency, as taught either by Dr. West, Dr. Hopkins, or Dr. Emmons, we cannot see how we have misrepresented their opinion. What says Dr. Emmons? Does he not constantly assert, that no created being can possess power to act in and of himself—‘that men are in such a sense, *dependent* agents, that all their exercises, or actions, *must originate from a divine efficiency*,’—‘that we can no more *act*, than we can *exist*, without the constant *influence* of the Deity,—that moral exercises, both sinful and holy, flow from a divine operation upon the mind of a moral agent, and not from a natural faculty enabling him to originate his own internal exercises,’—that there must be the exercise of divine agency in every human action,—‘that mind *cannot act*, any more than matter can *move*, without a divine agency,’—and that ‘God is and must be the author of all human volitions, by his direct creative efficiency.’

Such are the opinions of Dr. Emmons, and as we believe, of other members of the Mendon Association. What, then, is the question? Not whether *all* the members of this association hold these opinions,—not whether those who do hold them, do not also hold other and contradictory opinions. But the question is, whether Dr. Emmons and other members of Mendon Association, do not hold *these* opinions? Do they not hold, that it is impossible, in the nature of things, that God should create an agent having power to act, or to originate action, in view of motives, without the extrinsic agency of God producing his acts? If so,—and to what less than the affirmation of this, do the positions of Dr. Emmons amount,—if so, to what purpose is it to say, that man has all the power requisite to choice,—that by power, they mean *power*,—that man is *really able*, or has the *power*, to choose for himself,—to what purpose is it to say all this? We have not denied, that they may and do assert the plainest contradictions. It is no concern

of ours, whether they do or not. The question is, whether they do not maintain, that God does, and must, from the necessity of nature, produce every human volition, by his own direct agency? that the human mind *cannot act*, any more than matter *can move*, without a divine agency? If to say these things, is not denying, "that man has *all* the power *requisite* to choice"—"that he has the intrinsic power to be really and truly the author of his own moral actions," we wish to be told, how it can be denied. How a being, who *cannot* act without divine agency, can possess *all the power requisite* to action; how man can be the author of those exercises or acts, which God, by his direct efficiency creates,—needs explanation.

3. As to the courteousness of our remarks, as well as those of the letter, we willingly leave our readers to judge. We are not aware of having intended any thing uncourteous, or of having done wrong in stating the grounds on which we felt, and do still feel, that the Hopkinsian views of divine efficiency in the production of human volitions, are liable to objections. We apprehend, that it would be an unheard of thing, to publish such a letter without some comments, nor could the writer (especially if he is to be considered as speaking merely as an individual, and not in an official capacity,) with the strictest regard to the courtesies of life between christian brethren, expect us to do so. We have no wish to wound the feelings of any; but when our candor, if not veracity, is called in question, it becomes us to exonerate ourselves from the charge. It is in the same spirit, that we propose now to continue our remarks. Let our mistakes, if we err, be corrected; but why call in question our intentions?

4. There are parts in the above letter, which we find it utterly impossible to reconcile with other parts of it. Thus it is said, in stating the belief of the Hopkinsians of Mendon Association, "that man has the same power in *kind* to choose, as his Maker, that before he can be divested of that power, he must be divested of the *intellectual* as well as moral image of his Creator,—the *essential elements of his nature* must be taken from him. In other words, he is essentially "unmade," or he is no longer a moral and accountable agent, if he has not the power, and *all the power requisite* to choose in view of moral motives." All this is well: we give it our most hearty concurrence. But how shall we reconcile it with what follows. "True he is a *dependent* moral agent, while God is *independent*." If this sentence mean any thing to the purpose, it means, that man is *dependent as a moral agent*. Has man, then, we ask, the same power in *kind* with his Maker? Is *dependent* moral agency the same in *kind* with *independent* moral agency? As a sort of explanatory addition, as well as scriptural proof, the passage in Phil. ii. 12, 13, is referred to. Great stress is laid, by

the advocates of the divine-efficiency scheme, on the word here translated "*worketh in them to will, etc.*," as if their views were thereby most triumphantly established. But does not the bible also speak with equal explicitness of yet another agent, who worketh (the same original word, *εργαζω*) in the children of disobedience? Does Satan then by a positive, direct efficiency, *create* sinful volitions in men? And yet does God also *create* them?

We have been requested, in a note to the above letter, to answer some queries; and as the subject now naturally arises, we may as well discuss this point in our present remarks. The question which heads the list, is one which admits of different answers, according to the aspect in which it is viewed. We may take the last query, however, as rendering it somewhat less indefinite. "Is he [man] dependent for the existence and the preservation of his mental powers merely, and independent as respects his choice?" We lay out of question here the case of regeneration, in which we are agreed, that the sinner, not as a moral agent, but through his perverseness in sin, is dependent on the influence of the Holy Spirit, for all holy affections or volitions. But the question now under consideration, relates only to the requisites of moral agency; and viewed in this light, we have no hesitation in answering it in the affirmative. But what is meant by "power to choose *independently* of any influence *ab extra*," as it is expressed in another question? Is it meant to exclude what is sometimes called the influence of motives; or is it merely the object to exclude a divine efficiency? We wish, that our querist had put his question in a somewhat more intelligible shape. Perhaps, however, we can arrive at the desired answer, by some further considerations. For this purpose, let us refer to the question as applied to the divine mind. Has *God* or has he not "the power to choose *independently* of any influence," that is, efficiency "*ab extra*?" Of course we do not mean *sustaining* influence out of himself. Let our querist also answer another question. Does God ever act except in view of motives? Have motives *any* influence on the divine mind? Can he be truly independent *ab extra*, thus acting in view of motives? Must not a power, the same in *kind* also, act in the same manner, when once it has begun to exist? The whole question is brought within a very narrow compass. It is simply nothing more or less than this; Can God *create* agents, who when created and sustained, can act without his continued efficiency, literally producing their voluntary acts. We claim that he can: and that there can be no moral agency in man, unless he possess such power. We suppose the writer of the letter, with his brethren of Mendon Association, would deny such a view of man's moral agency. God can originate his own acts in view of motives; or in other words, he *acts* in view of motives. So we

believe, that man can originate his own acts in view of motives ; not that he determines to choose, according to the old and exploded doctrine of the self-determining power of the will. But he is created with a faculty called will, which can act without any efficiency from God, and which without any other divine aid than sustaining and preserving power,—in view of motives, invariably chooses wrong, till an influence from God, distinct from that of motives, secures a right choice. We maintain therefore, that man has the same power in *kind* with his Maker, being made in this respect, after the similitude of God. But Mr. Smalley professes for himself and brethren, to make an essential difference. “Man is a *dependent*, God is an *independent* moral agent.” Either here is a mere ambiguity of language, or a difference in *kind* in the power, is ascribed to man and to his Maker. We are glad to see, that the idea of mere passive power is disclaimed as absurd. But we cannot yet perceive how there can be active power in man, when a direct divine efficiency is necessary literally to create his volitions. Active power, if it be any thing, is power adequate to act. To say then, that there is active power which cannot act without divine agency, is to say that there is power adequate to act, which is not adequate to act,—power to act which cannot act. According to our views of the subject also, under this creative agency of God, the mind of man can possess no power to act otherwise,—no adequate power to exercise any other volition, than that which God creates. Every human volition is the direct product of a divine creating energy. It takes place, by a necessity, which as truly excludes the moral agency of man, as it is excluded from non-entity.

We know, that the scripture uses the terms *create* and *creation*, in a figurative or secondary import, with reference to the moral change called regeneration. But the advocates of the divine-efficiency scheme, if we can understand them, use the terms in their literal and primary meaning ; and thus maintain, that man is the agent or doer of those acts, which God creates by his direct efficiency. But our object is not now, to determine the biblical doctrine. On that point, see *Christian Spectator* for December, 1835. We simply maintain, that to exhibit man as an agent or doer in those things which God creates by direct efficiency, is a philosophical absurdity.

We have long supposed, that Hopkinsian writers confound the following things in their reasonings,—the dependence of man as a sinner, on divine influence for holiness, with dependence as a moral agent ; and dependence as a moral agent, with dependence as a creature, for continued existence. Because man is dependent as a *sinner*, for holiness, through the perverseness of his own will ; nor because he is dependent as a creature, for continued being,

does it follow, that he is dependent as a moral agent. And why the latter dogma,—why the impossibility, that mind should act without divine agency, should be so confidently maintained, without proof, or even an attempt at proof, we are at a loss to decide. We have supposed indeed, that this doctrine has been resorted to, as the only adequate basis of the certainty of human action. The mistake lies, in not perceiving, that the acts of the most independent agent which can be conceived, are as truly certain before they exist, as the acts of an agent who is dependent in the most absolute sense. On this ground, while we maintain that man as a *moral agent*, possesses in and of himself, the power to originate his own moral acts, we also maintain the certainty of all human action.

To conclude,—we are not satisfied, that there are no Hopkinsians, properly so called, in the Mendon Association. Dr. Emmons, we know is a member of that body, and though Mr. Smalley intimates, that the writings of Dr. Emmons may appear in some instances not to harmonize with his statements, he is very careful to express no dissent from the opinions of this distinguished divine. Let this be done,—let the Mendon Association say, that they wholly dissent from the views of Dr. Emmons, on the point in question, and it will be something to the purpose. Let Mr. Smalley say this, and we shall begin to suspect that we are in the wrong. But as the case now stands, we are only confirmed in the accuracy of our statements. We are so, by Mr. Smalley's own declarations. Correct as we deem many of the views of truth, which he has expressed,—as when he says, 'that man has *all* the power *requisite* to choice,' yet when he represents him also as a dependent moral agent, meaning,—if he means any thing to the purpose,—that he has not power to act without divine agency to produce his acts, or as his question clearly implies, dependent "as it respects his choice;" we cannot doubt, that Mr. Smalley holds substantially the very opinion, which we regard as objectionable. For what can be plainer than this, to wit,—if the agency of God is requisite, so far as power is concerned, to produce an act of choice in man, then man has not *all* the power requisite to an act of choice. Until then, it shall be shown, that man has *all* the power *requisite* to an act of choice, while he is in such a sense dependent on God, that he has *not all* the power *requisite* to an act of choice without the agency of God,—we see not how, according to Mr. Smalley's own statements of man's dependence, we are required "to confess our mistake."